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Summary
Electronic money innovations (such as card-based, mobile-phone-based or com-
puter-based electronic money) are the most visible signs of far-reaching in-
stitutional change in economy-wide payment systems worldwide. Technologi-
cal progress is increasingly intertwined with new products, new market en-
trants and new governance structures in payment systems. This research re-
port focuses on the impact of these changes on monetary policy. A number of
questions emerge in this context and are tackled in the report: How are the op-
eration of alternative means of payment (e.g. payment services by non-banks
such as mobile telecom operators) linked to central banks and how does that
affect monetary policy? How does institutional change in payments system af-
fect the stability and predictability of the demand for central bank money? Will
the decrease of demand for money lead to a moneyless world? Is there a role
for monetary policy in a world without central bank money?
In the introductory chapter, Stefan W. Schmitz and Geoffrey E. Wood outline
the theoretical framework and the set of diverse but complementary meth-
odological approaches which are applied in the research project. Furthermore,
they provide an overview of institutional change in economy-wide payments
systems. The analysis of data concerning retail and wholesale payment sys-
tems in the Euro area, the UK, and the US shows pronounced institutional
variation. Policy initiatives and changing demand by banks and final customers
are seen as the main drivers of institutional change. New payment instruments
and payment service providers, the move to Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS)
and increasing electronification are the most visible indicators of this institu-
tional change. Electronification and alternative means of payment are expected
to lead to a steeper payment pyramid: the ratio of central bank (CB) money to
total value of payments decreases. This development is giving rise to concerns
about the future role of money in general and CB money in particular in econ-
omy-wide payments systems. Institutional change affects monetary policy by
its impact on demand for CB money and on the efficacy of monetary policy
implementation at a given demand for CB money. CBs have a large range of
instruments at their discretion to react to and to influence institutional change
in the payment system. They are heavily involved in the legal and political
process shaping the broad legislative framework concerning payment instru-
ments, and they have been transferred substantial regulatory power within the
broad legislative framework. In addition, CBs can adapt the instruments of
monetary policy implementation and their own payment system policies to cope
with institutional change in the payment system.
Lawrence H. White applies an economic history approach and argues that
in the United States as in Europe, payments-system innovations continue (as
they have done for centuries) to promote the substitution of alternative pay-
ment media for direct use of base money. Though no revolution is evident, the
real demand for central-bank-issued currency may shrink relative to transac-
tions volume and to demand for broader monetary aggregates. In some re-
spects, though no trend is evident in the United States, central-bank-issued
deposit liabilities may be challenged as a medium for settling interbank flows.
The central bank’s power to influence nominal variables is not proportional to
the size of its balance sheet. Shrinkage of the central bank’s balance sheet will
therefore not usher in a new era in which monetary policy has no effect, either
for good or for ill.
Forrest H. Capie, Dimitrios P. Tsomocos and Geoffrey E. Wood set out the
argument that money evolved to reduce transaction costs by economising on
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information. They develop a formal model in which money exists by virtue of
that property, and compare the costs of operating a fiat money system with the
costs of operating a system of electronic barter. The key cost parameters are
identified. They show that within this framework fiat money dominates – is
cheaper than – electronic barter, unless inflation drives up the nominal inter-
est rate. Secondly, increases in the number of commodities increase the costs
of electronic barter faster than they do the costs of using fiat money; and fi-
nally that the lower bound to the cost of using fiat money is always below that
of electronic barter. Thus fiat money is a superior transaction technology to
electronic barter; transaction chains that use it have intrinsically lower infor-
mation requirements. The resulting demand for fiat money by the non-bank
public will in turn give rise to demand by the banking sector. Their joint de-
mands will ensure both that central banks survive, and that they will retain con-
trol of a price level measured in the money they issue. Institutional change in
the payments system will no doubt have quantitative implications for central
bank operations, but it will not have qualitative implications for them.
Based on a critical assessment of the literature on electronic money and mone-
tary policy, Stefan W. Schmitz demonstrates that many of the models on the
effects of payment innovations on monetary policy assume an institutional struc-
ture of the monetary system that involves the separation of the unit of account
from the generally accepted medium of exchange (GAME). His analysis shows
that these models lack an analysis of the institutional structure of the payment
systems, i.e. the mechanisms of price formation and that nominal prices in the
unit of account presuppose the direct or indirect exchange of goods for the
GAME, which embodies the unit of account in competitive markets. Until the
world economy resembles the Arrow-Debreu model, transaction costs will re-
main positive and a GAME – which also fulfils the function of the uniform
unit of account – will further reduce transaction costs relative to an economy
without a GAME. The institutional structure is likely to involve redeemability
of eMonies in the GAME and the respective uniform unit of account will pre-
vail in the economy. The CB is likely to maintain its monopoly in the provi-
sion of the GAME and the unit of account at zero marginal costs. Neverthe-
less, the ongoing institutional change in the payments system – at the retail and
the wholesale level – will necessitate adaptations of monetary statistics and of
the instruments and the implementation of monetary policy, a challenge CBs
have proved able to cope with quite successfully so far.
In his contribution on monetary policy in a world without central bank money,
Stefan W. Schmitz argues that many papers attempting to discuss monetary
policy without CB money turn out to assume that the CB maintains a monop-
oly in the provision of the GAME and the medium of final settlement on closer
inspection of the implicit institutional structure of the monetary system pre-
sented. Unfortunately, they do not make the institutional structure explicit, i.e.
the money market, the existence of a GAME and a medium of final settlement
are rarely discussed in detail. The models are, thus, incomplete and inconsis-
tent. The efficacy of monetary policy is discussed solely from the perspective
of the monopoly provision of the GAME and the medium of final settlement
by the CB, at zero marginal costs. It does not take into account the regulatory
authority of CBs. In contrast, his paper provides a conceptualisation of mone-
tary policy in a world without CB money based on a GAME that also serves
as medium of final settlement. CBs can implement monetary policy by impos-
ing reserve requirements in terms of the medium of final settlement and by
paying or charging interest thereon. These instruments are independent of the
monopoly of CBs in providing the GAME at zero costs at the margin. The
smaller set of instruments and particularly the loss of control over the aggre-
gate supply of the medium of final settlement impair the power of CBs to con-
tain the volatility of the target rate. Politico-economic objections to this insti-
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tutional framework also apply to the current practice of transferring regula-
tory powers and substantial discretion to CBs. Indeed, the current legal frame-
works of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Fed hardly need to be
adapted. They already confer the necessary regulatory authority to CBs to con-
duct monetary policy based on the proposed instruments of implementation in
a world without money.
In a case study of the effects of the Austrian eMoney scheme Quick on mone-
tary policy Stefan W. Schmitz demonstrates how CBs can limit the detrimen-
tal impact of the diffusion of payments innovation on monetary policy imple-
mentation. Reporting requirements, redeemability requirements, and minimum
reserve requirements are the main instruments that are applied in the case un-
der consideration. While the details of the institutional structure of the scheme
differ from schemes in other EU countries, the legal framework is largely de-
fined by the EU eMoney directive 2000/46/EC and by the ECB’s instruments
of monetary policy implementation.
The results can be summarised in the following manner: First, by whatever
mode of analysis used, it emerged that fiat CB money would not be wholly re-
placed by any form of electronic money currently envisaged. Most of the pay-
ment innovations are linked to CB money at some point. There is no evidence
that they significantly reduce the ability of CBs to predict the demand for CB
money in LVPS and the money market. Second, developments which have in
the past, and may in the future, have improved or will improve the robustness
or the efficiency of payments systems have not had and are not expected to
have fundamentally damaging effects on the ability of central banks to control
monetary conditions.

1 Institutional Change in the
Payment System and its Impact on
Monetary Policy – An Introduction
Stefan W. Schmitz and Geoffrey E. Wood
1.1 Introduction
The report presents the results of a research project on the interdependence
between institutional change in the payments system and monetary policy.
Monetary policy has been at the centre of economic research from the early
stages of economic thought, but payment system research has attracted in-
creased academic attention only in the past decade or so. This report’s contri-
bution consists of merging these two so far largely separated fields. It initiates
research on the interdependence of institutional change in the payments sys-
tem and monetary policy. (A neglected but instructive contribution to this field
of study is the work of John Wheatley who emphasised the interrelation
between payment systems and monetary policy at the beginning of the 19th
century.1)
We are exploring the inevitable tension between the central bank’s desire to
control the monetary system – in order to ensure the effective implementation
of monetary policy, the maintenance of financial stability, the smooth opera-
tion of the payment system and the collection of seigniorage –, which in gen-
eral is thought to require commercial banks to hold some reserves of central
bank money, and the desire of the commercial banks to economise on such
reserves. The interaction of these forces drives institutional change in the pay-
ment system. What implications does institutional change in the payment sys-
tem have for monetary policy? To answer this question, this report addresses
two main subjects, the first of which is subdivided into three topics, the sec-
ond into four. These divisions are as follows:
1. Institutional change in the payments system
a. Conceptualisation and empirical analysis of institutional change in the
payment system
b. Relevant forces shaping institutional change in whole-sale as well as
retail and small value interbank payments systems (e.g. payment system
policy; new technology enabling the emergence of new markets, new
products, and new governance mechanisms; liberalisation, integration and
consolidation of financial and product markets)
c. Various central banks have moved to real time gross settlement (RTGS)
inter-bank payment systems in recent years, against previous trends to-
wards deferred net settlement systems (DNS).
2. Implications for monetary policy
a. Implications of the alternative institutional structures of payment systems
for the conduct and implementation of monetary policy
                                                          
1 For a discussion of Wheatley’s contribution see Schmitz (2004).
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b. Effects of institutional change in the payments system and the likely evo-
lution of the demand for central bank money
c. Adaptation of the instruments of implementation of monetary policy by
central banks
d. Alternative models of monetary policy implementation in a world with-
out CB money
A team of researchers, from academia and central banks combined to analyse
these topics from complementary perspectives – empirical economics (i.e. eco-
nomic history), economic theory, and institutional economics – and in differ-
ent institutional environments of monetary policy (i.e. the Euro-area, the UK
and the USA).
Payment systems affect monetary policy through various channels. Their in-
stitutional structure has an impact on the functioning of the money market.
That market’s reliable and predictable functioning is a prerequisite for effec-
tive liquidity management and monetary policy implementation. Intraday li-
quidity provision (which has little monetary policy implication) can spill-over
into the overnight market (possibly with monetary policy implications). Pay-
ments systems can also affect the stability and predictability of the demand for
central bank money, which usually serves as the means of final settlement in
the interbank market.
In order to assess, to what extent institutional change in the payment system
affects monetary policy, a number of theoretical and empirical questions are
addressed.
• Method: What are the appropriate methods to investigate institutional change
in the payments system?
• Main drivers of institutional change in payment systems: What are the rele-
vant forces shaping institutional change in whole-sale as well as retail and
small value interbank payments systems (e.g. payment system policy; new
technology enabling the emergence of new markets, new products, and new
governance mechanisms; liberalisation, integration and consolidation of fi-
nancial and product markets)?
• Institutional change in payment systems: What are the main institutional
characteristics of payment systems? The institutional structures of payment
systems show a great variety in different economic environments, for his-
toric reasons2 as much as for differences in the adoption of recent innova-
tions. What are the major signs of institutional change in payment systems?
A number of banks and non-banks, e.g. mobiles telecom operators, have
entered the market for the provision of payment services in recent years
with alternative means of payment. How are their operations linked with
the CB and how does that affect monetary policy?
• Institutional change in the payment system and monetary policy: How does
institutional change in the payments system affect the stability and predict-
ability of the demand for central bank money? How does it impact on the
quantity supplied and demanded as well as the quality of the means of final
settlement? If effects are identified, can central banks adapt the instruments
of implementation of monetary policy to cope with institutional change?
• Central bank payment system policy: Various central banks have moved to
real time gross settlement (RTGS) and hybrid interbank payments systems
in recent years, against previous trends towards deferred net settlement
(DNS) systems. What are the implications of the alternative systems and
their institutional features (i.e. availability of intraday credit in RTGS) for
                                                          
2 Humphrey et al. 1996.
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the conduct and implementation of monetary policy? What are further in-
struments at the discretion of central banks to react to institutional change
in the payment system?
• The extreme case – a moneyless world: Recent innovations in whole-sale as
well as retail and small value interbank payment systems are widely ex-
pected to reduce the demand for money, and perhaps to increase the inter-
est sensitivity of the demand for money. Is the collapse of the demand for
money to zero simply the limit of such an evolution and should it, there-
fore, be modelled accordingly? Or would a “moneyless economy” reflect a
different and incommensurable structure of the underlying economy? What
are the appropriate methods to study such a fundamental institutional change?
Is there a role for “monetary policy” in a world without central bank money?
The following pages attempt to lay the common foundations for the analyses
presented in the main body of the report.
1.2 Method of Analysis
The definition of the “payment system” refers to the economy-wide payment
system as the entire web of payment instruments in an economy. It consists of
a number of individual payment systems, which are broadly categorised into
two groups: whole-sale as well as retail and small value interbank payment
systems. A payment system is defined as “… incorporating a particular set of
payment instruments, technical standards for the transmission of payment
messages and agreed means of settling claims among system members, in-
cluding use of a nominated settlement institution.” (CPSS 2003, 9).
The analyses presented in this report utilise different but complementary ap-
proaches to investigate the impact of institutional change in the payment sys-
tem on monetary policy: economic history (Lawrence H. White), general equi-
librium analysis in Shubik’s tradition of modelling monetary economies (For-
rest H. Capie, Geoffrey E. Wood, Dimitrios P. Tsomocos) and institutional
economics (Stefan W. Schmitz).
The report advocates diversity in the methods of analysis. The different ap-
proaches are employed to complement each other, as they allow the highlight-
ing of different conceptualisations, main drivers as well as potential directions
and impacts of institutional change.
Complementary
methods of analysis
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1.3 Main Drivers of Institutional Change in the Payment Systems
The following sections will relate institutional change in the payment system
to its main interdependent drivers, which are broadly categorised in two groups:
policy initiatives3 (e.g. Core Principles; SEPA, EU New Legal Framework;
Revision of Federal Reserve Policy on Payments System Risk (PSR policy),
Amendments to Money Transmitter Laws in many US states) and changing
demand by banks (e.g. minimising opportunity costs of holding reserves) as
well as final customers (i.e. increasing demand for cross-border payment serv-
ices due to globalisation). New technologies are rarely drivers in their own
right; more often they have an impact on institutional change by enabling the
development of new products, new markets, and new governance structures.4
This section provides a brief summary of the most important policy initiatives.
Johnson (1998) describes CB activities aimed at reducing settlement risk in
the payment system by ensuring payment finality without explicit CB inter-
vention. Measures taken include the containment of intraday exposure in
DNS, collateralisation, loss-sharing agreements, the reduction of float, the
implementation of RTGS operated by CBs (e.g. the ECB’s TARGET system,
the Fed’s Fedwire, and the Bank of England’s CHAPS) and the establishment
of Lamfalussy standards for private DNS in 1990.
As an extension of the Lamfalussy Standards for DNS the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) initiated the Core Principles (CPSS 2001a) for sys-
temically important payment systems5 in 2001. The most important of the ten
principles encourage payment systems to have a risk management procedure
that clearly allocates responsibilities between operator and participants, to be
able to complete settlement in the case of failure of the largest net debtor in
DNS, to settle in CB money, to permit fair and open access and disclose the
relevant criteria and to have effective governance mechanisms in place. In
addition, the BIS assigns certain responsibilities to CBs in relation to the Core
Principles. Central banks’ own payment systems should comply with the Core
Principles, they should disclose their payment system objectives and policies,
and they should oversee the compliance with the Core Principles in system-
atically important payment systems. The Core Principles were adopted by the
ECB Council in 2001 and incorporated into the oversight standards for retail
payment systems in 2003.6 They were also incorporated into Federal Reserve
Policy on Payments System Risk (PSR policy) in 20047.
Retail payment systems in the European Union are expected to undergo sub-
stantial institutional change in the next decade or so, due to increasing demand
for cross-border payments and ensuing policy initiatives. Despite the introduc-
tion of the common currency in 1999 and 2002 the intersections of national
retail payment infrastructures in the Internal Market remained inefficient and
much higher costs for cross-border payments than for domestic ones persisted.
                                                          
3 Policy initiatives in the area of banking and financial markets have a direct and in-
direct impact on payment systems, too. Furthermore, privacy, consumer protection,
and anti-money-laundering laws, to name but a few, also affect payment systems and
can influence institutional change.
4 McAndrews/Trundle 2001.
5 CPSS (2001a) defines a system to be systemically important, if disruptions in the re-
spective settlement process can have a sever impact on other financial system par-
ticipants or lead to systemic implications.
6 ECB 2003, 2004.
7 Federal Reserve System Docket No. OP-1191.
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In response, the European Council initiated the Single Euro Payment Area
Initiative (SEPA) in 2001 to promote the creation of a euro area-wide inte-
grated retail payment infrastructure by the end of 2010. Effective as of 1 July
2002 it requires charges for cross-border electronic payments in euro within
the Internal Market up to € 12 500 (€ 50 000 after 2005) to be the same as for
domestic payments in euro (Regulation (EC) No. 2560/2001). It contains a
similar requirement (effective as of 1 July 2003) for cross-border credit-trans-
fers in euro within the Internal Market. The Regulation promotes standardisa-
tion and straight through processing (STP) by the use of the International Bank
Account Number (IBAN) and the Bank Identifier Code (BIC) to decrease the
costs of cross-border credit-transfers. The European Payments Council (EPC)
was set up by the banking industry to guide and implement the SEPA project.
The milestones of the SEPA initiative were laid out in a White Paper in 2002.
The operation of the first pan-European Automated Clearing House was en-
visaged for 2003. The EPC planned to introduce a pan-European credit trans-
fer instrument (Credeuro) in 2003 and a pan-European direct debit instrument
(PEDD) in 2005. Recommendations for consistent tariffs for card schemes
should be implemented in 2006. Full migration of customers to the Single Euro
Payment Area is intended by 2010. The ECB plays a catalyst role, but signalled
to impose regulatory measures, if the progress towards a SEPA were back-
tracked by banks. The European Banking Association (EBA) operates the first
Pan European Automated Clearing House (PEACH), called STEP 2, as infra-
structure for retail payments covered by the Regulation.
The legal framework governing payments services in the EU is based on EU
legislation and on national law. In order to remove legal barriers to an inte-
grated European payments infrastructure and as part of the Commission’s Fi-
nancial Services Action Plan (FSAP), the European Commission proposed a
New Legal Framework (NLF) for payments in the Internal Market to review
and consolidate community legislation in 2003.8 The basic principles of the
NLF are that payment service providers should face prudential requirements
proportionate to the risks involved and that a level playing field for all market
participants as well as appropriate consumer protection should prevail across
the EU. The ECB is intensively involved in the legislative and political proc-
ess concerning the NLF (as it also was in the case of the eMoney Directive
2000/46/EC).9
Implementation of the SEPA initiative and of the New Legal Framework is
likely to remain a driver of institutional change in European payments systems
beyond 2010, due to the expected consolidation and integration of national
payments infrastructures in Europe.
In the US the fragmentation of the legal framework regarding payment serv-
ices is substantial, too. Apart from Federal regulations such as the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act (1978), Federal Reserve Regulation E and the Federal Re-
serve Policy on Payments System Risk, state abandoned property laws and
money transmitter laws apply to some payment services and instruments. Un-
derstanding and complying with a large number of legal requirements is a sub-
stantial burden for payment service providers in the US.
                                                          
8 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
concerning a New Legal Framework for Payments in the Internal Market (Consulta-
tive Document) COM (2003) 718.
9 Payment System Policy Working Group 2004.
… New Legal
Framework
US retail payment
system subject to change
due to regulation, too
6 ____________________________ 1  Institutional Change in the Payment System and its Impact on Monetary Policy – An Introduction
The main legal framework governing payment systems falls in the competence
of legislatures. Nevertheless, central banks exert a high level of influence in
drafting rules at the international level (e.g. Core Principles) and in shaping
legislation by consulting governments and legislature (e.g. NLF, eMoney Di-
rective 2000/46/EC). Furthermore, legal frameworks in the EU and US trans-
fer substantial regulatory discretion concerning the regulation and oversight of
payment systems to central banks (e.g. minimum reserve requirements, re-
porting requirements, ECB Minimum Standards, Regulation E).
1.4 Institutional Change in the Payment System
The central institutional characteristics of payment systems concern the means
of final settlement10 in the payment system and its relation to the generally
accepted medium of exchange in the economy as well as to characteristics of
the clearing and settlement institution (CSI). The latter include conditions of
access to its accounts, conditions of access to its credit facilities, and the na-
ture of its clearing and settlement process (i.e. RTGS with or without intraday
credit, DNS, hybrid systems). In addition, the surrounding institutional envi-
ronment, in which the payment system operates, is of importance: the state of
development of the interbank money market and the sophistication of partici-
pants’ treasury management. But also some features of monetary policy im-
plementation have repercussions on the institutional characteristics of the pay-
ment system. The reserve maintenance system is of particular relevance in this
respect (i.e. the averaging of minimum reserve requirements, the averaging
period, its relation to the interval of CBs’ refinancing operations and the po-
tential employment of minimum reserves for settlement purposes).
These characteristics can be interrelated in important ways. The relationship
between the GAME and the means of final settlement as well as the relation-
ship between the CSI and the issuer of GAME can influence credit and li-
quidity risk of the payment system. If the means of final settlement is not the
GAME, potential demand for exchanging the means of final settlement into
the GAME imposes a liquidity risk on the participants of the payment system,
as the GAME is by definition the most liquid asset in the relevant market. If
the CSI is not the issuer of the GAME, its opportunity costs of holding suffi-
cient reserves are positive and it can – in principle – go bankrupt, thus impos-
ing a credit and liquidity risk on participants. Although, there is no historical
evidence of CSI bankruptcies we are aware of.
For monetary policy implementation the involvement of the CB in issuing the
GAME, and its role in the payment system are critical. If the CB acts as the
CSI, the role of access to accounts11 and credit at the CSI can give rise to
risks for monetary policy implementation, due to potential spill-over of intra-
day credit to the overnight money market. If the CSI also performs supervi-
sory functions with respect to the participating institutions, potential econo-
                                                          
10 Settlement finality refers to an unconditional and irrevocable payment (EU Final
Settlement Directive 98/26/EC). For a discussion of the parameters influencing the
choice of means of final settlement in the CLS system see Freixas et al. (2001).
11 The Reserve Bank of Australia introduced exchange settlement accounts which pro-
vide access to CB settlement services for non-banks. Payment service providers, that
are in a position to maintain liquid even during seasonal peaks as well as during
periods of stress, are eligible. The only service the accounts permit, are settlement
services related to a clearing process the account holder participates in.
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mies of scope arise due to informational advantages. In historical examples of
private CSI, the institution also acted as regulator and supervisor of the par-
ticipating institutions.12 If the CSI is also the issuer of the GAME, the lender
of last resort function can be fulfilled at lower marginal costs. It is sometimes
claimed that conflicts of interest may arise with monetary policy objectives of
the issuer of the GAME, but this is not an inevitable problem.13
Institutional characteristics influence the operational characteristics of the pay-
ments market, such as its efficiency (as measured for example by the turnover
ratio – how often do intraday reserves turnover in the payment system; size of
the float – the value of funds processed at any time and thus neither at the dis-
cretion of the payer nor the payee; execution time – the time it takes to exe-
cute a payment order), stability, and reliability (stress resistance), the concen-
tration of payment flows, the nature and intensity of competition among pay-
ment systems, structure and level of costs of access to the payment system and
to intraday credit, and the degree of tiering in the payment system. The follow-
ing subsections describe what we regard as the most important aspects of cur-
rent institutional change in wholesale as well as retail and small value inter-
bank payment systems:
1.4.1 Wholesale Payment Systems
According to the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS, 2003),
liberalisation, globalisation, and consolidation have enormously increased the
volumes handled in national wholesale (large value) payment systems and have
thus increased awareness of potential threats to systemic stability. (As the
CPSS consists of central bank delegates, it is less eager to stress the mainte-
nance of seigniorage income as a driver of reform.) Consequently, the design
of payment systems underwent considerable change. The spread of RTGS was
intended to increase the safety of the large value interbank payment systems.
These enabled the development of Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS), De-
livery versus Payment (DVP – in security settlement) and Payment versus Pay-
ment (PVP – in foreign exchange settlement). Bilateral intraday payment ob-
ligations were harder to manage in DNS, as they remained largely invisible
for most participants until end-of-day clearing. Bilateral intraday obligations
result from the lag between sending payment messages and end-of-day set-
tlement. Final settlement depends on the completion of all payment orders en-
tered during the day. Thus, settlement cannot be considered final for a partici-
pant, even if the participant has no bilateral claim against the illiquid party.
Fry (1999) reports that unprotected DNS dominated in the large-value pay-
ment market internationally until the 1980s and that the associated risks were
largely ignored. The Lamfalussy Report (BIS 1990) suggested “Core Princi-
ples” for cross-border DNS for the containment of risks, in particular that the
system should be able to settle even in the case of failure of the largest net
debtor. Nevertheless, participants in DNS had to comply with minimum lev-
els of creditworthiness, which in turn had to be monitored by other partici-
pants or the system operator, which restricted the number of direct participants.
The number of participants in RTGS vastly exceeds the number of direct par-
ticipants DNS usually had. In 2001 the CPSS (2001a) adopted the Core Prin-
ciples for systemically important payment systems, which encourage CSI to
settle in CB money. All large value payment systems in the Euro area settle in
                                                          
12 See inter alia Selgin/White 1994, Holthausen/Monnet 2003.
13 See Wood 2000.
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CB money.14 The wholesale money market is the only financial market in the
EU which it is effectively integrated15. The establishment of the European large
value payment system TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross
Settlement Express Transfer) in 1999 laid the foundations for this integration
and, thereby, for the ECB to implement monetary policy effectively across the
Euro area.
McAndrews/Trundle (2001) argues that the remaining risks and the associ-
ated costs even in protected DNS led to the adoption of RTGS in all EU and
G10 countries in the 1990s. The higher costs of liquidity in RTGS also gave
rise to hybrids. McAndrews/Trundle distinguishes two main types – Continu-
ous Net Settlement (CNS) and queue-augmented RTGS. The former evolved
from DNS. Participants hold some liquidity with the system operator and en-
ter payment orders throughout the day. These orders are queued, i.e. not exe-
cuted until an algorithm identifies those orders that can be netted without im-
plying net positions of one of the participants that exceed its available liquid-
ity balance. The algorithm operates frequently throughout the day and settle-
ment occurs each time a group of payments complies with the relevant netting
requirements. Technically the system remains a DNS, but net settlement oc-
curs so frequently that many payments are effectively settled in real time. The
settlement risks associated with the interdependency of settlement in DNS is
reduced by reducing the length of the settlement period.
Queue-augmented RTGS are an important form of RTGS. Again payment or-
ders are queued and an algorithm searches for offsetting orders on a bilateral
or even multilateral basis. Once a pair or group of orders fulfils the relevant
criteria, they are settled on a gross basis. Legally and technically the system is
a gross settlement system, but economically only net positions are relevant.
The gain in liquidity saving comes at the price of settlement deferral until a
pair or group of payments complies with the relevant criteria. Usually offset-
ting occurs frequently during the day, so the deferrals are very short.
Centralised queuing mechanisms for CNS and queue-augmented RTGS all re-
quire sophisticated, reliable and cost efficient ICT infrastructure. This under-
lines the role of technological advances in enabling institutional change in the
payment system. McAndrews/Trundle (2001) argues that the related invest-
ment and operational costs may outweigh the ensuing benefits in terms of li-
quidity savings. This implies that sophisticated centralised queuing mecha-
nisms are less attractive for payment systems with inexpensive intraday credit
and highly concentrated payment flows among a small number of participants,
who can more easily coordinate their payment orders. Fry (1999) highlights
that DNS with a small number of large participants might entail a moral haz-
ard problem, which should be taken into account in the analysis of the costs of
DNS. For participants face an incentive to underinvest in mutual monitoring
of counterparty risk, as they rely on the LLR function of the CB to bail-out
large participants, who are considered, perhaps erroneously, “too big to fail”.
The adoption of CNS and RTGS eliminates this moral hazard problem, as
counterparty risk is reduced.
In both kinds of hybrid systems a RTGS is required in the background to set-
tle the remaining payment orders not offset by the end of the day. In RTGS
individual participants can reduce their working balances by delaying payments
during the day. By entering payment orders after they have received sufficient
funds, they can settle them from incoming payments and save liquidity costs.
This incentive structure leads to delay of payments and the potential risk that
                                                          
14 ECB 2004a.
15 European Commission 2004.
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not all payments can be completed during the day. Market participants can solve
the problem by cooperation mechanisms. McAndrews/Trundle (2001) distin-
guishes ex ante mechanisms (e.g. participants set limits of net payments to in-
dividual counterparties; internal queues that release payments in response to
incoming payments) and ex post mechanisms (e.g. rules of behaviour with ex
post compliance monitoring). In addition, system operators can contribute to
the solution of the coordination problem by centralised queuing mechanisms,
as the probability of netting and offsetting matches increases with the number
of payment orders entered at specific batches.
In RTGS intraday credit is usually provided explicitly by the clearing institu-
tion (often the CB), so that the clearing institution rather than other participants
bears the associated risks. The centralisation of credit risk exposure and the
better availability of information improve credit risk management in payment
systems. On the other hand, the demand for settlement reserves or CB intraday
credit increases, so that the payment systems become more reliant on CB money
(either in the form of intraday credit or in the form of settlement reserves with
the CB). McAndrews/Trundle (2001) argues that the evolution of hybrid sys-
tems constitutes a trade-off between CBs’ desire for stability and market de-
mands for efficiency.
CPSS (2003) reports empirical findings of the extent of tiering in selected
LVPS16: Out of the twenty-nine payment systems analysed, seventeen reported
high degrees of tiering (i.e. less than 25% of domestically located banks were
direct participants), six reported mixed degrees of tiering (i.e. 25%-75% of
domestically located banks are direct participants), and six reported low de-
grees of tiering (i.e. more than 75% of all domestically located banks partici-
pate directly).17 Only twenty-two payment systems provided figures concern-
ing the degree of concentration in the value of payments handled. In seven of
them the five largest participants accounted for more than 75% of the value of
all payments.18 Table A-12 shows that banks’ reserves at the CB differ widely
between the Euro area (5.7% of narrow money in 2002), the UK (0.3% of
narrow money in 2002), and the US (1.7% of narrow money in 2002), which
is largely due to different MRR and tiering. The latter becomes evident from
the share of banks’ deposits at other banks of narrow money, which ranges
from only 2.9% in the US to 51.3% in the UK. Table A-13 lists the number of
direct and indirect participants in 52 SVPS and LVPS in the Euro area, the
UK, and the US in 2002. In some LVPS the share of direct participants is 100%
(Fedwire US), while in CHAPS Sterling (UK) it is only 0.05%. In ECB’s
TARGET the ratio is 45%.
The Payments Risk Committee (PRC, 2003) investigated options to cope with
the internationalisation of payment services and to reduce the costs of liquid-
ity at the international level. It recommended the development of new intraday
liquidity services involving intraday real-time repos, cross-boarder collateral
pool facilities, and intraday collateral and currency swaps. It also asked central
banks to accept securities, which are traded on foreign markets and denomi-
nated in foreign currencies, as collateral in intraday liquidity enhancing opera-
tions. Central banks could increase the efficiency of international large value
payments by liberalising remote access to their domestic RTGS, central banks
accounts, and intraday credit for foreign participants and the establishment of
multicurrency facilities. The decision is likely to be based on trading off the
                                                          
16 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singa-
pore, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
17 CPSS 2003, 21, Table 1. Data refer to 2002 with a few exceptions.
18 CPSS 2003, 21, Table 1. Data refer to 2002 with a few exceptions.
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perceived benefits with respect to decreasing settlement risks and enhanced
static efficiency due to central banks’ involvement, against the perceived costs
stemming from increased risks for monetary policy implementation (e.g. po-
tential problems in controlling the supply of aggregate overnight reserves due
to the provision of intraday credit foreign participants) and from public in-
volvement (e.g. barriers to market entry and innovation as well as reduced
dynamic efficiency in the market for international payment services).
1.4.2 Retail and Small Value Interbank Payment Systems
The efficiency and reliability of retail and small value interbank payment sys-
tems (SVPS) affect consumer confidence in the financial system as well as in
the CB and currency in particular. Therefore central banks are regularly in-
volved in payment system operation and/or oversight. However, their influence
varies. Some have an operational capacity; others have merely an oversight
function, and may act as catalysts for market developments.19
CPSS (2002) summarised recent trends in SVPS in the G-10 countries and in
Australia:
• A shift from cash and paper-based instruments (i.e. paper cheques) to non-
cash electronic payment methods (card-based – credit and debit cards – as
well as account-based – direct debit and credit transfers)
• An increase of straight through processing (STP) due to enhanced inter-
operability of payment procedures based on common data protocols
• The evolution of product innovation in the context of new payment meth-
ods (eMoney, mPayments) and in the area of access products (ATMs offer
additional services, such as reloading prepaid mobile phone cards, internet
banking)
• New entrants (e.g. market mobile phone companies, telecommunication op-
erators, net-based scratch card companies) are often particularly innovative,
and are more active in the area of new payment instruments (e.g. eMoney,
Electronic Bill Presentment and Payment – EBPP), despite the fact that
banks remain the main players in the payment system.
BCG (2003) expects the share of non-cash payments in Europe to increase from
42% in 2003 to 57% in 2010. In the US the share is expected to remain stable
at 85%. That corresponds to an annual growth rate of 6% in Europe and 5.5%
in the US. The composition of non-cash payments shifts towards electronic
payments. The Federal Reserve System (2004a) estimates the annual growth
rate of the number of non-cash payments to have accelerated from 3.1 percent
(1979-2000) to 3.8 percent (2000-2003). In 2003 the number of electronic non-
cash payments (55% of non-cash payments) exceeded that of checks (45% of
non-cash payments) for the first time. The processing of paper checks de-
creased between 2000 and 2003 due to increased electronification of check
payments at the point of sale and due to substitution of checks by electronic
payment instruments.
Table A-4 in the data appendix presents evidence of the evolution of cashless pay-
ment instruments in the Euro area, the UK and the US from 1998 to 2002. The
number of cheque transactions decreased in all three areas, while the number
of transactions by all other cashless instruments (credit/debit cards, credit trans-
fers and direct debit, eMoney) increased. The total number of transaction by
electronic cashless instruments exceeds that of cheques substantially in all
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three economies in 2002. The diffusion of debit/credit cards per inhabitant in-
creased strongly during the period, as did the use of eMoney in the Euro area
(table A-5). The use of credit transfers and direct debits grew substantially in
the US and only slightly in the Euro area and the UK, where diffusion is much
higher already. Table A-6 on the relative importance of cashless instruments by
volume indicates, that the US mostly rely on cheques and credit/debit cards,
while the Euro area uses largely account based instruments (credit transfers
and direct debits). The data on relative importance based on value (table A-7)
reveals that direct transfers play the most important role in all three econo-
mies in high value payments. The number of ATMs per 1 million inhabitants
in much higher in the US than in the Euro area and the UK in 2002 (table A-9).
The number of transactions in the UK and the US is about twice as high as in
the Euro area. Table A-10 presents data on eMoney cards and terminals in the
Euro area. In 2002 about 22 million eMoney cards were issued in the Euro
area with an average loading of € 37. About 90000 terminals accepted these
cards. In general, the distribution of cards with various functions (credit, debit,
cash, eMoney, cheque guarantee) differs widely between the three economies
(table A-11). The analysis of data concerning the retail payment systems in the
Euro area, the UK, and the US shows pronounced institutional variation.
Humphrey et al. (1996) argue that the pricing of payment services has a strong
impact on the direction of institutional change in payment systems by shaping
changes in demand. This point is frequently stressed with regard to the (creep-
ing) diffusion of alternative payment instruments (i.e. eMoney). Additional
factors influencing the economy at large do often have an impact on the pay-
ment system as well (e.g. the introduction of the Euro).
Account-based (e.g. direct debits and credit transfers) and card-based payment
processes differ in important ways: While account-based transactions are exe-
cuted at the expense of the account-holder (either on a per-transaction-basis
or in terms of total operating expenses of the account), card-based products
involve a per-transaction-fee payable by the merchant.20 Account-based trans-
actions are often cleared and settled via a National Automated Clearing House
(NACH).
In all European countries (except Austria, Finland, and Russia) and in the US,
NACHs operate in SVPS as DNS. NACHs are run in the background as an in-
frastructure not visible to the customer. In Europe central banks are actively
involved in operating NACHs, many of which are owned and operated by
central banks or by a company partly owned by a central bank (see table A-13).
Card-based transactions are often cleared and settled via private, branded, net-
works. The visibility of these is a central strategic issue for the operating com-
pany. Clearing and settlement often take place on the books of a private CSI.
The share of paper cheques has fallen continuously as electronification, straight
through processing (STP), and interoperability of non-cash payments increase.21
As a result the Bank for International Settlements (CPSS 2002) reports in-
creases in security, decreases in operational risk, and reduced settlement lags.
Pan European Clearing Houses (PEACHs) evolved as an industry response to
the increased pressure on prices for cross-border transactions resulting from
the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) initiative. Due to stricter access criteria,
more complex technological requirements, and a lower number of transactions,
cross-border payments remain more expensive than domestic ones. Currently
a large share of cross-border payments is processed via correspondent bank-
ing relationships. These are costly to administer and complicate risk as well as
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treasury management. In order to cope with these disadvantages, European
banks have developed alliances (such as the European Banking Association
EBA) and joint ventures. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have increased
the cheaper variant, in-house cross-border payment services. In addition, money
remittance offices provide cross-border money transfer services and spread
geographically. Card-based transaction feature prominently in cross-border
payments in tourism and distant selling (i.e. eCommerce).
Advances in information and telecommunication technology, the role of econo-
mies of scale and scope in payment systems, and political pressure may lead to
a consolidation and concentration of the European SVPS market. Consolida-
tion and concentration impact on efficiency and stability of the payment sys-
tem in various ways. The BIS conjectures that competition enhances the in-
novative capacity and efficiency of market participants.22 On the other hand, a
fragmented market might leave potential economies of scale and scope partly
unexploited, increase operational risk due to different procedural and techno-
logical standards, and amplify legal risks due to differences in legal arrange-
ments or regulatory provisions concerning different market participants. Co-
operation among market participants is necessary to some extent, as common
technological standards and interoperability increase the efficiency of the fi-
nancial system. “Co-opetition” (competitors cooperate in selected areas – e.g.
development of common standards – but compete in input and output markets)
poses challenges for competition policy; these problems are not unique to the
payments market.
Both innovation and new market participants pose questions concerning the
adequacy of the current legal and regulatory framework including CBs’ settle-
ment and access policies. The payment system traditionally rests largely on
commercial banks. Despite institutional change in the payment system leading
to the blurring of boundaries of traditional financial sectors, banks still domi-
nate the wholesale payment system. A number of product innovations in retail
payment systems increased the role of non-banks in small value transactions.
Although the active participation of non-banks in handling payments has a
long history in the US and Europe (e.g. postal giro), the increasing diffusion
of current innovations such as smart cards and online debit cards raises a num-
ber of interesting questions; some are addressed in a study by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Kansas City23. It presents evidence that non-banks engage in a
large number of payment activities, but that they are hardly involved in set-
tlement activities. As the latter are conducted mainly through the banking sys-
tem, the potential dangers for systemic risk due to participation of non-banks
in the payment system is thought to be limited.
Cross-border economic activity increases as a result of European integration
and so does demand for cross-border small value interbank payments. This will
affect the structure of the European market. Major participants in the cross-
border market (PEACHs) might also attract domestic payments. Large NACHs
that expand into the cross-border market, on the other hand, might evolve into
PEACHs. The emergence of an integrated cross-border payments market is
likely to increase consolidation pressure on national markets. However, the
market is still nationally fragmented and tendencies to delay integration are
motivated by past investments in domestic payment system infrastructure, which
are not yet fully depreciated. Consequently, switching from domestic to inte-
grated small value interbank payment systems involves high investment under
considerable uncertainty concerning future market structure. As a result of the
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high fixed costs of direct participation, due to the more stringent technological
requirements in PEACHs than in NACHs, banks with low cross-border vol-
ume might find it more efficient to participate indirectly via a larger domestic
hub. That institution can be the respective CB or a domestic commercial bank.
Most small value interbank payment systems in the EU are tiered to some
extent; some are tiered to a large extent with the indirect participants by far
outnumbering the direct ones. All systemically important payment systems in
the EU settle in CB money.24 But settlement in CB money occurs for the direct
participants’ clearing balances only. Although these include payment orders of
indirect participants, the latter usually receive only commercial bank money
after settlement.
Institutional change affects the choice between direct and indirect participation
in interbank small value payment systems. The spreading collateral require-
ments and increasing technological sophistication increase costs of direct par-
ticipation. Advances in ICT and increasing transaction volumes decrease the
costs of operating and accessing payment systems at the margin for, both, di-
rect and indirect participants. The impact on relative costs of direct and indi-
rect participation remains ambiguous and the evidence so far is inconclusive.25
In the cases of large nostro-banks and “quasi systems”, small payment system
participants settle on their books, which might rise to stability concerns in
tiered systems. The Ferguson Report (Group of Ten 2001) defined “quasi sys-
tems” as financial institutions, which are not officially CSIs, that clear and set-
tle large values relative to a well defined notion of entire payment flows across
their own books. Especially in correspondent banking systems a small number
of banks might emerge as nostro-banks. Many smaller banks hold accounts at
these and settle across their books. Therefore, the extension of payment sys-
tem oversight to these institutions might be called for.
Electronification as well as the emergence of institutional innovations (e.g. in-
creased tiering), new payment methods (e.g. m-payments offered by mobile
phone companies) offered also by non-banks, new markets (i.e. integrated
European payments market – PEACHs, Continuous Linked Settlement – CLS)
are expected to lead to increases in efficiency and to decreases of CB money
needed to support a given value of payments in a relevant market. However
spectacular recent innovations in payment systems are depicted, a world with-
out CB money is not in sight. None withstanding, it is important for policy
makers as well as for researchers to investigate the implications of such an
evolution, even it is deemed unlikely at the moment.
1.5 Institutional Change
in the Payment System and Monetary Policy
The formulation, conduct and implementation of monetary policy take place
in an institutional environment of which the economy-wide payment system
forms an integral part. In principle, CBs implement monetary policy by ma-
nipulating the short-term interest rate, i.e. the overnight interest rate in the
interbank market. Despite the small size of their repurchasing operations on
interbank markets relative to total turnover, their impact is sufficient to steer
the market. This is mainly due to their ability to issue the GAME at zero mar-
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ginal cost. But CBs have additional instruments at their discretion which in-
crease their grip on the money market by imposing a structural liquidity defi-
cit. They can influence demand for their own liabilities by minimum reserve
requirements (MRR) and by legal restrictions concerning the issuance of bank-
notes, as well as by (in some countries) ‘moral suasion’. The main instruments
of monetary policy implementation are open market operations (OMO), mini-
mum reserve requirements (MRR), and standing facilities (lending and deposit
facility). Today CBs also routinely employ announcements of levels of their
main operating target in monetary policy implementation. These instruments
can be adapted to cope with institutional change in the payment system. But
they also have an impact on the structure evolution of payment systems, and
can, therefore, be employed by CBs to proactively shape institutional change
in payment systems.26
The impact of the institutional characteristics of the payment system on
monetary policy can be categorised along three dimensions.
First, institutional characteristics of the payment system affect the level of de-
mand for CB money as well as its structure, predictability, velocity, and its
sensitivity with respect to CBs’ instruments (i.e. the interest elasticity of de-
mand for CB money). Deutsche Bundesbank (1997) points out that the sub-
stitution of sight deposits for cash – due to decreasing costs of access to ac-
counts by debit cards, electronic banking, and ATMs – might change the in-
formation content of monetary aggregates. The velocity of circulation of sight
deposits is supposed to be higher than that of cash, so that the velocity of cir-
culation of monetary aggregates might increase, too. On the other hand, im-
proved payment instruments might enable individuals to separate transaction
holding from store-of-value holdings more effectively. This might lead partly
to a shift of funds from high velocity low-interest bearing deposits to low ve-
locity higher-interest investments. The Bundesbank (1997) reports that the over-
all decline in the velocity of M3 experienced over the past decades was not
slowed down by innovations in payment instruments. The interest rate sensi-
tivity of monetary aggregates has increased, and this trend is expected to con-
tinue. It is mainly driven by the “asset acquisition behaviour” of investors.
The Bundesbank conjectures that a gradual change in the velocity and com-
position of monetary aggregates will not undermine monetary targeting in prin-
ciple, as the CB will be able to take trend velocity change it into account in
setting the growth rate of monetary aggregates. In addition, new payment in-
struments (i.e. eMoney) are included in the definition of M1.
Second, the operational efficiency of the payment system is a precondition for
the emergence of deep and liquid interbank markets. These, in turn, are pre-
requisites for the effective implementation of monetary policy, as a large and
unstable float can lead to higher and more volatile reserves on the level of in-
dividual banks as well as at the aggregate level. That leads to more volatile
intraday and overnight interest rates, and can make it harder for CBs to judge
the liquidity stance of the system.27 In addition, the estimation of autonomous
factors in reserve demand will become harder for CBs; this estimation is a nec-
essary precondition for determining the maximum operational volume of refi-
nancing operations at given interest rates. In the short run, CBs can impose
accounting standards (i.e. either the payer’s or the payee’s account has to be
debited/credited before the transaction is completed) to deal with the float al-
                                                          
26 Descriptions of the monetary policy instruments of the ECB and the Fed can be found
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beit at expense of distributional side effects. In the long run, more efficient
procedures (e.g. electronification of procedures) will reduce the float. Effi-
cient pricing of payment services in the interbank payment system with respect
to the implicit credit entailed in float will increase incentives for banks to im-
plement more sophisticated treasury management practices, procedures, and
systems. Fry et al. (1999) point out that an efficient payment system, that is
available and accessible throughout the monetary area, will enhance the ef-
fectiveness of the implementation of monetary policy in all financial centres
throughout the monetary area by reducing transaction costs on the money
market. Consequently, the fragmentation of the money market is prevented and
the implementation of monetary policy can focus on a single and centralised
money market. (A special case of the point Cagan made in his classic paper
“Why do we use money in open market operations?”.) The implementation of
TARGET was motivated by this objective.
Third, the payment system should not be a source of unforeseen and unpre-
dictable shocks to the quantity and costs of liquidity with ensuing direct and
indirect ramifications for monetary policy. CBs are the sole provider of liquid-
ity to the market at zero marginal costs. In addition, they are not considered
competitors by payment system participants, operate under a “public interest”
prerogative28, and are entrusted with the role of lender of last resort (LLR).
This role is often nowadays accompanied by the responsibility for operation
and/or oversight of payment systems and their participants. The failure of a
large debtor in a DNS and the consequential liquidity shortage could motivate
the CB – in its responsibility as LLR – to inject liquidity, which could spell
over into the overnight market. The potential conflict of interest between these
functions of CBs as monetary authority and LLR led to a discussion of their
institutional separation.29 At the same time, CBs often bear legal and/or statu-
tory responsibilities for the stability of the financial system and the payment
system30, so that the market would expect them to act as LLR even in the ab-
sence of an official and explicit LLR mandate. The operation of LVPS and the
oversight of other payment systems could imply an informational advantage
for the CB that would greatly enhance its position to put in place effective
policies to prevent liquidity problems of individual participants to threaten
systemic stability (e.g. through the operation of RTGS systems), to detect po-
tential liquidity problems of individual participants early, distinguish liquidity
from solvency problems as well as to act as LLR efficiently and effectively.
In short, the institutional characteristics of payment systems affect the demand
for CB money, the environment in which monetary policy is implemented,
and the efficacy of different instruments of monetary policy implementation.
                                                          
28 Arguments for the public interest motive go beyond the role of payment systems for
monetary policy implementation. An efficient and stable payment system is a nec-
essary part of the infrastructure for both an efficient economy of intra-temporal pro-
duction and exchange as well as for a stable financial system of inter-temporal allo-
cation. However, seigniorage provides a private interest motive for CBs’ involvement
in LVPS.
29 See Goodhart/Schonmaker (1995) and Wood (2000) for a discussion.
30 Article 105 (2) of the Treaty establishing the European Union and Article 3.1. of the
ECB Statutes explicitly state that the promotion of the smooth operation of the
payment system is a basic task of the ESCB. The Federal Reserve Act (1913), the
Monetary Control Act (1980), and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (1978, 1996)
are the basis for the Fed’s task to promote an efficient nationwide payment system.
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1.6 Central Bank Payment System Policies
In addition to participate in shaping and implementing government policy ini-
tiatives regarding payment systems policies, CBs have a number of instruments
at their discretion to influence institutional change in payment systems. CBs’
policies concerning payment systems can be distinguished according to the
relevant addressees, which can be payment systems or their participants. The
most important policy instruments available to CBs are: settlement policy, and
access policy to CB accounts31 as well as to intraday credit at the CB. In ad-
dition, CBs often resume an active role in payment system operation, regula-
tion and oversight. CPSS (2002) provides an overview of relevant CB policies:
First, many CBs encourage systemically important payment systems to settle
in CB money in order to reduce systemic, credit and liquidity risk as well as
to ensure service continuity (settlement policy).32 In some cases the require-
ment to settle in CB money is restricted to the funding and defunding of end-
of-day transactions, while settlement during the day is allowed to take place
in alternative high-quality assets. Furthermore, the CB is often, for competitive
reasons, preferred over competitors as the settlement institution. CBs often act
as lender of last resort and participate in banking supervision. Continuous in-
volvement in the payment system provides CBs with access to information
valuable in fulfilling both roles successfully. Involvement can incur costs in
addition to the resource costs of oversight, as CBs usually grant intraday credit
when they act as settlement institutions. Thus, they have to bear certain risks,
namely, credit risk and the risk of spill-over of intraday credit to overnight
credit.
Second, CBs’ access policies to CB money (in the form of CB accounts) are
the core instrument of their payment system policy with respect to payment
system participants. Access is usually granted to institutions, whose role in the
payment system is considered to be important enough for financial stability,
so that the associated risks for CBs can be justified. These are usually resident
banks. The drivers of institutional change in the payment system, in particular
liberalisation and globalisation, have led to the blurring of boundaries between
different financial sectors and to an increase in the demand for cross-border
and multicurrency clearing and settlement services. Consequently, some CBs
have broadened the range of financial and non-financial institutions, which are
granted access to CB money, such as security firms, security settlement sys-
tems, foreign exchange settlement institutions, insurance companies. In many
cases access to CB money and (limited) banking regulation is extended to non-
banks that provide payment services. In order to facilitate cross-border, for-
eign exchange, and multicurrency settlement, some CBs adapted their policies
to allow remote access to CB money, i.e. access for institutions that have no
offices in the country under consideration.
Third, CPSS (2002) reports that, in general, access to CB accounts also im-
plies access to intraday credit at the CB and the underlying considerations are
very similar. In order to limit their risk exposure, CBs require collateral or
third-party guarantees, charge fees, and set limits, which provide further in-
struments to fine-tune CB policies with respect to institutions. Technological
                                                          
31 Access to CB accounts influences the costs and the legal barriers non-bank entrants
to the payments market face and, thus, affects efficiency, concentration, and stabil-
ity of the payment system.
32 “Core Principle VI: Assets used for settlement should preferably be a claim on the
central bank; where other assets are used, they should carry little or no credit risk
and little or no liquidity risk.” (CPSS 2001a, 34).
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standardisation (acceptance of international standards for message protocols)
can reduce the costs of direct access to interbank payment systems and can
have an impact on CBs’ access policies.
Table A-16 provides an overview of access criteria to selected LVPS in the Euro
area, the UK, and the US and documents wide variations between different
systems. Neither CBs’ settlement nor their access policies at large are by any
means homogenous, according to CPSS (2002). CBs have a number of instru-
ments from their tool-box of payment systems policies at hand to react to – but
also to play a more proactive role in shaping – institutional change in the pay-
ment system.
The chapters of the report build on a common framework, which consists of
diverse but complementary methodological approaches. The analysis of data
concerning retail and wholesale payment systems in the Euro area, the UK,
and the US shows pronounced institutional variation. Policy initiatives and
changing demand by banks and final customers are seen as the main drivers
of institutional change. The latter leading to strong growth in the values and
numbers of transactions in wholesale as well as retail and small value interbank
payment systems. This in turn leads to calls for higher efficiency of payment
systems, but also serves as motivation for many policy initiatives. New pay-
ment instruments and payment service providers, the move to RTGS and in-
creasing electronification are the most visible signs of institutional change.
Electronification and alternative means of payment are expected to lead to a
steeper payment pyramid: the ratio of CB money to total value of payments
decreases. This development gives rise to concerns about the future role of
money in general and CB money in particular in the economy-wide payment
system. Institutional change affects monetary policy by its impact on demand
for CB money and on the efficacy of monetary policy implementation at a
given demand for CB money. CBs have a large range of instruments at their
discretion to react to and to influence institutional change in the payment sys-
tem. They are heavily involved in the legal and political process shaping the
broad legislative framework concerning payment instruments and they are trans-
ferred substantial regulatory power within the broad legislative framework. In
addition, CBs can adapt the instruments of monetary policy implementation
and their own payment system policies to cope with institutional change in the
payment system.
1.7 The Chapters
In this section the chapters of the report are discussed in the order they appear
in the report.
Lawrence H. White’s sterling point in “Institutional Change in the US Pay-
ments System and its Implication for Monetary Policy (1945-2000)“ is that
the central bank’s monetary liabilities consist of paper currency (in the United
States, Federal Reserve notes) and commercial bank deposit balances held at
the central bank (which the banks use for interbank settlements). Payment sys-
tem innovations have potential consequences for monetary policy, if they pro-
vide such close substitutes that they significantly reduce the scale or increase
the price-elasticity of demand for central-bank-issued currency or central-bank-
issued settlement deposits. His chapter analyses the structure of recent inno-
vations that may provide close substitutes for paper currency and for central-
bank settlement balances. He investigates the effects of these on the institu-
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tional structure of the economy-wide payment system and the response of US
monetary policy. He also compares the more recent developments with the
diffusion of credit and debit cards and their impact on US monetary policy.
Forrest H. Capie, Dimitrios P. Tsomocos and Geoffrey E. Wood (“Modelling
Institutional Change in the Payment System and its Implications for Mone-
tary Policy”) appraise one possible technological development, namely the
evolution of electronic barter, and model both it and money as transactions
technologies. Their method is in the tradition of Shubik’s approach to model-
ling monetary institutions. By comparing the models, they appraise the future
of fiat money. First is set out an outline of the technology that may replace
money. This is followed by an informal description of the model used to ap-
praise both this technology and fiat money as means of conducting exchanges.
This is in turn followed by the development of a formal model, and the impli-
cations of the analysis for the survival (or otherwise) of fiat money. This leads
to a discussion of economic policy, and then to a concluding overview.
In his paper “eMoney and Monetary Policy: The Role of the Inter-eMoney-
Institutions-Market for Settlement Media and the Unit of Account” Stefan
W. Schmitz presents a critical assessment of the literature on eMoney and
monetary policy. After briefly summarizing his own previous results on eMoney,
redeemability, the unit of account and monetary policy, he arranges the alter-
native models of eMoney and monetary policy in three categories. First come
models which assume that central bank money will be replaced by another
medium of exchange. Second is a review of models that argue that the resid-
ual demand for base money will remain positive, and third of those that pro-
pose payments systems with a publicly sanctioned unit of account, but with-
out a generally accepted medium of exchange (GAME), in which net balances
are either settled by privately issued fiat-type monies or the transfer of wealth.
In the case of the last he discusses the implicit models of the market for media
of settlement between eMoney-institutions and the role of the unit of account.
Emphasized is the relationship between the function of money as the gener-
ally accepted medium of exchange (GAME) and its function as the unit of ac-
count, in doing so. His conclusion is that the alternative models of a world
without money are inconsistent and incomplete, thus confirming his previous
results on eMoney, redeemability, the unit of account and monetary policy by
rejecting the alternatives.
Stefan W. Schmitz (“Monetary Policy in a World without Central Bank
Money”) sets out the prospects for monetary policy in such a world. The role
of CB money as generally accepted medium of exchange (GAME) is a precon-
dition for the implementation of monetary policy in the current institutional
set-up. In the paper it is shown that conferring certain regulatory competencies
(including the power to impose financial obligations on third parties) on CBs
enables them to implement an equivalent to monetary policy in a world with-
out CB money. The analysis is based on the conceptualisation of a payment
system that does not settle in CB money; in which the demand for CB money
is actually zero. As shown by an analysis of the legal foundations of the op-
erations of the ECB and the Fed, CBs do in fact already possess the necessary
regulatory powers to manipulate the demand for the generally accepted me-
dium of exchange (GAME). Politico-economic objections to granting CBs the
necessary regulatory competencies also apply to the institutional frameworks
currently in place in the Euro area and the US.
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In a case study of the effects of the Austrian eMoney scheme Quick on mone-
tary policy (“Electronic Money in Austria: Legal Foundations, Brief His-
tory, and Monetary Policy Implications”) Stefan W. Schmitz demonstrates
how CB can limit the detrimental impact of the diffusion of payments innova-
tion on monetary policy implementation. Reporting requirements, redeemabil-
ity requirements, and minimum reserve requirements are the main instruments
that are applied in the case under consideration. While the details of the in-
stitutional structure of the scheme differ from schemes in other EU countries,
the legal framework is largely defined by the EU eMoney directive 2000/46/
EC and the ECB instruments of monetary policy implementation.
An appendix providing data on transaction volume and value in major pay-
ment systems as well as on their institutional characteristics in the euro area,
the UK, and the US is to be found at the end of the report. It was researched
and compiled by Florian Saurwein.
1.8 Overview
It is hard to avoid ending such an introductory chapter with a plea for further
research, and a recommendation to study the papers which follow. Both of
these should be taken as read. A little more, however, is worth saying. In par-
ticular, by whatever mode of analysis was used it emerged that fiat CB money
would not be wholly replaced by any form of electronic money currently en-
visaged. Second, it was also clear that developments which have in the past,
and may in the future, improve the robustness or the efficiency of payments
systems have not had fundamentally damaging effects on the ability of central
banks to control monetary conditions.
In sum, the tension between the central bank’s goal and that of the commercial
banks which was alluded to in the opening of this introduction has so far been
creative rather than destructive, and shows signs of remaining so.
The research project, on which this report is based, was initiated by the princi-
ple researcher Stefan W. Schmitz at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and
conducted under the project chair of Michael Latzer. Florian Saurwein was re-
sponsible for researching, collecting and presenting the data basis for the proj-
ect. Financial support by the OeNB Jubiläumsfond33 is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
                                                          
33 The project proposal was submitted and financial funds were allocated to the project
before Stefan W. Schmitz joined OeNB.
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2 Payments System Innovations in the
United States since 1945 and their Implications
for Monetary Policy1
Lawrence H. White2
2.1 Payments System Innovations in the United States since 1945
and their Implications for Monetary Policy
2.1.1 The revolutions that haven’t yet happened
Monetary policy works through its control over the monetary base, the vol-
ume of the central bank’s monetary liabilities. (Central bankers typically pre-
fer to think and talk about monetary policy working through changes in a tar-
geted interest rate, but the central bank’s balance sheet holds the key to un-
derstanding what the central bank can do to influence interest rates and other
variables.) The central bank’s monetary liabilities consist of paper currency
(in the United States, Federal Reserve notes) and commercial bank deposit
balances held at the central bank (used for interbank settlements).3 Payment
system innovations have potential consequences for the conduct of monetary
policy if they provide such close substitutes that they significantly reduce the
scale or increase the interest-elasticity of demand for central-bank-issued cur-
rency or central-bank-issued settlement deposits.
Recent innovations that may provide close substitutes for paper currency in-
clude such electronic money devices as card-based, mobile-phone-based, and
personal-computer-based means for consumers to hold and transfer spendable
balances. Innovations that may provide close substitutes for central-bank set-
tlement balances include deposit-transfer systems that settle outside the central
bank’s books, such as PayPal, e-gold, and deposit transfers cleared and settled
by private systems (private automated clearinghouses and ATM networks).
                                                          
1 Paper prepared for the workshop on “Institutional Change in the Payments Sys-
tem and Implications for Monetary Policy in the Euro-Area, the UK, and the
USA,” organized by the Institute for Institutional Change and European Integra-
tion – ICE, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, Austria, 26 June 2004. Revised
November 2004.
2 F. A. Hayek Professor of Economic History, Department of Economics, University
of Missouri – St. Louis;
Author contact: UMSL, One University Boulevard, St. Louis, MO 63121 USA.
lwhite@umsl.edu.
3 In the US, Federal Reserve liabilities of both types also serve to satisfy a commercial
bank’s statutory reserve requirements against demand deposits. By computerized
“sweeping” of demand deposits into other liabilities without reserve requirements, US
banks have reduced their statutory requirements so dramatically in the past 10 years
that the requirements have effectively become non-binding (Anderson and Rasche
2001). Many banks now more than satisfy their requirements simply with the Fed-
eral Reserve notes they hold to meet customer check-cashing and automatic teller
machine withdrawals.
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In a 1996 interview (Bass 1996) banker Walter Wriston declared that digital
currency carried on smart cards was “the revolution that’s waiting in the
woods” and a “technology … on the verge of exploding”. The predicted ex-
plosion has yet to happen.
Monetary economists (Cronin and Dowd 2001; Friedman 1999) and central
bankers (BIS 1996; King 1999) have envisioned serious consequences for –
perhaps the complete disappearance of – monetary policy should privately is-
sued electronic money completely displace central bank liabilities. The litera-
ture on e-money in this respect resembles the earlier literature on the “legal
restrictions theory” of money demand (see Wallace [1983] and White [1987]),
which envisioned the complete displacement of central bank liabilities by
higher-yielding bonds in the absence of legal restrictions. Cronin and Dowd
(2001, p. 227) foresee that
the demand for central bank money will not only drastically fall, but also
probably disappear altogether, over a foreseeable horizon. Prospective tech-
nological progress with electronic payments and settlements systems is likely
to combine with ongoing institutional changes – such as shifts toward pri-
vate-sector settlements systems – to eliminate the demand for central bank
money.
One BIS (1996, p. 2) report posits that e-money innovations “have the poten-
tial to challenge the predominant role of cash for making small-value pay-
ments” by dint of their greater convenience, but worries that therefore “they
also raise a number of policy issues for central banks because of the possible
implications for central bank seigniorage revenues and monetary policy and
because of central banks' general interest in payment systems.” To date, the
displacement of paper currency by e-money has been a non-event for US mone-
tary policy makers.
At the 1999 Jackson Hole conference on “New Challenges for Monetary Pol-
icy,” sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, the Bank of Eng-
land’s Deputy Governor Mervyn King (1999, p. 49) declared that, with enough
computing power,
There is no reason, in principle, why final settlements could not be carried
out by the private sector without the need for clearing through the central
bank. … [T]he key to a central bank’s ability to implement monetary pol-
icy is that it remains, by law or regulation, the only entity which is allowed
to corner the market for settlement balances … Without such a role in set-
tlements, central banks, in their present form, would no longer exist, nor
would money.
The Federal Reserve System’s role in clearing and settlement has, if anything,
grown since 1999. At the 2003 Jackson Hole conference, where the topic was
“Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy,” the
changes and uncertainty posed by electronic money and private settlement were
never mentioned as a concern.4
                                                          
4 The uncertainty that seemed of the greatest concern to the 2003 Jackson Hole policy-
makers was uncertainty about the size of the gap between actual output and “poten-
tial output”.
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2.1.2 Credit and debit cards
Between 1945 and 2000, the proliferations of credit cards and later debit cards
were the most visible developments in US retail payments. Credit cards
systems grew to handle nearly one-fourth of US retail payments. The effects
that these developments had on monetary policy, through their effects on the
demand for central bank money, may give us some hint as what we might ex-
pect from payment innovations now in prospect.
Sellers have extended credit to their customers for centuries. The growth of
multi-outlet retail chains (most notably of gasoline stations and department
stores) in the early twentieth century led to the formalization of standing credit
authorizations and their representation by company “charge cards” that could
be used for charging purchases at any of the company’s outlets. Such single-
company cards were supplemented by “travel and entertainment” cards be-
ginning in 1950. The first of these was the Diners Club card, initially accepted
by 14 restaurants in New York City. American Express, then a leading issuer
of traveler’s cheques, launched a more widely accepted T&E card in 1958.
Unlike some retail chains, Diners Club and American Express expected the
consumer to pay his charge balance in full at the end of each month.
Meanwhile various banks, the first of which may have been Franklin National
Bank in New York in 1951, began issuing their own “universal” credit cards
combining widespread acceptance with the opportunity to defer repayment be-
yond the end of the month. Because US laws at the time restricted each bank
to operating in a single state or city, each bankcard was similarly limited at first,
accepted only by the local retailers that the bank had signed up. Bank of
America, then the largest bank in California with branches throughout the state,
launched its BankAmericard in 1958. It took the card nationwide through li-
censing agreements with banks in other states beginning in 1966. An alliance
of other California banks, seeking to build a network large enough to challenge
the BankAmericard, formed a reciprocal bankcard-acceptance arrangement
called the Interbank Card Association in 1966, and quickly began signing up
banks in other states. The association adopted the “Master Charge” brand in
1969. Bank of America responded to the challenge by transferring ownership
of its card brand to a similar association of issuing banks in 1970. The associa-
tion licensed the card internationally, renaming it Visa in 1976. Master Charge
became MasterCard in 1979.5
A third universal card, the Discover Card, was introduced by the nationwide
Sears retail chain through a financial services subsidiary in 1985. American
Express introduced its own universal credit card, the Optima Card, in 1987.
Credit card penetration became high in the 1970s and has continued to rise at
an even pace, as measured by the share of US households having at least one
credit card. According to the Federal Reserve System’s Surveys of Consumer
Finances (Yoo 1998, p. 21), the share stood at 64 percent in 1983, 70 percent
in 1989, 72 percent in 1992, and 75 percent in 1995.
Some economists in the 1970s extrapolated from the growth of credit card use
to the notion that credit cards would soon almost completely supplant cash and
check payments, making the monetary aggregates irrelevant. Brunner and Melt-
zer (1990, p. 358 n. 1) later commented:
                                                          
5 MasterCard International (n.d.), Visa USA (n.d.).
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in the United States following the introduction of credit cards and a wider
range of substitutes for money in the 1970s [a] common claim was that the
demand for conventional money – currency and demand deposits – would
go to zero and monetary velocity would approach infinity. Shortly after these
predictions, monetary velocity declined.
Cross-sectionally, as one would expect, credit card ownership is associated
with smaller holdings of demand deposits (Duca and Whitesell 1995). But in
time series the velocity of US$ M1, as Brunner and Meltzer indicated, de-
clined after 1980 despite the continued growth in the use of credit cards (see
Figure 2.1-1). The leading explanations for the post-1980 break in the path of
M1 velocity are (1) the corresponding break in the path of nominal interest
rates (Rasche 1993), caused by disinflationary Federal Reserve policy, and
(2) the deregulation of interest rates on M1 deposits (Rotemberg 1993).6 Given
that the spread of credit cards was gradual and steady, there is no reason to
link the use of credit cards to the sudden unsteadiness of M1 velocity and the
corresponding challenge for monetary policy-makers.
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Figure 2.1-1: Velocity of US M1, 1960-2004, and Credit Card Use
                                                          
6 For discussion of the impact of the velocity trend break on monetary policy thinking,
see Hafer and Wheelock (2001).
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2.1.3 Electronic payments today in the USA
Wholesale wire transfer
The largest flows of electronic payments in the United States are large-value
(“wholesale”) interbank payments over Fedwire and the National Settlement
Service, both owned and operated by the Federal Reserve System, and over
CHIPS, owned by an association of 54 commercial banks from 22 countries
and operated by The Clearing House, an association of the US affiliates of 11
major banks.7
Fedwire is a real-time gross settlement system (with intraday overdrafts) that
transfers funds among commercial banks’ reserve accounts at Federal Reserve
Banks. Banks use Fedwire to transmit interbank loans of reserves (“federal
funds”) and, on behalf of customers, to transmit immediate final payment for
securities and real estate transactions. The National Settlement System (NSS)
is a mechanism for private-sector clearing networks (that handle paper checks,
automated clearinghouse payments, ATM and debit cards, and credit cards) to
settle end-of-day net obligations among participating banks by transferring
funds among the banks’ reserve accounts at Federal Reserve Banks.8 Accord-
ing to the Federal Reserve, about 9500 institutions can send or receive funds
over Fedwire. In the year 2000, daily Fedwire activity approached 430,000 pay-
ments with a total dollar value around $ 1.5 trillion. The mean payment was
around $ 3.5 million, the median around $ 25,000.9
CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System) handles a comparable
daily volume of payments: 257,000 payments a day with a total dollar value
around $ 1.4 trillion. Banks principally use CHIPS to transmit payment for for-
eign exchange transactions and cross-border payments. Rather than real-time
gross settlement for each transaction, CHIPS uses what it calls “a combination
of prefunding and bilateral or multi-lateral netting,” with the netting continu-
ously conducted during the day by its “patented balanced release algorithm”.
The netting reduces gross payment flows and thereby reduces participants’ li-
quidity needs. The “prefunding” of settlement accounts (i.e. the pledging of
liquid reserve balances, the equivalent of an escrow arrangement), in the amount
of some $ 2.8 billion at start of each day (with provisions for intraday top-
ping-up when necessary), allows CHIPS to provide real-time finality for pay-
ments up to the value of the paying bank’s available liquid funds. CHIPS de-
clares that “Payments are matched, netted and settled usually in a matter of
seconds. Over 85% of payments are cleared before [noon].” Settlement of in-
terbank net obligations takes place through transfers among the banks’ reserve
deposits held on the books of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.10 CHIPS
advertises that it is less costly for its participants than Fedwire, but one indus-
try observer (McGuire 2001, p. 4) has said that CHIPS “competes with Fed-
wire chiefly on the basis of service innovation and quality.”
CHIPS introduced real-time finality only in 2001. Previously it had used end-
of-day net settlement with a contingency plan for “unwinding” of payments in
the event of end-of-day participant default. (The plan never had to be put into
                                                          
  7 The Clearing House, formerly known as the New York Clearing House Association,
is jointly owned by The Bank of New York, ABN AMRO, Bank of America, Deut-
sche Bank, HSBC, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank One, JP Morgan Chase, Wacho-
via and Fleet.
  8 http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedwire/default.htm.
  9 http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/coreprinciples/default.htm.
10 See McGuire (2004, p. 1) and http://www.chips.org/about.php.
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practice because no participant has ever defaulted.) The move to real-time fi-
nality might seem to have improved the competitive position of CHIPS as
against Fedwire/NSS, but volume on CHIPS has not been growing any faster
than volume on Fedwire/NSS.
Even if CHIPS were to completely displace Fedwire and NSS, the implica-
tions for base money demand – and therefore for monetary policy – would
seem to be minor. As noted, CHIPS makes final settlement using base money
in the form of bank deposits at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. CHIPS
could in principle settle off the Fed’s books (Selgin and White 2002, pp. 145-
46), as all clearinghouses did before the advent of the Federal Reserve. If it
were to settle by physical transfer of Federal Reserve Notes, the banks’ de-
mand for base money would merely be changing form, not size or elasticity.
If it were to settle by transfer of claims on the clearinghouse association’s own
depository, that depository would need to own base money. (In pre-Fed days,
the NYCHA normally held 100% gold reserves.) As long as base money re-
mains central bank liabilities, the central bank retains a foothold sufficient for
conducting monetary policy.
Retail electronic payments
Perhaps the most prominent recent development in retail payments systems in
the United States has been the steady progress in switching from paper checks
to electronic deposit transfers cleared through the automated clearinghouse
system. The Federal Reserve (see Table 2.1-1 below) reports that the volume of
paper checks peaked in 1999 and has declined each year since. The Fed proc-
essed 15.8 billion paper checks in 2003, a volume 4.7% smaller than in the
previous year.11 At the same time the Fed processed 5.6 billion commercial
electronic payments in 2003 through its FedACH (Automated Clearing House)
system, a volume 12.1% greater than in the previous year. These commercial
FedACH payments exclude large-value wire transfers. At present the lion’s
share of ACH payments are pre-arranged “direct deposit” of payroll and “di-
rect payment” of monthly bills, but a growth area is payments that the con-
sumer individually authorizes via internet banking.
Table 2.1-1: Activity in Federal Reserve Priced Services, 2003, 2002, and 2001
Millions of items Percent change
Service 2003 2002 2001 2002 to 2003 2001 to 2002
Commercial check 15,806 16,587 16,905 -4.7 -1.9
Funds transfer (Fedwire) 126 117 115 7.5 1.6
Commercial FedACH 5,588 4,986 4,448 12.1 12.1
Source: Federal Reserve System (2003, p. 118)
                                                          
11 The Federal Reserve System (2002b, p. 12) estimates that it clears 41% of the paper
checks written in the US; total checks thus numbered close to 40 billion. The other
clearing routes are “on-us,” i.e. within-bank (29%), through private clearinghouses
(18%), same-day settlement (6%), Treasury/postal money order (1%), and other (5%).
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Table 2.1-2: Estimated Volume and Dollar Value of US Electronic Retail Payments, 2000
Payment instrument
Transaction volume
(millions)
Dollar volume
($ millions)
Average payment
value
Credit cards 15,048 $ 1,235,374 $ 82.10
Debit cards 8,278 $ 348,131 $ 42.05
Automated Clearing House* 5,622 $ 5,674,851 $ 1,009.40
Electronic Benefits Transfer 537 $ 13,744 $ 25.56
Total 29,487 $ 7,272,100 $ 246.62
* Table 2 ACH volume exceeds Table 1 ACH volume because Table 1 includes only pay-
ments routed through the Fed’s ACH system. Table 2 includes privately cleared ACH
payments.
Source: Federal Reserve System (2002b, p. 58) and author’s calculations based there-
on. Credit cards are the sum of general-purpose and private-label cards. Debit cards
are the sum of “offline” (signature-based, routed through Visa and MasterCard net-
works) and “online” (PIN-based, routed through ATM networks) cards. EBT here
counts only consumer payments using funds in special government-benefit accounts
(representing food aid, welfare, Social Security, Veterans’ pensions); government
transfers into the accounts are included under ACH.
The Federal Reserve continues to study the status and evolution of the US
payments system. The Fed’s 2001 “Survey of Consumer Finances” found ap-
proximately 88 percent of U.S. families in that year using electronic funds
transfer services in one or more of four forms: ATM cards, debit cards, direct
deposit (into a consumer’s bank account, typically of pay or government bene-
fits), or direct payment (electronically deducted from a consumer’s bank ac-
count). About 70 percent used ATMs, 67 percent direct deposit, 47 percent
debit cards, 40 percent direct payments (FRB 2003, p. 73).
The Fed’s 2000 “Electronic Payment Instruments Study,” in addition to meas-
uring the volume of these four established payment techniques, noted the fol-
lowing “emerging payment technologies” (Federal Reserve 2002b, p. 70):
• Electronic Bill Payment and Presentment
• Person-to-Person (P2P) payment
• Stored Value (prepaid) cards
• Internet Currencies.
Each of these emerging payment technologies merits some discussion
comment as to its character and potential implications for monetary policy. In
addition, we consider the mobile phone payment systems that are now in de-
velopment.
The Fed study also mentions, as payment technologies in the test-marketing
stage,
• internet platforms for debit/ATM cards
• an “ACH debit card”
• point-of-sale conversion of paper checks to electronic transactions
• internet platforms for debit/ATM cards, routing the payment through the
Electronic Funds Transfer networks (i.e. through ATM clearing systems such
as Star and NYCE). Like PayPal, but unlike internet bill payment via ACH
(which typically takes two or more days to deliver the payment), the EFT
networks transmit the payment near-instantly.12
                                                          
12 See Davis (2002).
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• an “ACH debit card,” which in contrast to an ordinary debit card “routes
transactions through the ACH system rather than an EFT network.”
• point-of-sale conversion of paper checks to electronic transactions which
are then routed through the ACH system.
We will consider these technologies in connection with electronic bill payment
and presentment, because all are devices for facilitating deposit transfer.
Electronic Bill Payment and Presentment (EBPP)
refers to “online services that enable customers to receive, review and execute
payment of their bills over the Internet” by transfer of bank deposits. EBPP is
a small but rapidly growing category of ACH payments. Previously the ACH
system focused on pre-authorized recurring payments (e.g. payroll, monthly
mortgage). EBPP allows consumers to make one-time payments using tele-
phone or internet banking. As such, EBPP provides a close substitute for paper
checks rather than for paper currency. The same applies to point-of-sale con-
version of paper checks to electronic transactions which are then routed through
the ACH system.
An internet platform for debit cards that would route the payment through the
Electronic Funds Transfer networks (i.e. through ATM clearing systems such
as Star and NYCE) rather than through ACH would provide yet another close
substitute for paper checks rather than for paper currency. It potential advan-
tage over internet bill payment via ACH, which typically takes two or more
days to deliver the payment, is that the EFT networks transmit payment near-
instantly.13 Thus online EFT debit would combine the convenience of online
payment from an existing bank account with the immediacy of PayPal.
The replacement of paper checks with EBPP (or online EFT debit) would re-
duce the use of central bank settlement balances only if ACH (or EFT) pay-
ments were more commonly cleared and settled outside the Fed’s books than
are check payments. In practice, the Fed is even more predominant in ACH
than in check clearing. The Federal Reserve Banks clear about 69% of inter-
bank paper checks, but more than 80% of commercial interbank ACH pay-
ments and 100% of government-to-recipient ACH payments (Electronic Pay-
ments Network 2002, p. 2).
The Fed’s dominance of ACH processing has actually increased in the past
decade. The ACH system was launched in 1974. The Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 directed the Fed to price its
payment services (both check and ACH processing) on a “market-competitive”
and cost-recovering basis, with the intention that private-sector payment pro-
viders would no longer face subsidized competition. In 1994 the three existing
private-sector ACH operators – American Clearing House, Visa, and the New
York Automated Clearing House – formed a private exchange system, labelled
PAX, allowing them to exchange transactions without going through the Fed
and paying the Fed’s inter-regional fees. Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004,
262) estimate that in 1996 the FedACH system “handled approximately 75%
of the roughly 3.3 billion on-others (between two different banks) commercial
ACH transactions processed”. In 2001 and 2002 the Federal Reserve Banks
substantially reduced the prices of their ACH services, and announced plans
for a third price cut, driving the American Clearing House and Visa out of the
business (Electronic Payments Network 2002, p. 7),. Today the NYACH, re-
named the Electronic Payments Network, is the only remaining private ACH
                                                          
13 See Davis (2002).
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operator.14 The EPN has publicly complained about the Fed’s “unfair” and
“anti-competitive” pricing policies, but Fed officials have argued that its re-
duced prices reflect its reduced unit costs for ACH transactions (Herd 2001;
Roseman 2003).
In any event the settlement for all private clearing systems (paper checks, ACH,
EFT) takes place on the Fed’s books through the National Settlement System.
Even the complete displacement of Fed clearing by private clearing would
therefore not affect the demand for base money (except to the extent that
greater netting takes place before settlement) or the potency of monetary pol-
icy.
Person-to-Person (P2P) payment
“involves an electronically initiated transfer of value from one individual to
another” to “send money to family members, settle debts with friends and pay
for items purchased through online auctions.” (Federal Reserve 2002b, p. 70).
The Fed study does not name specific providers but clearly refers here to the
PayPal service (purchased in October 2002 by the auction website eBay) and
its less successful rivals (Citibank’s c2it, which closed down in November
2003, and Yahoo! PayDirect). PayPal currently has about 40 million US-dollar-
denominated accounts, and a total of slightly more than 45 million accounts
world-wide. It does not report the US$ stock of funds in those accounts. The
Wells Fargo Bank, the payment processor for PayPal, reported US$ 12 billion
in Internet payments flow during 2003. PayPal’s reported payment flow for
the first quarter of 2004 was US$ 4.3 billion. Compared to the previous year’s
first quarter, PayPal’s nominal revenue grew 68 per cent.15
PayPal combines a credit card and deposit transfer forwarding service with the
functional equivalent of an online bank with instantaneous on-us settlement. If
Smith has a positive PayPal account balance, he pays Jones by transferring
part of that balance. If Smith’s account balance is zero, he pays by charging a
pre-registered credit card or making an ACH transfer from a pre-registered
bank account. Jones receives a demandable debt claim on PayPal in the form
of a PayPal account balance. A positive PayPal account balance can be with-
drawn (transferred to an ordinary bank account) by check or ACH transfer.
Though it has deposit-like liabilities, PayPal denies that it is a bank: when open-
ing a new PayPal account, a customer must agree to the statement “that (i) Pay-
Pal is not a bank and the Service is a payment processing service rather than a
banking service, and (ii) PayPal is not acting as a trustee, fiduciary or escrow
with respect to your funds, but is acting only as an agent and custodian.”16
The core of PayPal’s business is not in fact best described as person-to-person
payment, but rather as person-to-micromerchant payment, where a “micro-
merchant” is a seller whose business is too casual or too small to justify the
cost of signing up with Visa or MasterCard (if they would even accept him).
One journalist (Sisk 2004) notes that PayPal
                                                          
14 Regional payments associations – e.g. Western Payments Alliance, South Western
Automated Clearling House Association, Southern Payments Exchange – support
and represent commercial banks in their ACH business but do not themselves pro-
cess payments.
15 http://www.epaynews.com/statistics/transactions.html; 
www.epaynews.com archive (04 May 2004 and 23 Apr 2004).
16 http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=p/gen/ua/ua-outside.
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“... essentially invented the micromerchant category through a combination
of prescience and luck: prescience in realizing early that its emphasis on
person-to-person payments would not pay the rent, and luck that it was the
early favorite by buyers and sellers on the Internet’s iconographic success
story, eBay.”
“We started as P-to-P, but that ended up never being a big part of our busi-
ness, and now it’s less than 5 percent,” says PayPal’s Todd Pearson, man-
aging director for merchant services. “Those who followed in our footsteps
mistakenly thought that P-to-P was the main thing.”
PayPal “gained critical mass quickly on eBay” because it offered buyers the
convenience and speed of online payment with immediate confirmation, and
because it offered sellers easy sign-up and fees that are a “fraction of the cost
of [accepting] credit cards” (Sisk 2004).
Does the growth of PayPal have any implications for monetary policy? For
each dollar of a customer’s PayPal account balance, PayPal holds a matching
deposit balance in Wells Fargo Bank, unless the customer elects to have PayPal
to invest the funds in shares of a PayPal money-market mutual fund (MMMF).
The movement of balances from other commercial bank deposits to PayPal
balances of the first type does not alter the banking system’s total stock of de-
mand deposits, but merely redistributes it among banks. It poses no difficulty
for US monetary policy. The movement of spendable balances into the Pay-
Pal MMMF shares poses no greater difficulty for monetary policy than the
growth of other MMMFs has posed since the mid-1970s. MMMF shares are
not counted in M1, so their increasing use as a means of payment (relative to
M1 deposits) increases the ratio of spending to M1 (the velocity of M1). Be-
cause the growth of MMMFs has been gradual, and their transactions use
limited, the growth in M1 velocity over the period has likewise been gradual
(again see Figure 2.1-1). MMMF shares are counted in M2, so the Fed can track
their volume and estimate its effect on M1 velocity. The amount of spending
per dollar of PayPal fund shares may be greater than that of other MMMF
shares: unlike the typical checkable money-market mutual fund, PayPal im-
poses no minimum size on out-payments. If this difference in spending is great,
and PayPal were to become sizable among MMMFs, the Fed might want to
track PayPal MMMF balances separately from other MMMF balances.
Whether PayPal ought to be considered a bank for regulatory purposes is an
entirely separate question. It might be noted that a “bank” is defined in US
law as an intermediary that both takes deposits and makes loans. PayPal does
not make loans. In the 1980s, when US banks established subsidiaries to
gather deposits (but not to make loans) in locations where they were not al-
lowed open full-fledged branch offices, such subsidiaries were known as “non-
bank banks”. PayPal might accordingly be called a combination of “non-bank
bank” and checkable money-market mutual fund.17
                                                          
17 In a 2001 interview (at http://www.efinanceinsider.com/email31501.html), PayPal's
“co-founder and CEO” Peter Thiel said that PayPal had deliberately avoided be-
coming a bank in order to avoid bank regulation: “We're 90% a payments company,
and maybe 10% bank-like. We are not regulated like a bank because we don't offer
FDIC insurance, but correspondingly we also have much less of a regulatory load.
We are pretty determined to stay on that side of the banking rules. We've spent a
lot of time looking at whether we should become a bank – we even had the option
to acquire a bank charter in the fall – but we decided to avoid that track because of
the regulatory cost issues and the sense that the payment piece is most valuable to
people.”
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Stored Value (prepaid) cards
have garnered academic attention in the past decade for their potential to re-
introduce private currency. At least in the form of MasterCard’s Mondex de-
vice, which permits card-to-card transfers, card balances have been seen as
the 21st century version of the 19th century banknote: bearer claims that circu-
late without engaging any interbank clearing system. Such balances could be
a very close substitute for central-bank-issued currency if issuing them were a
profitable undertaking.
The Fed study comments (Federal Reserve 2002b, p. 70) that stored-value
cards are “best known for their gift card application, as a replacement for a gift
certificate,” but “also being used for payroll, incentives, insurance, refunds and
other purposes.” Gift-certificate cards spendable only at a single retail chain
are, however, quite different from general-use cards like Visa Cash and Master-
Card’s Mondex.
Godschalk and Krueger (2000, p. 6) have argued persuasively that issuing digi-
tal bearer balances (e.g. to be carried on “smart” microchip-embedded cards)
does not yet appear to be profitable. The firm DigiCash, a pioneer in encryp-
tion software for bearer e-money, went bankrupt in 1998; the firm CyberCash
did likewise in 2001 (see also McCullagh 2001). German banks have given
away millions of cards capable of carrying currency balances, only to find that
the public has little use for them. Nor have other technical platforms like per-
sonal computers proven popular as electronic purses:
No e-money issuer has a clear business case. There is a morning-after feel-
ing for most e-purse roll-outs in Europe. Even in Germany with a free mass
distribution of e-purses on chipcards by the banks (more than 50 million
GeldKarten) the volume loaded is stagnating at a level of a negligible 0.01%
of the total money supply M1. For software-based e-money products like
ecash we see in spite of booming e-commerce worldwide only a few pilot
projects (e. g. Deutsche Bank).
As Kevin P. Sheehan (1998, p. 4) has commented: “electronic-cash pilots have
shown that the technology is effective, but they have also shown that, for the
most part, consumer demand is lacking.”
For consumers, credit and debit cards already provide convenient noncash pay-
ments without explicit transaction fees. The credit card allows the consumer
to borrow or enjoy float; the debit card allows him to pay from a deposit bal-
ance that earns interest up to moment it is spent.18 To date, the most success-
ful niche for prepaid chip card balances has been use as a substitute for coins
in unmanned point-of-sale transactions: e.g. transit systems, parking meters,
laundromats (Godschalk and Krueger 2000, p. 17). Non-banks, such as transit
systems, have been the most successful issuers. Such use implies small balances
per card, which implies little “float” to the issuer. For example, an average
card balance of US$ 10 would, at a 4% interest rate, generate only US$ 0.40
per year per card in float for the issuer, not enough to cover the average costs
of launching and maintaining the card scheme. The cards alone reportedly cost
about US$ 2.50 each.19 A transit system can find a smart farecard worth is-
suing even with near-zero float if it replaces a more costly fare-collection sys-
                                                          
18 Retailiers face higher higher transaction processing fees for credit and debit cards
(typically around 3%) than for prepaid cards (typically less than 1%), but for some
reason retailers seldom offer consumers a discount for paying by the cheaper method.
As a result consumers have little incentive to prefer prepaid cards.
19 http://www.cardtechnology.com/cgibin/readstory.pl?story=20040301CTDN623.xml.
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tem20, but a bank will not find a currency-like card profitable with near-zero
float unless it can collect sufficient per-use transaction fees. The higher the
transaction fees, however, the less attractive is the card to the consumer as a
cash substitute.
Lack of apparent profitability is presumably why, after test-marketing trials in
the late 1990s (e.g. Visa Cash at the Atlanta Olympic Games of 1996; Mondex
at Burger King restaurants on Long Island, NY in 1998; a joint trial in Man-
hattan’s Upper West Side in 1997-8), little has been heard from Visa Cash or
Mondex. MasterCard was reportedly pursuing “more than 400 smart card proj-
ects” in late 2003, but many if not most involved storing information other
than money balances, such as loyalty points, event tickets, and personal data.21
Internet Currencies
characterized by the Fed study as “intended to be spent on the Web,” pre-
sumably refers to such now-abandoned schemes as Beenz and Flooz. Cur-
rent startups that may belong in this category include the Peppercoin (http://
corp.peppercoin.com/) and BitPass (http://www.bitpass.com/learn/) “micro-
payment” systems. Promoters of these systems are hoping that pay-per-down-
load music sites will be a “killer application” for micro-payments. Unlike
Beenz and Flooz, Peppercoin and BitPass do not involve proprietary units of
account, but denominate their payments in dollars. Thus they might alterna-
tively be categorized as P2P systems (akin to PayPal, except that they emulate
bearer currency rather than deposit transfer) or as the online equivalent of pre-
paid card balances. As in the case of prepaid cards, internet currencies limited
to small payments should not be expected to pose a challenge to monetary
policy.
There also exist “internet currencies” today that are not dollar-based: the gold-
based systems as e-gold.com and GoldMoney.com. Both offer gold ownership
accounts, denominated in gold grams, with account balances transferable on-
line. (As PayPal does, the services allow transfer to anyone with an email ad-
dress and will create an account for the recipient if he does not already have
an account.) E-gold currently claims 732,000 gold-denominated accounts (con-
trast PayPal’s 45 million accounts), and processed 25,000 spending transac-
tions on a recent day totaling 136kg, which at $ 12.815/g amounts to $ 1.74
million (compare PayPal’s $ 47 million per day). The marketplace has not
stampeded to e-gold, or to bricks-and-mortar gold banks, because of the well-
known network property of a monetary standard (or “critical mass” problem,
from the point of view of a potential competitor): customers who try to spend
gold-denominated account balances around the internet (or around town) will
discover relatively few stores willing to accept them in payment. The incen-
tive to join the network of those who accept e-gold is weak so long as the net-
work is small, so smallness of the network is self-perpetuating.22
                                                          
20 As a replacement for collecting paper notes and coins from farecard vending ma-
chines, the Chicago Transit Authority now offers a “prepaid smart fare card” with an
“automatic replenishment” feature whereby the commuter authorizes the CTA to re-
load the card balance when necessary by charging the commuter’s credit card or deb-
iting his bank account, http://www.cardtechnology.com/cgi-bin/readstory.pl?story=
20040108CTDN004.xml.
21 http://www.cardtechnology.com/cgibin/readstory.pl?story=20040303CTDN652.xml.
22 Schmitz (2002) discusses how network effects reinforce the dominant unit of account
in the context of electronic money systems.
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The inertial barrier to a new monetary standard can be overcome by high in-
flation that makes the incumbent standard costly to use: in recent decades
chronic high inflation in countries with peso and ruble standards has led to
spontaneous “dollarization”, the displacement of local currencies by US dol-
lars. The most plausible scenario for spontaneous displacement of dollars by
gold-based payments is likewise the advent of a high dollar inflation that is
expected to persist. In the event of high inflation, the availability of a gold-
based (or Euro-based, or Swiss-Franc-based) substitute for dollar-based pay-
ments will amplify the price-elasticity of demand to hold dollars and thereby
compound the Fed’s problems. But this correspondingly means that the avail-
ability plays the salutary role (from the public’s perspective) of increasing the
Fed’s incentive to avoid high inflation. So long as the Fed does responsibly
avoid high inflation, the availability of gold-based payment systems will not
seriously weaken the demand to hold base dollars and therefore will not
threaten the Fed’s ability to conduct monetary policy.
Phone-based payments
have taken over much of the new-technology “buzz factor” that card-based
payments have lost. A number of different models are being discussed and test-
marketed, mostly outside the US. Although there are no apparent legal barri-
ers to their development within the US, mobile phone penetration is slightly
lower in the US.
Visa International and Philips Electronics have a joint venture to equip mobile
phones with chips allowing them to conduct micropayment and credit-card
transactions at unmanned points-of-sale.23 Similarly the Hungary-based con-
sortium SEMOPS (www.semops.com), for Secure Mobile Payment System, is
developing a system for mobile point-of-sale payment, eliminating the con-
sumer’s need to wait in a line when the store is busy. These schemes offer new
“front-end” access to established credit card systems rather than any funda-
mentally new payment system (the “back end” remains the same).
PhonePaid is a UK-based service, accessible either via the web or by calling a
toll-free number and following the prompts, that appears to be closely mod-
eled on PayPal. To pay someone you need his mobile phone number (rather
than his email address, as with PayPal).24 As an alternative P2P system, the
monetary policy implications of PhonePaid appear identical to those of Pay-
Pal.
The British telecom firm Vodafone has launched “m-pay,” a system that “al-
lows Vodafone consumers to make remote micropayments [5 p to £ 5] by charg-
ing to their phone account.” Merchants need m-pay hardware in order to ac-
cept m-payments. A consumer’s payments during the month appear on his
monthly phone bill. (Lonie 2003, p. 5) Such systems represent a potentially
important innovation, because they turn phone companies into direct competi-
tors with banks and credit card networks as payment service providers. They
provide a substitute not only for deposit transfer and credit card, but also for
cash payment.
In parallel with the historical emergence of par acceptance among private
banknote issuers, mobile payment providers are already discussing hardware
interoperability agreements in order to widen acceptance (see Mobile Pay-
ments Forum 2002). Should they provide any payment recipient the option to
                                                          
23 http://www.cardtechnology.com/cgibin/readstory.pl?story=20040109CTDN020.xml.
24 http://www.phonepaid.com/home/home.htm.
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credit his own mobile account with whichever telecom (which would be more
useful to him that a claim on the payer’s telecom, thereby further widening
acceptance), the participating telecoms would find it convenient to form an
inter-telecom clearinghouse for mobile payments. To the extent that customers
with net payment inflow choose to carry positive mobile account balances
(rather than demand a transfer to their bank accounts at month-end), the phone
billing system has become a parallel deposit-transfer system.
2.2 Conclusion
Payment system innovations, in the United States as in Europe, continue (as
they have for centuries) to promote the substitution of alternative payment
media for direct use of base money. Though no revolution is evident, the real
demand for central-bank-issued currency may shrink relative to transactions
volume and to demand for broader monetary aggregates. In some respects,
though no trend is evident in the United States, central-bank-issued deposit li-
abilities may be challenged as a medium for settling interbank flows. As argued
elsewhere (Selgin and White 2002, pp. 147-154), the central bank’s power to
influence nominal variables is not proportional to the size of its balance sheet.
Shrinkage of the central bank’s balance sheet will therefore not usher in a new
era in which monetary policy has no effect, either for good or for ill.
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3 Modelling Institutional Change in the
Payments System, and its Implications
for Monetary Policy1
By Forrest H. Capie2, Dimitrios P. Tsomocos3 and Geoffrey E. Wood4
3.1 Introduction
Many institutional changes have taken place to payments systems. Indeed, they
have been in continual change ever since money first emerged as the dominant
technology for conducting transactions. Means of settlement between banks
have changed: cheques replaced cash in many transactions, and they have in
their turn been replaced partially (much more in some countries than others)
by cards. Technology is even developing whereby mobile telephones can be
used to effect instantaneous settlement of transactions. These have all affected
the relationship between the quantity of money demanded and income. But
none of the innovations has threatened to move us from a money-using society
to one which transacts by some other means.
The implications for monetary policy have therefore been, in theory at least,
trivial. And this has also been true in practice. Central banks have remained
able to use monetary policy to influence, and to control within surprisingly
narrow limits, the course of the price level. Indeed, as the short-to-medium re-
lationship between money and income has become looser (as evidenced by in-
creasing difficulty in fitting well-behaved money demand functions), central
bank control of inflation has improved. The changed constitutional relation-
ship between central bank and government that has occurred in many coun-
tries appears to have produced benefits which have more than offset the in-
creasing difficulty of using monetary policy to control inflation.
But how long can that benign outcome last? It would be too much to expect
still further improvements to inflation control; that would be an excessive de-
mand on monetary policy and central banks. Our concern is whether the pres-
ent benign situation can persist. Will developments which appear to be on the
horizon loosen still further the money-income relationship, or even end it by
eliminating money as a transactions technology?
                                                          
1 The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Bank of England, City University, LSE or the University of Oxford.
The authors are grateful to Peter Andrews, Willem Buiter, Charles Goodhart, Mer-
vyn King, Andrew liliko, Stefan Schmitz, Martin Shubik, seminar participants at
the Austrian Academy of Sciences, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank
and the 2003 International Conference of Game Theory, Mumbai, India. All re-
maining errors are ours.
2 City University.
3 Bank of England, Said Business School and St. Edmund Hall of University of Ox-
ford and FMG.
4 Bank of England and City University.
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The aim of this paper is to appraise one such possible technological develop-
ment, and to model both it and money as transactions technologies. By com-
paring the models, we shall be able to appraise the future of fiat money.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first set out an outline of the tech-
nology that may replace money. Then we provide an informal description of
the model we use to appraise both this technology and fiat money as means of
conducting exchanges. This is followed by the development of our formal
model. We then develop the implications of our analysis for the survival (or
otherwise) of fiat money. This leads to a discussion of economic policy, and
then to a concluding overview of our findings and policy conclusions.
One preliminary remains: definition. McCallum (1985, 2003) distinguishes very
clearly between a monetary system of exchange, a barter system of exchange,
and an accounting system of exchange. The first is one which uses a “tangible
mechanism of exchange”; a “monetary system of exchange”, he goes on, is
“… one in which the vast majority of transactions involve money on one side”.
This he contrasts with barter, “… in which commodities are directly exchanged
without any intermediate conversion into money”. The third type of system is
one in which “… there is no money by which McCallum means at this point a
medium of exchange] but exchanges are conducted by means of signals to an
accounting network, with debits and credits to the wealth accounts of buyers
and sellers being effected with each exchange.” McCallum goes on to say that
he regards that system as non-monetary, as a “highly efficient form of barter”.
In the present paper we follow him in that. It must be noted, though, that
whether such a system would dominate barter conducted electronically but with-
out an agreed medium and unit of account should be demonstrated rather than
assumed. We do, however, leave for another paper whether electronic barter
with a mechanism and a unit of account would dominate electronic barter with-
out these two features. The question is interesting, for only if the former does
dominate is the concept and controllability of a price level a logically possible
subject for discussion in an electronic barter world. But making the compari-
son would require detailed modelling of transactions costs in the two systems,
and the results would not be relevant to the present paper’s conclusions.
3.2 Technology and Exchange
The development of electronic, and in particular of computer, technology has
led to speculation that electronic technology will replace fiat money in facili-
tating exchange. Just as barter was supplanted first by commodity money and
then by fiat money because these were superior transactions technologies, so,
it is argued, information storage and transmission will be so facilitated by com-
puter technology that in its turn fiat money will be displaced.
Central to analysis of this proposition is the medium-of-exchange function of
money. The crucial distinction is between a money-using economy and a barter
economy, whether it is one of primitive or of electronic barter, is that in the
former a medium of exchange is used. Our aim in this paper is to establish a
simple formal framework which will let us examine the crucial determinants
of whether or not a medium of exchange will be used. To do this, we con-
struct a model of exchange with costs of transacting an intrinsic part of it; for
if there are no costs of transacting then there are no transactions costs on
which a medium of exchange can economise.
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As was observed some years ago by George Stigler (1972), a world without
transactions costs would seem a very strange place. There would be no firms
– and therefore no banks, insurance companies, or other financial institutions.
And further, there would be no money. The essence of our argument is that so
long as there are transactions costs there will be money, and that even elec-
tronic barter will not, except under very special circumstances which we set
out below, be able to replace ‘fiat’ money because it will not be as effective in
reducing transactions costs. To develop the economic intuition underlying our
model we first argue informally why some form of money to mediate trade in
mass anonymous markets evolved as a device to reduce the costs of transact-
ing. Then, we go on to show that once the concept of using money had devel-
oped, still further cost reductions were achieved by a further development –
convergence to a very small number of commodities which were used as money.
Indeed, a single money is, subject to certain constraints on its issuance, the
optimal outcome. We would remark at this point that while all the subsequent
arguments are set implicitly or explicitly in an exchange economy the conclu-
sions would be expected to hold a fortiori in an economy with production, for
if there is production then the number of exchanges will exceed these in an
exchange economy with the endowment that our production economy pro-
duces.
Barter, whether with or without electronic accounting, involves the double co-
incidence of wants. The buyer must want what the seller is selling – and vice
versa. That could be eliminated by what Meltzer (1998) calls ‘barter credit’ –
supplying goods now in exchange for a promise of goods later. But such trans-
actions are rare even in economies with developed and reliable legal systems.
Why? The reason is that there is a cheaper way of transacting. Credit, whether
barter credit or not, requires the seller to know about the buyer – about his or
her creditworthiness, and the features (such as income) which contribute to that.
If a money which is widely accepted and recognised is available, then the per-
sonal attributes of the buyer become irrelevant. All that matters is what he is
offering. Less information has to be gathered, so trade becomes cheaper. This
expands the possibilities for trade, so both buyer and seller gain. (The analogy
with a tariff reduction is clear.)
For something to evolve as the sole medium of exchange of a society, rather
than be imposed as such, two conditions have to be satisfied. These are as fol-
lows. First, not all goods are equally suitable for use as money; the costs of
acquiring information must depend on the good selected. Second, the mar-
ginal cost of acquiring information about whatever is used in exchange falls
the more frequently it is used. These two features let us explain the once wide-
spread use of precious metals as a means of payment. Such metals can be as-
sayed for fineness, are divisible, can be readily quantified by weighing, and
are homogeneous – an ounce of gold of a certain fineness is identical to an-
other ounce of that fineness. Alternative monies – cattle, stones, and tablets of
salt – did not possess these attributes to anything like the same extent. These
are the attributes that guide us towards the monetary commodity. But, it should
be emphasised, the information – economising attribute is crucial. Precious
metals are not always available. If they are not, something else is used. Ciga-
rettes were used as money in German prisoner-of-war camps in the Second
World War (Radford (1945)). They were used because everyone could recog-
nise them, and knew that everyone would accept them in any exchange
We can thus see that a society will tend to evolve towards the use of a very
few commodities as money, given the assumption that not all commodities are
equally good at satisfying the medium of exchange function; and that one good
will come to dominate if the marginal cost of acquiring information about that
good falls the more it is used.
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Not only does the use of money eliminate the need to know about the buyer in
a transaction. When it has evolved into use as a unit of account, another sav-
ing is achieved. Without a medium of account and unit of account, any trans-
actor must know the bilateral exchange value of each commodity for every
other commodity.5 ‘If there are n commodities, there are at least (n(n-1))/2
separate values. The number of bilateral exchange ratios (prices) rises quickly.
With n = 100 commodities, there are at least 4,950 prices to know. At n = 500,
the number if 124,750, and with 1,000 commodities there are at least 499,500
prices. Without a unit of account, trade would be very limited by costs of in-
formation. Use of a unit of account to express value reduces the number of
prices from (n(n-1)/ 2 to n.’ Meltzer (1998).
So far we have argued that evolution to the use of a few commodities and sub-
sequently to one commodity as money, is beneficial. Subject to certain con-
straints going beyond that brings still further benefits. Paper money, so long
as there is not overissue that leads to inflation, brings a resource saving if it
substitutes in whole or in part for the commodities which heretofore had served
as money.
To summarise, we have argued that the concept and use of money emerged
through a process of search and discovery. Its advantage over barter credit,
which has some advantages over simple barter, is that it reduces transactions
costs still further by shifting attention from the qualities of the prospective pur-
chaser of a good to the qualities of what he is offering to pay for it. From (in
Allen Meltzer’s words, op cit) ‘a unique and possibly obscure set of attributes
to a common and widely known set of attributes’. A money-using society re-
quires less information than a bartering society.
Before going on to develop a formal demonstration of the above conclusions,
and then to show their relevance to the future of electronic barter and paper
money, it is useful to place the above arguments in their historical context, for
the view of the development and role of money set out above is not new. A
thorough exposition of it was provided over 100 years ago, by Carl Menger
(1892).(6) He maintained that money was a ‘social’ creation, a product of the
invisible hand. His was an example of an invisible hand explanation – in con-
trast to a government-based explanation – of a social institution (see Latzer
and Schmitz (2002)). The basic point was not original to Menger, either. (It is
a bold writer who asserts that he has found the original inventor of any eco-
nomic concept!) Adam Smith had made the point in the Wealth of Nations.
‘In order to avoid the inconvenience of such situations [where the would-be
seller of a good does not want what the would-be buyer offers] every prudent
man in every period of society, after the first establishment of the division of
labour, must naturally have endeavoured to manage his affairs in such a man-
ner, as to have at all times by him, besides the peculiar product of his own in-
dustry, a certain quantity of some one commodity or other, such as he imag-
ined few people would be likely to refuse in exchange for the product of their
industry.’ (1981 ed., pages 37-38).
                                                          
5 McCallum (2003) emphasises that the choice of a medium of account is of great im-
portance and that once that choice has been made, the subsequent choice of a unit
of account is of little significance. The example he gives is that the choice of gold or
silver as a medium of account can be vital, but once that choice is made, the quantity
of it which is the unit of account in unimportant. The debate over bimetallism in the
US in the run up to the Presidential Election of 1896 makes the point.
6 The complete text of this paper has recently been translated in English and is avail-
able in Latzer and Schmitz (2002).
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And that money was originally a social institution, although it had subsequently
become a government one, was also noted by Keynes (1935, pages 4-5).
‘Thus the Age of Money had succeeded to the Age of Barter as soon as men
had adopted a money-of-account. And the Age of State money was reached
when the state claimed the right to declare what thing should answer as money
to the current money of account – when it claimed the right not only to enforce
the dictionary but also to write the dictionary.’(7)
Now, it is not logically necessary for the medium of exchange to serve also as
the medium of account. But as several authors (Wicksell, 1935; Niehans, 1978;
and McCallum, 1985) have emphasised, if they do not coincide the “compu-
tational benefits” of having a medium of account are incomplete unless the
simple step of having it coincide with the medium of exchange is taken. Se-
vere inflation can disrupt this, but it does need to be severe; the two seem to
continue to coincide even at inflation rates well into three figures per annum.
3.3 Strategic Market Games: A Bird’s Eye View
Strategic market games provide a framework to rigorously introduce money,
other financial instruments as well as financial intermediaries to closed models.
The need for accounting clarity, institutional detail and the criterion of ‘play-
ability’ is such that minimal institutions (e.g. clearinghouses, central banks and
other financial intermediaries, credit, default etc) and well-defined price for-
mation mechanisms (sell-all, bid-offer, double auction) naturally emerge as
logical necessities in the rules of the game and the equilibrium concept used.
Ultimately, this class of games contributes to the development of formal micro
foundations to money, financial economics and macroeconomics.
Strategic market games are related to the design of resource allocation meth-
ods introduced by Hurwicz (1960, 1973). They were formally introduced by
Dubey and Shubik (1978, 1980), Shapley (1976), Shapley and Shubik (1977),
Shubik (1973) and Shubik and Wilson (1977). Three main price formation
mechanisms were introduced: one-sided Cournot type of model, a two-sided
Cournot type and a double auction (or two-sided Bertrand-Edgeworth model).
Fiat or commodity money is used and other market structures are also mod-
elled. For example, foreign exchange markets whereby no natural numéraire
or fiat money as a medium of exchange then one can employ a modified price
formation where trading posts between any two instruments or commodities are
set and consistent prices that clear all markets are determined via a giant
clearinghouse.
                                                          
7 The most fully developed modern statement of the ‘transactions cost’ theory of money
can be found in the work of Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer. The most detailed
statement of their view is given in Brunner and Meltzer (1971). Alchian (1977) also
develops the argument and Yeager (1968) draws out the implications of it for the be-
haviour of the macroeconomy. The argument that money evolved as a result of pri-
vate initiative of course leaves unexplained why all money is now state money. Some
scholars (eg Goodhart (2000)) argue that state money is an inherently superior ‘in-
stitutional symbol of trust’ (to use Shubik’s definition of money), while others (eg
Glasser (1989)) point to the successful existence of private mints until they were ex-
tinguished by law and maintain the opposite. A formal model of an explanation for
the dominance of state money can be found in Monnet (2002). An additional factor
which may predispose a society to state rather than private fiat money is the com-
parative irrelevance of the solvency of the state. See also footnote 14.
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Endogenous default, credit, financial intermediaries and incomplete asset mar-
kets are introduced and, therefore, one can formally model and analyse pay-
ment systems, monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies. For an excellent pres-
entation of these models one can consult, Shubik (1990, 1999), and for a more
technical analysis Giraud (2003). In principle, inefficiency in this class of mod-
els arises due to insufficient liquidity, or oligopolistic effects, or institutional
restrictions. Hence, active policy has non-neutral effects and possibly, but not
always, ameliorates welfare losses because of the transactions technology pre-
sent in the models. Last but not least, abstracting from the oligopolistic effects,
there exists a large literature on monetary general equilibrium models which
is akin to the strategic market games one since money and institutions are in-
troduced into the standard Arrow-Debreu model (e.g. Drèze and Polemar-
chakis (2000), Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992, 2003), Grandmont (1983), Lucas
(1980)).
In sum, since the institutions of society in general, and the financial institu-
tions in particular are the carriers of economic process a mathematical insti-
tutional economics is needed as it has been argued by Martin Shubik. This is
what strategic market games attempt so that to achieve a better understanding
of production, distribution, policy and, more generally, of political economy.
3.4 Formal Model
We use the strategic market game developed in Shubik and Tsomocos (2002).
Money depreciates (ie it wears out through deterioration of notes and coins’
quality) when used in exchange, and its replacement is costly.(8) The stipu-
lated means of exchange is fiat money and all transactions need cash in ad-
vance (see footnote 11 for the motivation of this constraint). Thus, agents bor-
row fiat money to make their transactions. The government extracts seignior-
age costs from the players in the form of interest rate payments. In order to do
so, it participates in exchange and bids to provide for its inputs of production.
The objective function of the government for the purposes of our argument,
without loss of generality, is to minimise the interest rate subject to the re-
quirement to replace worn out fiat money used in exchange, and the interest
rate which is a choice variable of the government determines its revenues. We
assume that the initial money supply enters exogenously. Figure 3.4-1 shows
the extensive form of the game. The exchange game is a one-period game with
four subperiods. At each subperiod, as we explain below, an agent or a group
of agents move. We first modify the game to admit both fiat money and elec-
tronic barter. We conceptualise electronic barter mediated as through a giant
clearing house run by an institution, perhaps the government. We then analyse
the condition under which fiat money dominates electronic barter.
                                                          
8 Calculations of the rate of depreciation of various types of money can be found in
Shubik and Tsomocos (op cit).
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Pg
P1, ..., PH
Settlement (agents pay back their loan)
Pg Pg
Government Sets
interest rate
Money market
(Loans of fiat money)
Exchange
P1, ..., PH, Pg
Government replaces
depreciated money
...       ...       ...
Figure 3.4-1: Trade with seigniorage cost of fiat money
(Note that the labelling P1, … ,PH and similarly P1, … ,PH, Pg indicate that all agents
move simultaneously. Also, the arrows indicate that there is a continuum of their re-
spective strategies.)
At the first move the government Pg, determines the interest rate. At the sec-
ond move, individuals, P1, …, PH, obtain fiat money in the money market at
the predetermined interest rate. At the third move, individuals exchange com-
modities and the government buys inputs of production to be used in the re-
placement of depreciated fiat money. We maintain simplicity of strategy sets
by assuming a continuum of traders, simultaneous moves, and a minimum of
information at the second and the third stage. Then traders pay back their
loans, and finally the government replaces depreciated money.
The government levies seigniorage costs to replenish depreciated money and
also participates in exchange.(9)
Let { } H..., 1, Hh =∈ be the set of agents and { } L..., 1, Ll =∈ be the set
of tradable commodities. Each agent is endowed with a vector of commodi-
ties Lhe +ℜ∈ .
The utility functions of agents are of the form  ℜ→ℜLh :u .
                                                          
9 A more extensive presentation and discussion can be found in Shubik and Tsomocos
(2002).
Government sets
interest rate …
... and collects
seigniorage to replenish
depreciated money
Agents maximise utility
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The following assumptions hold:
(i) ∑
∈
>>
Hh
h 0e
(ie every commodity is present in the economy).
(ii) ∀≠ 0,eh  Hh∈
(ie no agent has the null endowment of commodities).
(iii) hu  is continuous, concave and strictly monotonic ∀  Hh∈ .
(ie the more consumption the better).
Agents maximise their utility of consumption subject to the following con-
straints:
∑
∈
≤
Ll
hh
l vb (1)
(ie expenditures in commodities ≤ borrowed money).
h
l
h
l eq ≤ , ∀  Ll∈ (2)
(ie sales of commodities ≤ endowment of commodities).
∆(1)qp vr)(1
Ll
h
ll
h +≤+ ∑
∈
(3)
(ie loan repayment ≤ receipts from sales of commodities + money at hand).
where, ≡hlb money bid of h for the purchase of commodity L,l∈
≡hlq quantity of commodity Ll∈  offered by h,
≡hv loans contracted by h,
r   ≡ loan interest rate,
≡lp commodity price of Ll∈ and
∆(1) is the difference between the right and left-hand sides of equation (1).
As can be seen from the budget constraints (1) and (3) receipts from sales of
commodities cannot be used contemporaneously for financing purchases of
other commodities. This is the essence of the cash-in-advance constraint which
can also be thought as a liquidity constraint.
The exogenously fixed money supply M depreciates at a rate η .
Thus, if the total amount of fiat money borrowed by the agents from the
government (or central bank) is ∑
∈
=
Hh
h µv  and the expenditure of the
government for the purchase of inputs of production is g  then ( )gµη +  is the
depreciated amount of money, since ( )gµ +  is the total amount of money in
circulation.
A cash-in-advance
constraint applies
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The government’s production function for money exhibits decreasing returns
to scale in order to generate a unique optimum.(10)
( )gLg11L x,...,xFz =+ (4)
with
≡+1Lz amount of fiat money produced,
≡gtx inputs of production.
We impose the standard technical assumptions on the government’s produc-
tion set, Lgy +ℜ∈ , that guarantee feasibility and the existence of a solution to
the government’s maximisation problem.
(iv) gy0∈ ,
(v) gy  is convex and closed
(vi) ∃  if0B ∋> ( ) g1LgLg1 yz;x,...,x ∈+  then
B,xgl ∈  ∀  Ll∈  and B.z 1L ≤+
The government seeks to minimise interest rates because it simply aims to levy
the necessary seigniorage to replace depreciated fiat money. Thus the govern-
ment’s optimisation problem becomes,(11)
Ll,br, gl
max
∈
(12) -r
s.t 

 += ∑ ∑
∈ ∈+ Hh Ll
g
l
h
1L bvηz (5)
∑ ∑
∈ ∈
=
Ll Hh
hg
l vrb (6)
Where (5) is the amount of depreciated money that needs to be replaced, and
(6) is the budget constraint of the government (ie its expenditures to finance
the cost of production come from seigniorage).
The final allocations for the agents and the government are:
l
h
lh
l
h
l
h
l p
bqex +−= , ∀  Ll∈ (7)
(ie consumption = initial endowment – sales + purchases).
                                                          
10 For example, a Leontief production technology with coefficients
].x,...,γx[γminL, z l , γ gLL
g
111Ll =∈∀ +
If another technology were chosen, a unique equilibrium could be guaranteed by
an exogenous institutional constraint, such as a price level target.
11 Government purchases are all used in the production process, ie government does
not obtain utility from consumption.
12 Mathematically, minimisation of r is equivalent to maximise –r.
Government minimises
interest rate given costs
of production of money
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and
l
g
lg
l p
bx = (8)
(government’s inputs of production = money offered / prices).
Note that the relation between η and r is a complicated one and depends on
gains from trade that in turn determine the volume of transactions. The inter-
est rate r is set by the government to raise seigniorage revenue for the financ-
ing of fiat money production so as the replace depreciated money.
Finally, a Nash equilibrium (NE) or ( )ghhh ,x,ηη,M,,eH,uΓ  is a set of
strategy choices,
( ) ( ),p;b,x,qb,sss glhlhlhlgh == ; ∀  h H∈  and the government, and
( ) ∑ ×=∈= ∈ , BBΧ,ααα ghHhgh ∋
( ) ( )sΠs/αΠ ≤ (9)
where gh,BB  are the choice sets of the agents and the government
(ie 〉−〈= ∈ ) hold2()1:(),v,q(bB Llhhlhlh and
〉−〈= ∈ ) hold6()5:()(r,bB Llglg ), and ( )s/α  is s with either ts  or gs
replaced by any other strategy choice ta  or ga .(13) Also, Π(⋅) represents the
payoff functions of agents ( Πh(⋅) = uh ) and of the government ( Πg(⋅) = -r ).
Prices are formed using the Dubey and Shubik (1978) price formation mecha-
nism. Prices are by that mechanism formed as the ratio of the aggregate cash
bid in a particular market to the aggregate quantity of commodities offered for
sale. This is equivalent to an equilibrium condition; its accounting clarity al-
lows for cash flows in the economy to be traced precisely.
Thus, =lp






>+
+
∑ ∑∑
∑
∈ ∈
∈
∈
otherwise,0
0q;bbif,
q
bb
Hh Hh
h
l
g
l
h
l
Hh
h
l
Hh
g
l
h
l
(10)
The existence and inefficiency theorems for these outcomes are stated and
proved in Shubik and Tsomocos (2002). Here we will focus our attention on
the relative efficiency of using alternative means of payments (on fiat money
versus electronic barter).
                                                          
13 Without loss of generality, we consider the case of perfect competition (ie a contin-
uum of agents). Thus, agents regard prices as fixed in the optimisation problems.
Price formation
based on nominal
demand = nominal supply
3.5  Trade with fiat money versus electronic barter _______________________________________________________________  49
3.5 Trade with fiat money versus electronic barter
We conceptualise exchange using fiat money as follows. Consider a simple
case in which L = 4. Fiat money can be exchanged against every commodity
but commodities cannot be exchanged with each other. Figure 3.5-1 describes
the situation. The arcs connecting m with commodities 1, 2, 3, and 4 indicate
that money can be exchanged against all commodities. On the other hand,
commodities cannot be exchanged with each other (ie there are no arcs con-
necting them).(14)
1
2
3
4
m 3 4
1 2
Figure 3.5-1: Figure 3.5-2:
Trade with fiat money Trade via electronic barter
Thus, there exist four markets. If on the other hand we want to conceptualise
‘electronic barter’ we assume that commodities can be exchanged with each
other, perhaps via an accounting device of e-barter, which now becomes the
stipulated means of exchange, through a clearing house that matches demand
and supply.
In this case there will be 
( )
2
1LL −
 markets, ie, six markets altogether.(15)
Thus, in Figure 3.5-2 arcs connect all commodities with each other indicating
that exchange occurs via electronic barter.
Let us assume that the combined cost of gathering and then processing infor-
mation on each transaction is c. On the other hand trade with fiat money, by
virtue of its anonymity, divisibility, fungibility and its other properties does
not require any additional costs except its production and replacement costs.
These are covered in its production process as described in (4). Also, infor-
mation costs concerning the creditworthiness of borrowers in a fiat money
economy are dealt by commercial banks and not by the original issuers of
money (ie central banks) or by those who accept money in exchange for goods
or services. These costs cannot be avoided by the operators of the central clear-
ing house (or a similar transactions institution) that implements electronic
barter. Then the total cost of exchange with e-barter is:
                                                          
14 Note that the constraint that goods cannot be directly exchanged for goods is not im-
posed but naturally emerges as a consequence of our prior argument that trade with
money dominates primitive barter.
15 Extensive discussion on various market structures and how these affect exchange is
contained in Shubik (1999).
Fiat money can be
exchanged against all
commodities
Information problems
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commercial banks
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( ) )1 (H 
2
1LcLC +−= (16) (11)
We note that each agent participates in only one side of the market since wash
sales (ie the same individual participating in both sides of a particular market)
are not profitable in a strategic market game without oligopolistic effects. If
we assume that set-up costs for establishing either of the two market structures
are negligible we have proposition 1. We also note that the total cost of fiat
money and of electronic barter is endogenously determined; both depend on
the volume of transactions; see equations (6) and (11).
Proposition 1:
The cost of exchange with fiat money is lower than exchange with e-barter
provided that,
 v, where M0r M)1 c (H 
2
)1L(L
Hh
h∑ ∈=>−+−
Proof:
The cost of exchange with fiat money is ∑ ∈Hh hvr (∗),
since replacement of depreciated money is financed by seigniorage which is
levied by interest rates.
Hence, (11) – (∗) = ∑ ∈−+− Hh hvr )1 c (H 2
)1L(L
represents the cost difference of exchange with electronic barter versus fiat
money.
One point can usefully be made here about this relationship. If we imagine
technical progress lowering c, the very same process is likely to increase the
number of commodities, L. Indeed, over time we have seen a proliferation of
traded commodities most of them being associated with technical progress.
Note also that while the lower bound of r is zero, that of c is inevitably above
zero.(17)
Proposition 1 underlines the fact that fiat money is a decoupling device that
economises on transaction costs regardless from where they emanate (ie proc-
essing, information acquisition etc). On the other hand, electronic barter is a
centralised accounting mechanism that requires detailed knowledge of every
transaction. Thus, it inevitably entails higher aggregate costs in complicated
market systems with multiple markets and commodities. It is not a coincidence
that the advent of money (or equivalently the decline of barter) occurred con-
temporaneously with the development of the market system.
                                                          
16 We implicitly assume that we are in equilibrium such that agents participate in all
markets.
17 Why money is replaced by barter as a result of hyperinflation is summarised in the
above relationship. In hyperinflation, the nominal interest rate rises enormously. See
Capie (1986) for a review of some such episodes.
Fiat money is more
efficient in exchange
than barter
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Proposition 2:
The equilibria of
( )ghhh ,x,ηη, ,eH,uΓ
with trade with fiat money coincide with those of the corresponding game with
e-barter only if r = 0 and c = 0.
Proof:
If 0r = and 0c = the two alternative methods of financing trade produce same
commodity allocations. To get the same prices and allocations set
l
Hh
h
l
Hh
h
l
p
q
b
=∑
∑
∈
∈  and 
l
h
lh
l
h
l
h
l p
bqex +−= H.hL,l ∈∈∀
Then, regardless whether trade is conducted with fiat or through electronic
barter the same equilibrium obtains.
Proposition 2 underlines the fact alternative methods of financing become dis-
tinct only when transactions costs are present in the economy. Unless one in-
troduces process and the organisational details of market transactions, it is dif-
ficult to delineate the differences between alternative media of exchange. Both
of them, without transactions costs, are identical units of account. Money is
both neutral and super-neutral. Trade, no matter how organised, generates the
same allocations. Whenever 0r = and 0c = then money is a ‘veil’. For more
on this see Shubik and Tsomocos (2002) and Tsomocos (1996), (2003a,
2003b). Even in the case of bimetallism or multiple means of exchange as long
as there are determinate conversion rates among the media of exchange the
analysis can be conducted in terms of a ‘primary’ means of payment. However,
the allocations generated by the two methods of financing trade are not un-
ambiguously Pareto ranked whenever r, c ≠ 0. It remains an open question to
determine the conditions on r and c that allow one method to generate Pareto
superior allocations over the other.
A natural question that emerges from this analysis is whether it is possible for
fiat money and electronic barter to coexist in equilibrium; in particular, whether
fiat money can be used for a subset of commodities and electronic barter for
the rest. This issue is complicated and beyond the scope of our present analy-
sis, since the volume of transactions with each medium of exchange is endoge-
nously determined and in turn determines the subset of commodities whose
trade might occur with each medium of exchange. Also, the gains from trade
of each commodity influence the marginal benefit and cost using different
methods of financing trade. For example, if there exist big gains from trade in
a specific commodity, the government may reduce the marginal cost of trad-
ing in that market by introducing electronic barter and thus avoiding depre-
ciation of fiat money used in this particular very liquid market. We plan to
explore this question in future research.
e-barter only as
efficient as fiat money
if r = 0 and c = 0
Without transaction
costs there is no need for
media of exchange in
the first place
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3.6 The price level – meaningful and determinate
The intrinsic informational superiority of central bank issued base money will
ensure that demand for it is not extinguished by the growth of e-barter. De-
mand will remain from the non-bank public, and, because of that, derived de-
mand will remain from the banking sector. The central bank will thus retain
control of short-term interest rates.(18) This might seem at first glance sufficient
for it to retain control of the price level; for in many models a short rate is the
sole transmitter of monetary policy actions. For example, much recent work on
monetary policy uses small macroeconomic models which include an IS func-
tion analogous to that in a basic IS-LM model. These can be backward look-
ing, and thus very close to the traditional specification (eg Fuhrer and Moore
(1995)), or forward looking, embodying rational expectations (eg McCallum
and Nelson (1999a)). But whatever the specification, a common feature is that
demand for current output is a function of the real rate of interest, and that rate
in turn is typically assumed to be a short-term nominal rate. There is a crucial
assumption of slow price level adjustment; monetary policy in such models
affects output and inflation only through its effects on the real rate of interest.
This is surely a somewhat hazardous assumption in the present context. Slug-
gish price adjustment is a result of price adjustment being costly. In a world
where transactions costs have been drastically reduced by technical progress,
it would be strange to assume that the costs of price adjustment remained un-
affected. Accordingly, it also seems strange to continue to argue that mone-
tary policy depends crucially for its effectiveness on prices being statutory.
It is all the stranger since no such dependence is necessary.
Viewing the short rate as the sole transmitter of monetary policy is unneces-
sarily restrictive both theoretically and empirically. Allan Meltzer (1999a) has
recently summarised the body of theory and evidence which considers that
specification to be inadequate. He argued that although so long as prices are
sticky the real interest rate is indeed affected by central bank operations, so too
is the real monetary base, and changes in the latter affect aggregate demand in
ways additional to the effect of changes in the real interest rate. Meltzer (1999b)
reports empirical results for the United States which support this argument, as
does Nelson (2000) for the United Kingdom. (The result is not novel; earlier
work (eg Mills and Wood (1977)) found a relationship between the base and
the price level over long runs of data in the United Kingdom.) Nelson (op cit)
provides a clear summary of his results as follows:
“The common feature of the regressions is that for the United States and the
United Kingdom, real money growth enters output regressions sizeably, posi-
tively, and significantly. The real interest rate generally enters with a negative
sign, though both the sign and the significance of the real interest rate term ap-
pear to be less consistent across sub-samples than those of the money growth
terms?” (page 13, emphasis added.)
These empirical results are consistent with two quite distinct bodies of analy-
sis. One is on an approach which assumes utility is non-separable in consump-
tion and real money holdings. This justifies a real money balance term in the
IS function as a result of optimising behaviour. Koenig (1990) reports results
                                                          
18 We do not imply that without such demand it would lose control of short rates.
The argument in Goodhart (op cit) that the central bank can control rates through
its being able to sustain losses seems to us to be correct, despite objections of Sel-
gin and White (2002).
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…
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which support this; but others (eg McCallum (1999)) suggest that the coeffi-
cient on real balances is likely to be small).
A direct role for money is perhaps better defended and explained by an ap-
proach with much earlier origins. David Hume (1752) thought that money af-
fected the economy through a wide variety of channels, and expressed this
thought in a metaphor – water flowing from one place to another – that fre-
quently recurs in the discussions of the money transmission process.(19)
‘Money always finds its way back again by a hundred canals, of which we have
not notion or suspicion … For above a thousand years, the money of Europe
has been flowing to Rome, by one open and sensible current; but it has been
emptied by many secret and insensible canals.’ (page 48, 1955 reprint).
The many channels view is also articulated by Friedman and Schwartz (1982,
pages 486-87).
‘… The attempt to correct portfolio imbalances (resulting from an increase
in the money stock) raises the prices of the sources of service flows rela-
tive to the flows themselves which leads to an increase in spending both on
the service flows and then produce a new source of service flows….Sooner
or later the acceleration in nominal income will have to take the form of
rising prices, since the initial position was assumed to be one of equilib-
rium and we have introduced nothing to change the long-run trend of nomi-
nal income.’
This argument is also expressed in Brunner and Meltzer (1993) and was stated
very succinctly in Meltzer (1999b), as follows:
‘Monetary policy works by changing relative prices. There are many, many,
such prices. Some economists erroneously believe … monetary policy works
only by changing a single short-term interest rate.’
He also argues (1999a) that money balances are crucial in the transmission
mechanism. He sees ‘…the gap between desired and actual real balances as a
measure of the relative price adjustment required to restore full equilibrium’.
Our formal model (Section IV) which compared fiat money with electronic
barter (Section V) also yields the result that control of the issue of fiat money
controls the price level without any intermediation through an interest rate
channel. Our model manifests real as well as nominal determinacy as has
been shown in Tsomocos (1996, 2003a, 2003b). This is unlike the classical
competitive model which possesses a ‘finite’ number of equilibria with respect
to real allocations; only relative prices can be determined. Our model resolves
nominal indeterminacy through the presence of private liquid wealth (Tsomo-
cos (1996)). By liquid wealth we mean a commodity or a monetary instrument
which can be used interchangeably with money in real, financial, or bank trans-
actions, and its conversion rate is institutionally predetermined. The essence
of the determinacy argument and consequently of the non-neutrality result is
that monetary policy affects nominal variables, yet if private liquid wealth is
non-zero then monetary changes affect directly the endowments of agents re-
sulting in different optimisation choices and consequently different real con-
sumption. The issues of determinacy and money non-neutrality are intimately
connected and are analytically equivalent.
                                                          
19 See Wood (1995) for a discussion of the development of the quantity theory and the
history of the ‘water’ metaphor.
The formal model also
yields the result the
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Finally, if a model does not possess equilibria that are nominally determinate
then any discussion of exchange with a particular means of payment (either
fiat or e-barter) is not legitimate. If multiple price levels support the same equi-
librium real allocations then it is impossible to compare the relative virtues of
exchange with different means of payment.20
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we first set out the argument (a very traditional one) that money
evolved to reduce transaction costs by economising on information.
A formal model in which money existed by virtue of that property was then
developed and the costs of operating a fiat money system were compared with
the costs of operating a system of electronic barter. The key cost parameters
were identified. It was shown that within this framework fiat money domi-
nates – is cheaper than – electronic barter, unless inflation drives up the nomi-
nal interest rate. Secondly, increases in the number of commodities increase
the costs of electronic barter faster than they do the costs of using fiat money;
and finally that the lower bound to the cost of using fiat money is always be-
low that of electronic barter. Thus fiat money is a superior transaction tech-
nology to electronic barter; transaction chains that use it have intrinsically lower
information requirements. The resulting demand for fiat money by the non-
bank public will in turn give rise to demand by the banking sector. Their joint
demands will ensure both that central banks survive, and that they will retain
control of a price level measured in the money they issue. Institutional change
in the payments system will no doubt have quantitative implications for cen-
tral bank operations, but it will not have qualitative implications for them.
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4 eMoney and Monetary Policy:
The Role of the Inter-eMoney-Institution
Market for Settlement Media and the
Unit of Account
A Critical Assessment of the Literature
Stefan W. Schmitz
Introduction
This paper presents a critical assessment of the literature on eMoney and
monetary policy. After briefly summarizing my own results on eMoney, re-
deemability, the unit of account and monetary policy, I arrange the alternative
models of eMoney and monetary policy in three categories. Firstly, I present
models which assume that central bank money will be replaced by another
medium of exchange. Secondly, I review models that argue that the residual
demand for base money will remain positive, and thirdly, those that propose
payments systems with a publicly sanctioned unit of account but without a
generally accepted medium of exchange (GAME) in which net balances are
either settled by privately issued fiat-type money or the transfer of wealth. In
the case of the latter I discuss the implicit models of the market for media of
settlement between eMoney-institutions and the role of the unit of account. I
emphasize the relationship between the function of money as the generally ac-
cepted medium of exchange (GAME) and its function as the unit of account,
in doing so. I conclude that the alternative models of a world without money
are inconsistent and incomplete, thus, confirming my own results on eMoney,
redeemability, the unit of account and monetary policy by rejecting the alter-
natives.
In Schmitz (2002b) I present the arguments for the likely evolution of the in-
stitutional structure of electronic money schemes and the implications for the
monopoly of the central bank (CB) to provide the generally accepted medium
of exchange (GAME) and the unit of account. In section 4.1 I briefly summa-
rise the methodological approach, the arguments and the results on eMoney,
redeemability, the unit of account and monetary policy.
In this paper I focus on the discussion of alternative models and opposing views
of the ongoing institutional change in the economy-wide payments system with
particular attention to electronic money. I argue that these alternatives are in-
complete and inconsistent, thus, strengthening the conclusions in Schmitz (2002b)
by rejecting the alternatives. The analysis focuses on the role of the inter-
eMoney-institution market for settlement media (henceforth “money market”),
the existence of a GAME and its function as the unit of account.
Analysis of altern
ative models
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This paper is structured along the following lines: In section 4.1 I present a short
summary of the appropriate methodological approach to the analysis of the
institutional structure of eMoney-schemes and the ensuing results as derived
in Schmitz (2002a, b). In section 4.2 I classify the vast literature on eMoney and
a world without money according to common approaches to the GAME and the
unit of account and provide a critical assessment of each class of models in
turn. Section 4.3 summarises the results and concludes the paper.
4.1 eMoney:
Redeemability, the Unit of Account and Monetary Policy
The evolution of payments systems is subject to ongoing institutional change,
e.g. the emergence of coinage, transferable deposits and banknotes, fiat money
and credit card systems. The diffusion of electronic money schemes is a further
instance of institutional change. The method of institutional analysis is the ap-
propriate concept to investigate the likely consequences of the diffusion of
eMoney. The evolution of the retail payment system is path dependent as the
existence of a generally accepted medium of exchange (GAME) and a uni-
form unit of account can be interpreted as information networks that exhibit
network effects.1 In the current state of payments systems a dominant medium
of exchange prevails in the respective market where it also entails the function
of the uniform unit of account. The analysis of the effects of the diffusion of
eMoney-schemes has (i) to derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for
a transition from one GAME and the associated unit of account to another and
(ii) the effects of the diffusion of new technologies on the evolution of pay-
ments systems with respect to these conditions. I.e. will the diffusion of eMoney
lead to a sufficient reduction in the marginal costs of adopting a potentially
emerging new GAME individually?2 How does the payments system operate
in the phase of transition form one GAME to another? Is the parallel use of
multiple units of account efficient and sustainable? An appropriate methodol-
ogy to address the individual decisions at the margin – i.e. the individual
choice of medium of exchange and unit of account in a given institutional ar-
rangement – is based on New Institutional Economics, i.e. methodological in-
dividualism, transaction and information costs and an explicit analysis of the
process of transition between equilibria. In Schmitz (2002a) I argued that cur-
rent neoclassical models of money based on comparative static analysis are
inappropriate to analyse institutional change in the payments system, as they
do not account for the dynamics of transition between equilibria.3
                                                          
1 See Menger 1909, Krüger 1999, Schmitz 2002b, Selgin/White 2002 and Streissler 2002.
2 Another potential direction of research would address the following question: Will
the institutional change in the payments system reduce the marginal costs of coor-
dination to reduce the marginal costs of a socially concerted adoption of a new GAME
and a new unit of account? This question is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
3 In the literature on New Monetary Economics and its predecessors the transition is
not conceptualised uniformly. Some models argue that a new unit of account emerges
in an evolutionary manner with the potential for the parallel use of multiple units of
account, others assume that a new unit of account can only be introduced by gov-
ernment regulation (see Cowen/Kroszner 1992, 1994, Krüger 1999).
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Schmitz (2002b) shows that the parallel use of multiple units of account is not
desirable, and in the case of fiat-type currencies not feasible.4 The argument
does not provide a rational for legal barriers against potential currency com-
petition.5 I demonstrate that users and issuers face strong strategic incentives
not to opt for an alternative unit of account in eMoney schemes under current
inflation rates. On the one hand this result is due to network effects, sunk
costs6, information costs and switching costs which are characteristic for re-
tail payment systems and the choice of the unit of account.7 On the other hand
the argument rests on the findings regarding the underlying mechanism of price
formation: In the case of a price matching strategy, the existence and sufficient
liquidity of markets denominated in the dominant unit of account are neces-
sary preconditions for eMoney-schemes – denominated in alternative units of
account – to be able to quote prices in the alternative unit of account. Trading
on markets denominated in the alternative unit of accounts involve higher prices
due to a spread in exchange between the dominant unit of account and the al-
ternative ones.8 In the case of a price discovery strategy, the market denomi-
nated in the eMoney unit of account is less liquid relative to the one denomi-
nated in the dominating unit of account. Thus, the intensity of competition and
the information content of prices are lower, the spread between bid and ask
prices is higher. The institutional analysis of eMoney and monetary policy ana-
lyzes the choice of unit of account in an environment of a dominant unit of
account. At moderate levels of inflation, participants in the payment system
have no incentive to switch from the dominant unit of account to an emerging
alternative in the relevant market. Consequently, the most likely institutional
structure of emerging eMoney schemes includes denomination in the dominant
unit of account and redeemability, which is argued to be a necessary but not
sufficient precondition for the sustainable exchange of eMonies for CB money
at par.
The role of national currencies as units of account will not be diminished by
the diffusion of eMoney at current moderate levels of inflation. As CBs hold
on to the monopoly of the supply of the GAME, they retain control of its sup-
ply and its purchasing power, in principle. The balance sheet of CBs will
shorten relative to a world without eMoney which is mainly a positive sign as
institutional change in the payments system (e.g. net settlement systems, elec-
tronic wholesale and retail payments systems) increases its efficiency – which
                                                          
4 Crede (1995), Matonis (1995), England (1996), Kobrin (1997), Cohen (2001) and
Kroszner (2001) suggest the parallel use of multiple units of accounts is desirable
and indeed likely due to the diffusion of eMoney.
5 Models of the parallel use of multiple units of account often confuse this concept with
currency competition (e.g. Cohen 2001, Kroszner 2001).
6 Individuals joining a new electronic payments system invest in the new technology
in various ways (including software, acquiring the necessary technology competence,
and buy an initial balance of electronic funds) .
7 Similar arguments with respect to the role of network effects are also advanced in
Krüger 1999.
8 The spread is determined by the degree of uncertainty, the risk and uncertainty pre-
ferences of individuals, resource costs of holding inventory positions in different
risky assets (i.e. not nominally fixed with respect to the GAME) and the related risk
and uncertainty, the market structure, potential asymmetries of information amongst
traders, and transaction as well as information costs (see O’Hara 1997, Goodhart
1989). It is the price for the service provided by market makers – the service of im-
mediacy. The GAME is the most liquid good in the economy, the good with the high-
est marketability and, thus, involves the lowest spread (Menger 1909). It is unlikely
that the spread is completely eliminated by technological innovation unless transac-
tion costs are completely eradicated (see Krüger 1999 and Schmitz 2002b).
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implies that monetary policy becomes rather more than less effective.9 More-
over, CBs have proven to cope well with similar changes in the past (e.g. dif-
fusion of credit and debit cards10, elimination of reserve requirements in Aus-
tralia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom11). In an economy in
which CB money serves as the GAME and the unit of account, the crucial ques-
tion is how the emergence and diffusion of eMoney will affect the predictabil-
ity of the relationship between the instruments (i.e. US federal funds rate, ECB
main refinancing operations minimum bid rate), aggregate spending and the
objectives of monetary policy.
4.2 The Inconsistency and Incompleteness
of Alternative Models of eMoney and a World without Money
In this section I provide a critical assessment of models of monetary policy in
economies without CB money. I classify the models according to their ap-
proach to the institutional structure of the monetary system.12 In section 4.2.1 I
present models which assume that CB money will be replaced by other media
of exchange. In section 4.2.2 I review models that focus on arguments that the
residual demand for CB money remains positive. In section 4.2.3 I analyse mod-
els that propose payments systems with a publicly sanctioned unit of account
but without a generally accepted medium of exchange (GAME) in which net
balances are either settled by privately issued fiat-type money or the transfer
of wealth. In the discussion I focus on the (often) implicit institutional structure
of the monetary systems presented; that is on the models of the market for
media of settlement between eMoney-institutions, the existence of a GAME
and a unit of account. I emphasize the relationship between the function of
money as the GAME and its function as the unit of account.
4.2.1 Models assuming the Proliferation
of other Media of Exchange and Units of Account
Despite the large number of papers addressing the issue of electronic money
and monetary policy dating prior to the year 1999, the current debate was
strongly influenced by Friedman (1999, 2000).13 He does not doubt that the
CB retains its monopoly to influence the level of reserves in the economy de-
nominated in CB money but he questions the relevance of that monopoly over
                                                          
  9 Selgin 1996 and Selgin/White 2002 argue that monetary policy becomes even more
effective as the elimination of currency would reduce the variability of the money mul-
tiplier and, thus, increase the predictability of the relationship between central bank
(CB) money and nominal spending. Furthermore, the ratio of CB money to broad
money is so reduced that each unit change becomes more effective at the margin.
10 See Freedman 2000.
11 See Sellon/Weiner 1997 and Woodford 2002.
12 Many proposals discussed in this section display similarities to the BFH approach
to monetary economics pioneered by Black, Fama, Hall, developed by Greenfield/
Yeager (1983) and summarized in Cowen/Kroszner (1994) as New Monetary Eco-
nomics. Krüger (1999) critically discusses the BFH approach to eMoney and the
structure of the financial/monetary system.
13 E.g. Crede (1995), Matonis (1995), England (1996), Selgin (1996) and Kobrin (1997).
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the next quarter century. It is challenged by a potential reduction of the demand
for CB reserves due to privately operated retail payment systems – namely
private (electronic) monies which are not redeemable in CB reserves. Exam-
ples include issuers like the MTA (Metropolitan Transport Authority) and tele-
phone service providers. Furthermore, currency is supposed to be of little rele-
vance to transactions in the economy and is viewed as largely endogenous as
the CB accommodates the public’s demand for currency.
He conjectures that at the same time, institutional change in financial markets
– largely driven by innovations in information and communication technology
(ICT) pose a threat to the credit channel of the monetary transmission mecha-
nism. Non-bank financial intermediaries play an increasingly important role
in the provision of credit to the real sector without being subject to reserve
requirements. Disintermediation and securitization enable the real economy to
allocate savings and investment on financial markets directly. “From the per-
spective of the “credit view”, therefore, the CB’s monopoly over the supply
of reserves is irrelevant.” (Friedman 1999, 332).
Banks hold reserves at the CB because CB money is the only means of pay-
ment that provide settlement finality – they are the medium of final settlement.
Private competition might challenge that role of CB reserves too, as private
clearinghouses can provide net settlement in terms of their own liabilities.
Currently, these liabilities are denominated and redeemable in CB money such
that the clearinghouse needs to hold reserves on the books of the CB. In addi-
tion, all balances not netted out during the day continue to be settled in CB
money so that the system remains ultimately anchored in CB money. If the
balances on the clearinghouse’s books gain settlement finality, the demand for
CB reserves derived from inter-bank settlement might be reduced to an extent
that renders CB policy instruments ineffective.
Friedman (2000) clarifies the argument in the light of critique put forward by
Goodhart (2000), Freedman (2000) and Woodford (2000). Extreme events such
as the elimination of demand for CB money (reserves and/or cash), he argues,
are not necessary preconditions for the loss of efficacy of traditional monetary
policy instruments. Monetary policy actions still affect the level of economic
activity and asset prices in those parts of the economy that are directly or in-
directly based on CB money. He questions, however, that these economic con-
sequence are related in any close manner to the general price level, to aggre-
gate output fluctuations and asset prices in the entire economy, at the margin.
The monetary policy decisions of the CB will fail to move market rates, as the
market might no longer attribute the CB the power to move the real market
rate at its own discretion without large market interventions. Already the vol-
ume of CB market intervention is relatively low compared to total volume and
as the balance sheets of CBs will shrink, they will have to relay on “Open
Mouth Operations” even more.
Discussion
Although the effects of advances in ICT on the institutional foundations of fi-
nancial markets and the financial system are uncertain and to some extent nec-
essarily speculative, there are analytical instruments available to investigate the
likelihood, the preconditions and the likely effects of such change.14 Especially,
the evolution of private and inter-bank payments systems would deserve a more
detailed analysis of the institutional arrangements involved and their conse-
                                                          
14 See e.g. the papers presented at the FRBNY Conference on Financial Innovation
and Monetary Transmission, 5-6 April 2001, New York 
<http://www.ny.frb.org/pihome/news/speeches/finmon/finmon.html>.
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quences for the role of CB money as the unit of account and the medium of
final settlement. Neither in the case of privately issued fiat-type monies and the
parallel use of multiple units of account nor in the case of privately operated
wholesale payments system does Friedman provide any details of the institu-
tional structure of the model nor of the transition between the current institu-
tional arrangements and the envisaged monetary and financial future.15 The dif-
ferent strands of reasoning in Friedman (1999) show a common structure: on-
going trends that imply the reduction of the ratio of CB money to aggregate
spending – through privately operated clearing mechanisms (e.g. CHIPS) or
innovations in the area of retail payment systems (credit, debit and smart cards)
– are extrapolated further to the mathematical limit. The amount of CB money
necessary to operate wholesale and retail payment systems finally reaches zero.
Friedman implicitly assumes that the behaviour of the monetary system while
approaching the limit, and once it has reached the limit, exhibits structural con-
tinuity, in principle.16 Even though CB money is expected to become irrele-
vant in the limit, the monetary system does not exhibit any signs of instability
or structural changes. It remains unclear whether another medium of exchange
will assume the GAME and the unit of account-function. The consequences for
the real economy and the monetary system of neither option are considered.
Structural effects of an economy approaching the limit and finally reaching it
are neither explicitly nor implicitly discussed.
Both, the institutional structure of inter-bank settlement systems and of retail
payment systems have changed considerably over the past decades due to fi-
nancial innovation.17 The economy-wide payments system has had to adapt to
the interdependent trends of globalisation, liberalisation, advances in ICT and
increasing financial sophistication. Friedman fails to present convincing argu-
ments and evidence that these processes towards the limit have reduced the
efficacy of monetary policy so far. Furthermore, he presents no detailed ar-
gument for the assertion that the link between monetary policy instruments
and aggregate spending will loosen at the margin. The argument rests upon the
claim that the market might no longer attribute the CB the power to move the
real market rate at its own discretion without large market interventions. Fried-
man claims that extreme events – such as the elimination of demand for CB
money – are a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the loss of efficacy
of monetary policy, he fails to demonstrate why the market should discontinue
to act upon the announcements of the CB as long as the CB retains its monop-
oly to supply the GAME and the unit of account at zero marginal costs. He
does not expand on the preconditions under which the CB looses its monop-
oly before the limit is reached, nor does he discuss the institutional structure
of the monetary system in the limit.
Goodhart (2000), Freedman (2000) and Woodford (2000) present a number
of counter-arguments to Friedman’s gloomy forecast.
                                                          
15 See Freixas/Holthausen/Terol/Thygessen 2001 for wholesale payment systems. For
alternative media of exchange and the parallel use of multiple units of account see
Crede (1995), Matonis (1995), England (1996), Selgin (1996) and Kobrin (1997),
Cohen (2001), and Kroszner (2001) and for criticism of their positions see Schmitz
2002b and Selgin/White 2002.
16 A similar approach is adopted in Woodford (1998) and discussed in McCallum (2000).
17 For related empirical evidence see Pringle/Robinson (2002).
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4.2.2 Models focusing on the
Evolution of the Demand for Central Bank Money
Goodhart (2000) focuses on the question whether the diffusion of ICT will
completely eliminate the demand for currency and renders the CB impotent in
its pursuit of monetary policy. He argues that currency has two distinct ad-
vantages over electronic money: (i) Notes and coins offer anonymity to both
the payer and the payee. Advocates of electronic money occasionally empha-
size that the technology to ensure anonymity for the payer and the payee by
strong encryption is also available.18 But Goodhart points out that confidence
in anonymity is a more complex issue and that the protection of personal data
requires the decisive political will and a detailed legal framework.19 Currency
continues to have a comparative advantage relative to electronic money as in-
dividuals favour currency whenever they want to maintain their anonymity.
(ii) Currency is legal tender in many countries so that it cannot be refused as a
means of payment in cases the underlying contract does not explicitly specify
another form of payment. In addition to a first mover advantage, anonymity
and legal tender legislation result in currency having a comparative advantage
vis-à-vis electronic money. Therefore, its demand remains positive despite the
diffusion of electronic money. Capie/Wood (2001) generalizes the argument
with respect to anonymity by pointing out that currency is the most cost ef-
fective means of payment with respect to transaction costs (i.e. information
costs). Krüger (1999) provides anecdotal support from foreign exchange whole-
sale markets for the thesis, that even if marginal transaction costs are already
very low due to advanced information and communication technology, the
transaction costs can be reduced even further by the use of a GAME.
Capie/Tsomocos/Wood (2005) model an economy in which the role of fiat
money as medium of exchange is contested by advances in ICT that reduce
the costs of barter. The costs of operating the monetary system are fixed costs
given the quantity of money, which depends on the number of trades only in-
directly via individual money demand. The costs of barter consist of transac-
tion costs of gathering and processing information, which are incurred in each
transaction by each individual. While technological progress is likely to re-
duce the transaction costs of barter, they expect that it might as well raise the
number of commodities and, hence the number of markets and transactions.
Thus, the total costs of barter – aggregated across markets and transactions –
do not necessarily fall and might even increase. It should be added that tech-
nological progress might also reduce the operational costs of the monetary
system, i.e. the diffusion of electronic means of payment could reduce the tear
and wear of cash as well as the costs of cash logistics and, thus, the costs of
operating the monetary system. They conclude that the transaction costs asso-
ciated with electronic barter are likely to remain so high that the demand for
fiat money will not vanish. The results hold for any fiat money (e.g. foreign
currency) and not just for the CB money of the national CB.
Implicitly they assume that the demand for CB money will be sufficient to
maintain its role as GAME and as the unit of account. The structure of the
money market is not entirely clear. Agents in the economy obtain fiat money
at the beginning of the period via loans granted by the CB on the money mar-
                                                          
18 E.g. Chaum 1996. But he also argues that – while technologically possible – com-
plete anonymity might not be desirable in electronic payment systems.
19 Credibility and enforceability of the respective legislation as well as the appropriate
organizational structure of the operator of the payment system and its effective su-
pervision might be added.
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ket at the going rate. It remains unclear why the transaction costs in the money
market are supposed to be negligible. In the commodities markets trade credit
is ruled out, due to transaction costs, hence, the cash in advance constraint.
The latter is imposed on the grounds of high information costs on transaction
costs not settled in cash on the spot. The question arises whether agents have
to provide collateral or whether the CB has a legal information advantage over
other agents in the economy. Furthermore, the authors abstract from opera-
tional costs of the monetary system such as the costs of maintaining the insti-
tutional set-up, i.e. the trust of agents in the stability of the price level etc.,
and, hence, underestimate these costs. As these additional costs would not de-
pend on the number of commodities markets directly, the structure of the ar-
gument would not change, but the parameter values for which money domi-
nates e-barter might shift in favour of e-barter.
Berentsen (1998) suggests that due to the low transaction costs associated
with electronic money the demand for currency eventually vanishes. But as
electronic money is predominantly used in small-value payments and due to
the low costs of converting interest bearing deposit balances into electronic
money holdings, the stock of electronic money is expected to be small. Most
liquid assets would be held as demand deposits. Even in the absence of bind-
ing reserve requirements banks would hold settlement balances to settle daily
net positions in the inter-bank payment system. Hence, the demand for CB
money would remain positive and the CB would maintain its monopoly to
provide the GAME at zero marginal costs. Berentsen implicitly assumes that
electronic money is denominated in the dominant unit of account of CB money
and that it remains the GAME and the means of final settlement in the inter-
bank payment system. However, he does not consider the case in which elec-
tronic money were denominated in a unit of account different from the domi-
nant one in the respective market. He does not provide any arguments for the
continuing role of CB money as the GAME and unit of account. Furthermore,
he fails to establish a link between electronic money, the GAME and the unit
of account. The institutional set-up he has in mind seems to involve the re-
deemability of electronic money into CB money and, thus, its denomination
in the unit of account. Finally, the inter-bank payment system is based on CB
money as the banks’ settlement demand for CB reserves is expected to remain
positive. Neither of the two interdependent crucial implicit postulations is sup-
ported by analytical arguments. In sum, the CB is basically assumed rather
than demonstrated to maintain its monopoly position in the provision of the
GAME and the unit of account at zero marginal costs. Consequently, there is
no threat to the implementation of monetary policy by assumption.
Freedman (2000) distinguishes between stored-value-cards (SVCs) and net-
work money in his definition of electronic money. He emphasizes that a num-
ber of means of payment are currently in use and that SVCs should simply be
interpreted as an additional choice. Credit and debit cards have already reached
a considerable market share in medium sized transactions. SVCs offer less
protection from loss and theft than other means of payment, so that they will
be used for low value payments. Even in the unlikely event that they fully sub-
stitute for currency the entire payment system continues to be based on CB
money, as final settlement takes place on the books of the CB. The crucial is-
sue, of how the link between SVCs and CB money is institutionally designed,
is not elaborated any further. One can only assume that SVCs are denominated
in the dominant unit of account and that redeemability in CB money is the
rule. Consequently, CB money remains the GAME and the unit of account.
The balance sheet of CB shortens, but current monetary policy instruments
(i.e. announced target level for the main operating target in combination with
OMOs and standing facilities) ensure the efficacy of monetary policy imple-
mentation.
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Freedman (2000) regards the settlement of inter-bank balances by either pri-
vate clearing-houses or the transfer of low risk assets (i.e. treasury bills) as the
more serious threat to the efficacy of monetary policy. But even in these cases
he regards CB money as superior means of final settlement and expects the
demand to remain positive. The major drawback of private-clearing houses are
supposed to be (i) potential bankruptcy of the clearing-house20, (ii) an infor-
mational disadvantage of private clearing-houses vis-à-vis a CB which com-
bines prudential supervision with the operation of the payment system, and
(iii) the banks’ reluctance to see a competitor gaining a competitive advantage
by resuming the role as a clearing-house. However, the disadvantages of pri-
vate clearing-houses can be overcome in principle, as the informational dis-
advantages disappear if the supervision of members and the operation of the
wholesale payment system are combined.21 The institutional structure and the
accompanying governance mechanisms can be adapted to a level playing field
for the participants. An entity different from the privately operated clearing-
house seems to maintain a monopoly to issue the GAME. Hence, Freedman’s
model of private clearing- and settlement systems presupposes the continuing
role of CB money as the means of final settlement and the unit of account. In
this case the model collapses to one where even private clearing-houses would
not at all endanger the position of the note-issuing authority as the systems re-
mains firmly rooted on the GAME (CB money). However, participants of the
payment system would economize on their holding costs of means of final set-
tlement by netting arrangements.22
But Freedman takes his thought experiment a step further – banks could trans-
fer low risk assets to settle imbalances rather than reserves at the CB or at pri-
vate clearing-houses. He concludes that (i) the lack of a lender of last resort
(LLR), (ii) holding costs of low risk assets, and (iii) declining volumes of out-
standing government debt present the major drawbacks of the alternative sys-
tem. It remains unclear whether there is a GAME, a unit of account and a means
of final settlement in his model at all. Finally, he rejects the hypothesis that
the world will regress towards a pure barter economy, as the costs would be
too large. Thus, the demand for CB money will remain positive since CB re-
serves will maintain their function as means of final settlement for inter-bank
imbalances so that the CB continues to be able to steer money market interest
rates. CB money seems to remain the GAME and the unit of account.
Woodford (2000) argues that a sharp reduction of the demand for CB money
makes the implementation of monetary policy by quantity-targeting techniques
(e.g. targeting non-borrowed reserves) increasingly difficult. But as long as
that demand remains positive, the CB maintains the ability to control short-
term interest rates. He discusses the “channel”-approach as a feasible alterna-
tive institutional arrangement for the implementation of monetary policy. Un-
der such a system the CB can control the short-term interest rate without
changing the size of its balance sheet substantially. The “channel”-system is
based on the provision of standing facilities, i.e. a deposit and a lending facil-
ity at which the banks can draw on reserves from the CB without limits. Since
there is a spread – of about 50 basis points in the case of New Zealand – banks
                                                          
20 The major reasons for the stability attributed to CBs are (i) its rather narrow field of
activities, (ii) its large reserves and seigniorage and (iii) the backing by government,
and, most importantly, (iv) its comfortable monopoly to issue liabilities which the
government forces other banks (reserve requirements) and individuals to accept. As
these are a legal tender, the bank’s debtors cannot refuse to accept it – the CB can
always restore its own solvency and liquidity at negligible marginal costs.
21 See Selgin/White 1987.
22 See Selgin/White 2002.
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have an incentive to trade reserves in the money market to settle their net-
balances at the end of the day. The target rate, i.e. the equilibrium money mar-
ket rate, usually is halfway between the deposit and the lending rate. In theory
the banks’ objective would involve zero overnight balances, so that due to the
absence of reserve requirements the expected overnight reserves of the entire
system would be zero on average. In practice, however, a small positive target
for the aggregate level of overnight reserves ensures that the equilibrium money
market rate is close to the target rate. Monetary policy is implemented by
changing the rates on the standing facilities without adjusting the target level
of overnight reserves. Quantity adjustments by intraday credit are limited to
manage short-term liquidity shocks in order to avoid excessive volatility of the
market rate.
The diffusion of electronic money does not pose a threat to the efficacy of
monetary policy, in a “channel”-system. The demand for currency is not a pre-
requisite for the system to work. Its elimination would reduce exogenous shocks
to the volume of settlement reserves and, hence, might reduce the scope of li-
quidity management operations. A reduction of the demand for settlement bal-
ances due to improved treasury management by the participants in the pay-
ments system would reduce the average, aggregate volume of overnight set-
tlement balances. But as, both, theory and experience show, the size of these
is of limited relevance, in principle. A reduction of the interest elasticity of the
demand for settlement balances would lead to a higher volatility in the equi-
librium money market rate within the channel. Narrowing the channel could
reinforce the stability of the market rate. Finally, Woodford counters the ar-
gument that alternative settlement systems among commercial banks would
render monetary policy ineffective by invoking the low costs of the “channel”-
system. In the worst case the channel would narrow further to decrease the
expected opportunity costs of holding overnight settlement reserves so that
banks would not switch to alternative settlement mechanisms.
Palley (2002) models the threat to CB money as arising from the emergence of
e-settlement money that eventually replaces settlement balances in CB money.
He argues that the spread of innovations in information technology would en-
able banks to value their assets to market in real time. Instead of settling mu-
tual debts in CB money, banks would exchange assets – which are not further
specified – directly (so called “mutual fund e-settlement”). Also nonbank agents
would increasingly rely on the transfer of assets in settling debt. The relevant
interest rates would be set in a “loanable funds”-style asset market, so that
mutual fund e-settlement dominates CB money in the rate of return. Palley
fears that the system of mutual fund e-settlement would be unstable. Despite
the prevalence of mutual fund e-settlement in normal times, agents would pre-
fer CB money in times of crises. The reduced demand fro e-settlement bal-
ances could lead to the return of “old-fashioned bank runs” (Palley 2002, 223).
The inherent uncertainty of mutual fund e-settlement leads to a positive de-
mand for CB money, because it is subject to zero nominal price fluctuations.
In addition to the analysis of the demand for bank settlement balances, Palley
studies the effect of eMoney on the demand for required reserves, on nonbank
currency demand, on tax payment balances, and on international interbank set-
tlement balances. With respect to required reserves he concludes that the on-
going decline in their importance is likely to continue. Several countries abol-
ished required reserves. Their ability to implement monetary policy effectively
rests on the positive demand for CB money for transactions and settlement
balances. The current role of nonbank currency demand in monetary policy
implementation is negligible, so that a further decline does not affect the effi-
cacy of monetary policy implementation.
Palley expects bank to
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The demand for tax payment balances remains a source of demand fro CB
money. Governments must require taxes to be paid in CB money to ensure
that this source of demand to constitute an effective channel for monetary pol-
icy. The demand for CB money resulting from international interbank settle-
ment balances results primarily from the choice of reserve media of other CBs.
Palley conjectures that CBs are likely to hold their foreign reserves in CB
money rather than in risky mutual funds, in order not to gamble with national
welfare. He concludes that in the future the demand for CB money will be
further reduced relatively to total assets and liabilities in the economy, but
that it will remain positive due to a positive but highly volatile demand for set-
tlement balances (due to the inherent uncertainty of mutual fund e-settlement)
and due to governments requiring tax payments in CB money. The reliance of
tax payments to implement monetary policy would lead to increased interest
volatility, as tax payments are highly seasonal and often paid with delay.
Discussion
Currency transactions routinely require face-to-face contact so that their ad-
vantage in terms of anonymity might partly vanish. But be that as it may. A
positive demand for currency is not a sufficient condition for the efficacy of
the traditional instruments of monetary policy. Goodhart’s position is criticised
by Friedman (2000) as the “one drug dealer” argument. Discretionary changes
in the supply of currency are usually not an instrument of monetary policy im-
plementation. The fundamental issue is not addressed in the controversy. In-
stead of focusing on the choice of means of payment the choice of the GAME
is critical for the analysis of the future efficacy of monetary policy. Whether
economic agents transfer claims on the GAME via checks, credit or debit cards,
bank transfers, direct debit is of interest for fine-tuning the liquidity operations
of the CB and the sponsors of the relevant retail and wholesale payment sys-
tems but not for the elementary position of the CB as a monopoly provider of
the GAME at negligible marginal costs.
The size of the underground economy using currency is of indirect relevance
only. Unless demand for currency is large enough to maintain its unit of ac-
count function, currency will be comparable to contemporary alternatives to
money, e.g. LETS (Local Exchange Trading Systems) or widely accepted cou-
pon schemes.23 Despite the positive demand for alternative currency units in
LETS the expansion and contraction of their supply has no effect on macro-
economic activity neither at the margin nor on average. The currency units of
various LETS possess neither the GAME function nor the unit of account
function of money. The coupon schemes are denominated in the unit of ac-
count of the relevant market and offer redeemability in goods and services by
the issuer. Some of them are also accepted at par by establishments other than
the issuer. Their supply and demand are determined by the equilibrium con-
dition that the real marginal revenue (i.e. the real interest earned on the float
at the margin) equals the real marginal costs of operation, and that the real
marginal costs equal marginal utility (i.e. real opportunity costs of holding vis-
à-vis expected discounts etc.). Equivalently, neither the growth rate nor the
level of supply of coupons affects aggregate economic activity. Furthermore,
The CB could exert some control over the supply and demand of coupons via
its ability to influence the real rate of interest and, thus, the equilibrium con-
dition.
                                                          
23 See Eichenbaum/Wallace 1985 and Good 1998.
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Woodford (2000) basically avoids dealing with the threat to the demand for
CB money posed by the diffusion of electronic money. Throughout most of
his paper, the role of CB money as GAME and its function as the unit of ac-
count are never mentioned – let alone challenged.
He argues that low expected opportunity costs of holding overnight settlement
reserves in the “channel”-system and the creditworthiness of the CB result in
a comparative advantage of CB sponsored settlement relative to potential com-
petitors. It would even suffice that the CB provided infinitely elastic borrow-
ing and lending facilities regardless of the actual volume of transactions on the
CB’s book. The crucial assumption is that the CB maintains its position as the
sole provider of CB money at zero marginal costs. This argument, therefore,
presumes the critical points in the discussion – the positive demand for CB
money and the CB’s monopoly in the provision of the GAME at zero mar-
ginal costs. Even if the CB can continue to offer clearing and settlement serv-
ices at very low operating costs in its own liabilities, it would not suffice to
implement monetary policy unless these are the GAME. If its own liabilities
cease to be the GAME in the economy, sponsoring a settlement system will
not enable the CB to steer the market rate of interest in the GAME. It will be-
come impossible to offer infinitely interest elastic standing facilities at zero
marginal costs in the GAME.24 Instead the CB maintains the ability to steer the
interest paid on its own liabilities in terms of its own liabilities at zero marginal
costs. However, these interest rates would be of no relevance for the demand
and supply of the GAME and would not influence aggregate economic activity.
In the last two paragraphs, Woodford recognises the potential challenge to the
role of CB liabilities as GAME and unit of account. He light-heartedly em-
braces Hayek’s model of the parallel use of multiple units of accounts. But his
confidence in the market to provide a stable unit of account seems to be rather
low. He maintains that stable money would continue to be a vital public serv-
ice best provided by the CB, which could retain some influence over the ex-
change rate between its own liabilities and those of other issuers. He fails to
question the feasibility of the private issue of fiat-type money and the parallel
use of multiple units of accounts. The crucial issues of price formation and the
GAME are not touched upon.
Palley’s (2002) model of mutual fund e-settlement assumes that mutual fund
shares used in e-settlement are valued in real time. He does neither state what
the assets are denominated in nor against what they are valued in real time.
There are basically two options. First, the assets are traded against each other
and not denominated in a unit of account, but rather claims to real wealth. That
would imply that there are [nA(nA-1)]/2 relative asset prices in the economy
for nA assets. As Palley does not mention a GAME or a unit of account, there
would be [nAnG] goods prices for nG goods in the economy. The economy
would resemble a barter economy based on an electronic exchange mechanism,
but still relying on a double coincidence of wants. The assets exchanged in
mutual fund e-settlement would exchange at a spread, unless they were per-
fect substitutes. Consequently, the equilibrium is unstable as mutual funds that
exchange at lower spreads would dominate others as means of settlement.25
                                                          
24 That is the economic rational behind Friedman’s critique of Woodford’s argument:
“With nothing to back up the CB’s expression of intent [of changes in the equilib-
rium rate of interest on the money market], I suspect that the market would cease
to do the CB’s work for it.” (Friedman 2000, 16).
25 For a more detailed discussion of the final settlement by the transfer of wealth see
section 2.3.2. below.
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The second interpretation of Palley’s model is more likely, namely that it re-
sembles the current tiered system of payments. Individuals employ bank bal-
ances to pay debts and to acquire goods. Rather than writing checks on nomi-
nally fixed bank deposits, they draw them on mutual funds. The cheques con-
tinue to be denominated and settled in CB money, eventually. The means of
payment will be subject to change, but CB money will remain the GAME.
Mutual fund e-settlement would add another layer to the tiering structure of the
interbank settlement system. In order to reduce their demand for CB reserves,
banks defer settlement by extended netting arrangements, in which they em-
ploy mutual funds as collateral. According to Palley, the demand for CB money
remains positive and it is the only asset that exhibits zero nominal price fluc-
tuations. It is therefore the only asset the guarantees economic finality in set-
tlement. This interpretation is more likely to reflect Palley’s underlying model,
as he argues that agents demand settlement in CB money in abnormal times
and that the sharp increase in demand fro CB money causes a liquidity short-
age. That implies that liquidity refers to CB money.
4.2.3 Models based on a Publicly
Sanctioned, Uniform Unit of Account without a GAME
Privately Issued Fiat-Type Electronic Monies
Costa/De Grauwe (2001) analyse the efficacy of current monetary policy in-
struments (standing facilities and open market operations – OMOs) in a cash-
less society. They assume that the unit of account remains tied to the nation
state and continues to be “provided” by the state. Banks and other institutions
issue private fiat-type money in the form of deposits or eMoney. These insti-
tutions are not subject to minimum reserve requirements nor do they hold set-
tlement balances with the CB. Instead, they are assumed to hold liquid assets
such as shares or bonds as assets.
The nominal share price equals the discounted expected nominal dividend
stream. As the expected nominal dividends are a function of the expected
money stock, Costa/De Grauwe argue that the price level is indeterminate as
any expected growth rate of the nominal stock of money leads to a corre-
sponding growth rate of future nominal dividends and, consequently, to an in-
crease in the current nominal value of assets. The current value of the “nomi-
nal money stock” increases as well. There is no inherent equilibrating mecha-
nism to pin down the price level.
If the bank’s portfolio consists of bonds the dis-equilibrating forces arise in a
more complex fashion. As the bond price eventually returns to its face value,
destabilizing effects are supposed to arise via the quantity of bonds on the
bank’s balance sheet. An increase in the stock of money has positive affects
on economic activity so that firms issue more debt. At the same time the trans-
actions demand for money increases and both sides of the bank balance sheet
expand in parallel. Again there is no inherent constraint to the expansion of
banks’ balance sheets and, thus, money creation.
Furthermore, the expansion might also work via the value of collateral. The
expansion of the money stock leads to an increase in the value of assets in
general and to that of collateral in particular. The value of banks’ assets in-
creases as the money stock does. Costa/De Grauwe concludes that the price
level might be indeterminate and inflation might arise in their model.
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As the demand and supply functions of all agents in the model are homoge-
nous of degree zero in nominal prices the price level cannot be pinned down.
But what about a CB that does focus on nominal variables – can it steer nomi-
nal interest rates in the model and anchor the system?
An increasingly accepted view among monetary economists holds that the CB
does not have to conduct large-scale financial transactions in order to manipu-
late money market rates. Its monopoly power to create settlement balances at
zero marginal costs suffices to ensure the credibility of its target announce-
ments for the main operating target.26 In Costa/De Grauwe the CB has lost its
monopoly in providing the GAME. As the CB has to borrow funds in order to
lend funds via its standing facilities, arbitrage opportunities arise. Not only will
the CB incur large losses, it will also fail to affect the available liquidity in the
system but merely redistribute funds, according to Cost/De Grauwe. A similar
line of reasoning applies to OMOs: In this case, though, the CB can buy treas-
ury bills with its own liabilities, i.e. bank deposits similar to those issued by
commercial banks. The commercial banks will present these for re-conversion
into treasury bills afterwards and, thus, keep the amount of treasury bills cir-
culating outside the CB largely unaffected. Furthermore, the small size of the
CB’s balance sheet and the potentially large losses it incurs in attempts to steer
money market rates result in a loss of control over short-term money market
interest rates.
Can the CB regain control over money market rates if granted unlimited ac-
cess to funds by the treasury at zero marginal costs? Costa/de Grauwe argue
that this would only increase the opportunities for arbitrage without empow-
ering the CB to manipulate the total liquidity in money markets. If the CB had
unlimited access to treasury bills, it could manipulate the outstanding quantity
of these bills based on a given market demand schedule. “Thus, in a sense in a
cashless society, treasury securities become the ultimate means of payments.”
(Costa/De Grauwe 2001, 20).
Costa/De Grauwe suggests prudential regulation and supervision as alternative
instruments for monetary policy. The CB certifies eMoney-institutions. By
taking macroeconomic conditions into consideration the CB can employ the
capital adequacy ratio as an instrument of monetary policy. Legal reserve re-
quirements in “high quality” private money are judged to be of less importance
in practical policy implementation, as their impact is supposed to be large and
their flexibility low making their accurate implementation very hard.
Discussion
In the following discussion I argue that the Costa/De Grauwe model is theo-
retically inconsistent, its institutional set-up is incomplete and the main results
are questionable; i.e. there is no institutional arrangement that links the pri-
vately issued fiat-type monies to the unit of account, there is no GAME in the
model, it remains unclear what “liquidity” in the market for inter-issuer set-
tlement balances (money market) means exactly and the price levels of pri-
vately issued fiat-type monies are not indeterminate but infinite. The electronic
monies do not perform the GAME function of money, let alone the unit of ac-
count function.
                                                          
26 See e.g. Borio 1997, Guthrie/Wright 2000 and Thornton 2000.
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The literature on the time inconsistency problem associated with the issue of
private fiat-type money concludes that there is no effective constraint on indi-
vidual issuers credibly preventing them from inflating infinitely.27 Costa/De
Grauwe offer a number of explanations for the indeterminacy of the price level
that all involve the argument that there are multiple equilibria consistent with
an infinite set of expectations concerning the nominal money supply and the
resulting nominal value of assets (shares/bonds/collateral). In the case of re-
deemable privately issued commodity monies the argument is wrong, as the
redeemability constraint can be binding for each individual bank at the margin
even if it were not binding in the case of a concerted expansion of banks’ bal-
ance-sheets.28 However, in the case of privately issued fiat-type monies their
argument can be simplified. The most straightforward way for each individual
bank to increase its note issue and its assets in unison is to purchase assets
(stocks/bonds etc.) on financial markets at the prevailing market price. As the
issuers of fiat-type electronic money face zero marginal costs of issuing addi-
tional money, they buy collateral until the expected marginal return is zero as
well.29 Consequently, the price levels are determined – they are infinite for each
of the privately issued fiat-type monies. There is no GAME, no unit of account
in the model and consequently no money. Therefore, it is not surprising that
there is neither a meaningfully defined price level nor any monetary policy in-
struments available to the CB for its stabilisation.
According to Costa/De Grauwe the inability of the CB to manipulate the li-
quidity in the system results form the fact that its deposits would be recon-
verted into financial assets immediately, thus, leaving the amount of outstand-
ing deposits unchanged. The same argument holds true for any of the issuers
in the model, at the margin. It remains unclear why CB deposits are supposed
to be inferior to other banks’ deposits so that they are not held for transaction
purposes. Furthermore, there are no arbitrage opportunities in the Costa/De
Grauwe model: As the CB’s bid price for financial assets (stocks, bonds, treas-
ury bills etc.) is above the market price in terms of CB deposits and the CB is
expected to convert these deposits into financial assets at predetermined prices
on demand, the market price would increase in terms of CB deposits. But that
does not necessarily affect the market price in terms of any other bank’s de-
posits so that the deposits of various banks – the various privately issued fiat-
type monies – do not exchange at par necessarily. Costa/De Grauwe mentions
“high quality” electronic money in their argument concerning reserve require-
ments. If there are quality differences between electronic monies, they will not
exchange at par, unless they are adjusted for by interest payments on electronic
money, which does not seem to be the case in this model.
Consequently, the question arises what the unit of account in this model is.
Costa/De Grauwe (2000, 2) state that it is “provided by the state” as one US$
or one €. The continuous availability of market prices in each electronic money
in terms of the unit of account is a necessary precondition for the model. For
a high quality electronic money (EM1) the price of a certain good in terms of
the number of units of account (x US$ in terms of EM1) is lower than for a
low quality electronic money (z US$ in terms of EM2; z > x). As the various
electronic monies are not perfect substitutes their exchange will involve spreads.
In general, prices will be lowest for the electronic money that exchanges at
the lowest spread, which will, as a consequence, drive the others out of the
                                                          
27 See inter alia White 1999 and Schmitz 2002b for a discussion and the related literature.
28 See Selgin 1994.
29 See Taub 1985.
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market.30 But the model faces a more fundamental critique than its inherent
instability, namely that the unit of account is not meaningfully defined. Either
the denomination of particular electronic money is a purely nominalistic exer-
cise or the denomination is determined by market exchange. (i) In the absence
of redeemabilty the nominalistic denomination is entirely arbitrary and differ-
ent prices would have to be paid in different electronic monies. (ii) If denomi-
nation is determined by market exchange, each electronic money serves as a
unit of account as prices in different electronic monies differ. Hence, there is
no uniform unit of account, in both cases. There is neither a discussion of the
mechanism of nominal price formation nor an analysis of the institutional set-
up that links the publicly sanctioned unit of account to the eMonies in the
model.
There is no medium of final settlement in the model as eMonies can only be
reconverted into financial assets, which in turn pay dividends or interest rates
in electronic monies or more stocks and bonds. The model suffers from cir-
cularity so that no electronic money is linked to any good embodying the unit
of account directly or indirectly.31 There are no relative prices between elec-
tronic monies and any good, the price of which does not vary in terms of the
unit of account. Equivalently, there is no exchange between any such good and
all other goods in the economy so that no prices in terms of the unit of acco-
unt can be determined in exchange. Only nominal prices in terms of various
electronic monies could be observed, if they were not infinite due to the pre-
vailing time inconsistency problem.
The model is incomplete as the authors do not model a money market (or a
market for settlement balances between issuers of electronic monies). The
authors state that CB money will no longer be used as medium of (final) set-
tlement. They analyse a market for liquidity32 but fail to state what is sup-
posed to be exchanged there, in what kind of (financial) asset(s) this liquidity
is embodied. Due to the circularity of conversion there is no medium of final
settlement and, therefore, no market in which such a good can be traded. The
authors mention that treasury bills might assume the role of final settlement
media in a cashless world. They conclude that the CB could control the total
amount of liquidity in the economy in that case by varying the volume of treas-
ury bills. Their conclusion is only valid if the treasury ceases to issue treasury
bills without consent of the CB. Otherwise, the treasury would control the to-
tal amount of liquidity in the economy. The scenario implies that treasury bills
would assume the role of the GAME and the incidental functions of money
(i.e. the unit of account and store of value function). The liabilities of the treas-
ury would substitute for the liabilities of the CB as money. Again, the general
acceptance of these liabilities in exchange would depend predominantly on the
credibility of the treasury to provide a nominal anchor to the system.
In addition the model is incomplete because there is no rational for interme-
diation. The banks that issue electronic money do not offer any service – there
is no risk, liquidity, maturity, and volume etc. transformation. The question
arises why individuals should transfer electronic money that is convertible into
stocks and bonds rather than the stocks and bonds themselves. Presumable the
transaction costs involved in the transfer of assets are larger than those in-
volved in the transfer of eMonies, but the authors do not make that assump-
tion explicit nor do they discuss its bearing on the consistency of their model.
                                                          
30 See Schmitz 2000b.
31 See White 1984.
32 See in particular Costa/De Grauwe 2001, Figure 2.
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Final Settlement by the Transfer of Wealth
King (1999) offers a similar but more radical proposal as he eliminates inter-
mediation from the payments system and attempts to develop an indirect ex-
change economy with a unit of account. Transactions are settled in real time
by the transfer of wealth so that there is neither demand for CB money nor for
a GAME. The buyer obtains funds by a real time sale of a financial asset,
transfers these to the seller who immediately reinvests in financial assets. In
order to reduce transaction costs all financial markets transactions are com-
pleted automatically based on pre-agreed algorithms. Financial assets qualify
for inclusion in the barter system, if they are traded on markets administered
by the system which would match demand and supply, ensure efficient price
formation and settlement continuously. All prices are supposed to be quoted
in a publicly announced, uniform unit of account. King concludes that there is
no role for CB money. Hence, CBs cannot implement monetary policy.
Discussion
King’s model presumes that market prices for electronically traded financial
assets exist, that market prices for the goods and services exchanged exist, and
that all these prices are quoted in the uniform unit of account. In fact, the model
does not describe an indirect exchange economy. Financial assets are sold in-
stantaneously and “funds” are transferred which are reinvested upon receipt.
However, it remains unclear what these “funds” are. If they are risky financial
assets that are as liquid as the initial portfolio held by the buyer, then there is
no point in exchanging them for “funds” in the first place. If they are more
liquid then other financial assets, then these “funds” are a means of payment
and possibly a GAME and the economy is not an indirect exchange economy.
Similarly to Costa/De Grauwe’s (2000) term “liquidity”, the term “funds” is
not clearly defined.
Furthermore, it remains unclear how these funds – and indeed the financial as-
sets in general – are linked to the unit of account. In a Walrasian economy all
goods are equally liquid and any one of them can be chosen as the numeraire.
As it is traded on markets continuously against all other goods, there are al-
ways well-defined relative prices available for all goods vis-à-vis the numeraire.
Via the going market price of any good in terms of the numeraire all nominal
prices are determined at all times. In King’s model there is no good or service
that is the numeraire. Instead the unit of account is subject to regulation and
supervision such as weights and measures. In principle, the weight or the length
of an arbitrary good can be defined as the unit of measurement. The weight
and length of any other good is derived from a comparison with the standard
good that entirely relies on objective criteria. But how does this logic apply to
goods and financial assets? An arbitrary good, an abstract unit called e.g. US$,
is defined as the unit of account and the value of any other good is derived
form the standard by a direct comparison of value. Unfortunately, the com-
parison involves subjective values and cannot be undertaken objectively, com-
pared to the inspection of weights and measures. Consequently, any such com-
parison necessarily presupposes the existence of markets in which goods are
exchanged – directly or indirectly – for the standard. The exchange of goods
for the good embodying the standard (e.g. the GAME) constitutes the inter-
subjective comparison. The analysis of separability of GAME and the unit of
account usually lacks an analysis of the formation of nominal prices.33 The
standard can be linked to a financial asset by fixing its price through rede-
emability in the GAME. If that is what King has in mind, then the commodity
                                                          
33 E.g. Cowen/Kroszner 1994.
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(“funds”?) in his model is the GAME and the unit of account. Final settlement
would take place in the GAME and various forms of financial assets could
serve as means of payment (e.g. deposit transfers, checks etc.). Without any
such means of final settlement the model is characterised by circularity, as fi-
nancial assets are claims to financial assets. If, however, some financial assets
are claims to goods and services (e.g. one ounce of gold) at a fixed ratio, the
system will be nominally anchored. In that case it would resemble a traditional
commodity standard. Whether or not the CB has the power to manipulate the
nominal and/or the real short-term interest rate of the GAME depends on the
institutional set-up, i.e. control over the production of the commodity, large
stocks of the commodity, regulation of international flows of the commodity etc.
King’s model can be interpreted in two ways: (i) the first interpretation re-
sembles a Walrasian economy with all goods and services being equally liq-
uid. There is no money and no CB. One of the goods is arbitrarily chosen as
the numeraire but it has to be a good or services. It would be as liquid as any
other good and continuously traded vis-à-vis all other goods and services. An
illiquid abstract unit of account would not do the job. But as information is
not costly in this economy there is no need for a numeraire in the first place.
No transaction would be intermediated by “funds”; every transaction would
be settled by direct or indirect barter, which are equivalent in terms of trans-
action costs as these are all zero. Monetary policy is impossible and indeed
would only be harmful as all markets clear instantaneously and the resulting
allocations would be Pareto-efficient.
(ii) The second interpretation reveals that the model is basically a traditional
commodity standard with an advanced electronic retail payment system with
very liquid financial assets (e.g. mutual money market funds). The underlying
commodity would serve as the GAME and resume the unit of account-function
and financial assets could be increasingly employed as means of payment. The
challenges to monetary policy implementation would largely result from the
nature of the system as a commodity standard and not from the technology of
the means of payment. Although a more sophisticated system could increase
the costs of supervision of any underlying regulation (e.g. regulation of inter-
national flows of the underlying commodity). If the “commodity” (“funds”) is
CB money, the CB will retain the monopoly of issuing the GAME and the
unit of account at zero marginal costs. Hence, the efficacy of monetary policy
would not be affected, in principle.
Further Models Proposing Final Settlement by the Transfer of Wealth
Browne/Cronin (1995) propose a model similar to King’s that is based on the
transfer of shares of mutual funds and a unit of account without a GAME. New
technology in retail and wholesale payment systems eliminates the demand for
CB money. The unit of account function of money would be preserved by nu-
mismatists collecting CB coins and banknotes. Another option would be a com-
modity-based unit of account. Similar criticism applies to their concept as to
King’s (1999). However, they provide a few counter-arguments to White’s (1984)
criticism of the separation of the unit of account and GAME, in particular the
reduction of (operational) transaction costs by advances in technology (i.e. op-
tic fibre and smart cards) and the low share of currency in the total transaction
media already observable, to mention but two. To argue that a reduction in op-
erational costs could eliminate the spread reveals an unduly narrow concept of
the determinants of the spread (see section 4.1). That currency constitutes only
one percent of the transaction media is irrelevant for the argument because CB
reserves constitute CB money as well. But more importantly, the argument con-
fuses the different concepts of “medium of exchange” and “means of payment”.
Even if most payments are conducted by credit, debit cards, bank transfers,
The model is either a
Walrasian economy
without transactions
costs and barter is
efficient …
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Browne/Cronin argue
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spread in financial
markets …
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checks and other non-cash means of payment, the underlying GAME remains
CB money and the non-cash transactions constitute claims to CB money. Con-
trary to their claim, a transaction initiated by non-cash means of payment does
not constitute a separation of the GAME from the unit of account.
Kroszner (2001) envisages a future of the parallel use of multiple units of ac-
count rather than a single abstract one but the various units would all be based
on mutual funds. In addition to confusing currency competition and the par-
allel use of multiple units of account, he also treats competition of means of
payment as equivalent to competition in GAME (see FN 11, 14). Neither in
his analysis nor in Browne/Cronin’s is price formation in such an institutional
setting discussed.
Similarly to King (1999), Centi/Bougi (2003) base their “New Monetary Or-
der” on a world, in which transaction media are backed by equity claims. They
also reach the conclusion that CB money (i.e. outside money in general) and
monetary policy would vanish. Contrary to King, they do not mention a unit of
account explicitly. It remains unclear what the GAME, the unit of account,
and the medium of final settlement are in the model. The institutional struc-
ture of electronic money schemes is at best sketched rudimentarily. Competi-
tion of issuers of fiat money backed by real assets is conceptualised in a way
similar to Klein (1974). Issuers invest in brand name capital in order to gener-
ate trust among customers. However, as shown by White (1999) and Schmitz
(2002b) the potential loss of brand name capital does not provide sufficient in-
centives to prevent overissue and hyperinflation. They conclude that compe-
tition of privately issued fiat monies is infeasible. Centi/Bougi briefly discusses
dynamics in the market, according to which “good” money would drive out
competitors. They seem to insinuate that more than one competing monies
would prevail in equilibrium, but fail to derive the conditions, under which
such an equilibrium would proof to exist and to be stable.34
4.3 Conclusion
Friedman (1999, 2000) argues that the proliferation of alternative media of
exchange and units of account will render monetary policy irrelevant (section
4.2.1). He rests his case on the observation that privately operated retail and
wholesale payments systems economize on CB money. The reduction of the
ratio of CB money to measures of aggregate economic activity (e.g. GDP) will
eventually lead to its irrelevance, particularly in the limit when CB money is
eliminated. He does not present evidence that this ongoing process has already
reduced the efficacy of monetary policy. He assumes that reaching the limit
has no structural effects on the economy. In response to his critics he argues
that – in due course of the economy approaching the limit – the markets will
eventually discontinue to act upon the announcements of the CB. But he fails
to demonstrate why the markets should change their perception of CB power
as long it retains the monopoly to supply the GAME and the unit of account
at zero marginal costs – that is, before the limit is reached. He does not high-
light the conditions, under which the CB loses this monopoly before the limit
is reached, nor under which circumstances a new GAME emerges, if at all,
and what the process of transition would look like once the limit is reached.
He implicitly assumes that the economy would display no structural change
                                                          
34 For a detailed demonstration of the inefficiency of the parallel use of multiple units
of account see Schmitz (2002b).
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once it reached the limit. The institutional structure of the monetary system in
the limit is not discussed in any detail.
In response to Friedman (1999, 2000), a number of papers argued that the de-
mand for CB money will not vanish and that the limit will not be reached (sec-
tion 4.2.2). Some of the models focus on the public’s demand for currency others
on the banks’ demand for CB reserves. The motifs for the positive demand for
CB money vary (e.g. anonymity, first mover advantage, transaction costs of elec-
tronic barter, precautionary reserves). Models that highlight the residual demand
for currency usually fail to discuss whether the residual demand is sufficient to
ensure that CB money maintains the GAME- and unit of account-functions. Ar-
guments that stress the comparative advantage of CBs to provide final settle-
ment usually rest on the critical presumption that the CB maintains its monop-
oly to supply the GAME and the unit of account at zero marginal costs. The ar-
gument is circular in as far as it assumes the crucial role of the CB (as provider
of the GAME and the unit of account) to demonstrate the comparative advan-
tage of the CB to provide final settlement so that the demand for CB reserves
remains positive and CB money remains the GAME and the unit of account.
Models that are based on a publicly sanctioned, uniform unit of account either
envisage privately issued fiat-type electronic money (section p. 71) or final set-
tlement by the transfer of wealth (section p.75). Discussing the first vision of
a cashless society, Costa/De Grauwe (2001) argue that the price level would
be indeterminate and monetary policy based on traditional instruments (OMOs)
impossible. The model is incomplete and inconsistent as there is no institu-
tional arrangement that ensures that the privately issued fiat-type eMonies will
perform the unit of account function of money, there is no meaningfully de-
fined money market in the model and the price levels in the various eMonies
are infinite rather than indeterminate. As eMonies do not exchange at par, their
exchange will involve spreads. The model is unstable, as the eMoney with the
lowest spread will, in principle, drive its competitors out of the market. With-
out means of final settlement the model is characterised by circularity. A fur-
ther problem arises, as financial intermediaries do not seem to offer any in-
termediation services – it remains unclear why individuals should exchange
eMonies backed by assets rather than the assets themselves.
Models that are based on a publicly sanctioned, uniform unit of account and
the transfer of wealth face similar difficulties: there is no GAME, no well de-
fined price level and no unit of account, as the models fail to establish a link
between the publicly sanctioned, uniform unit of account and the means of
payment. They also lack an analysis of the formation of nominal prices and
simply assume market prices as given. Wealth is exchanged in an indirect man-
ner via “funds” but the term is not clearly defined. In 2.3.2 I suggest two in-
terpretations that either resemble a Walrasian economy without any transac-
tion costs or a commodity standard. While monetary policy is indeed ineffec-
tive, its feasibility depends on the choice of the underlying good in the “com-
modity” standard. If eMonies or assets are redeemable in CB money, it re-
sumes the function as the GAME and the unit of account and the CB remains
in control of the short-term interest rate.
Many of the models discussed assume an institutional structure of the mone-
tary system that involves the separation of the unit of account from the GAME.
The analysis demonstrates that these models lack an analysis of the mecha-
nisms of price formation and that nominal prices in the unit of account pre-
suppose the direct or indirect exchange of goods for the GAME which em-
bodies the unit of account in competitive markets.
Table 4.3-1 summarizes the common features of many models discussed in the
previous sections albeit few of them combine all the features.
His critics focus on the
positive demand for CB
money without taking
into account the its
function as GAME
and unit of account
The provision of the unit
of account and its role in
the economy are unclear
in this class of models
Many of the models
discussed assume an
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the monetary system
that involves the
separation of the unit of
account from the GAME
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Table 4.3-1: Common Features of Models on eMoney and Monetary Policy
Common Features of Models on eMoney and Monetary Policy
Neglect of transition process from existing monetary system based on GAME & uniform unit of account to
monetary systems envisaged for the future
Monetary systems envisaged for the future usually neglect the question whether GAME & uniform unit of
account exist
Neglect of literature on time inconsistency and privately issued fiat-type monies
Concepts of “means of payment” & “medium of exchange” often confused
Neglect of analysis of price formation mechanisms under envisaged monetary systems
No link between publicly sanctioned unit of account & means of payment
“Liquid funds” traded in money market not well defined
On closer inspection: Models collapse to Walrasian economy or commodity standard or current monetary systems
If ICT is supposed to overcome all frictions, all goods are equally liquid and
there is no need for a GAME and a uniform unit of account. All demand and
supply schedules are homogenous of degree zero in nominal prices and nei-
ther the price level nor the rate of inflation is defined unambiguously. Any
good or service can serve as numeraire. But relative prices remain to be de-
termined. As there are no transaction costs and there are relative market prices
for all goods at all times, their prices in terms of the numeraire are available
permanently at no cost. All markets clear and there is no need for monetary
policy, there is no need to nominally anchor the economy.
Until the world economy resembles the Arrow-Debreu model, transaction costs
will remain positive and a GAME – that also fulfils the function of the uni-
form unit of account – will further reduce transaction costs relative to an econ-
omy without a GAME. The institutional structure is likely to involve rede-
emability of eMonies in the GAME and the respective uniform unit of account
will prevail in the economy. The dominant medium of exchange in the respec-
tive market has a comparative advantage with respect to alternative units of
account at current moderate levels of inflation. The diffusion of eMoney might
reduce the threshold for currency substitution in high inflation regimes slightly.
But the CB is likely to maintain its monopoly in the provision of the GAME
and the unit of account at zero marginal costs. Current EU-regulation (Directive
2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September
2000 on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of
electronic money institutions) reinforces that prediction (i.e. article 3 on rede-
emability of eMoney). In principle, monetary policy will remain effective. In the
unlikely case that the monetary system discontinues to be rooted in CB money,
another GAME and unit of account emerge (e.g. commodity standard). In that
case the efficacy of monetary policy depends on the concrete institutional ar-
rangements. Nevertheless, the ongoing institutional change in the payments
system – at the retail and the wholesale level – will necessitate adaptations of
monetary statistics and of the instruments and the implementation of monetary
policy. A challenge CBs have proven to cope with quite successfully so far.
Models collapse to
Walrasian economy or
commodity standard or
current monetary
systems
All models fail to provide
a clear institutional
structure of the
underlying payment
system
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5 Monetary Policy in
a World without Central Bank Money
Stefan W. Schmitz
Introduction
This paper analyses the prospects of monetary policy in a world without cen-
tral bank money. The role of CB money as GAME is a precondition for the
implementation of monetary policy in the current institutional set-up. In the
paper I show that conferring certain regulatory competencies (including the
power to impose financial obligations on third parties) to CBs would enable
them to implement an equivalent to monetary policy in a world without CB
money. The analysis is based on the conceptualisation of a payment system
that does not settle in CB money; in which the demand for CB money is actu-
ally zero. As shown by an analysis of the legal foundations of the operations of
the ECB and the Fed, CBs do in fact already possess the necessary regulatory
powers. Politico-economic objections to granting CBs the necessary regulatory
competencies do also apply to the institutional frameworks currently in place
in the Euro area and the US.
A number of papers in the current debate on the impact of innovation in pay-
ment systems on monetary policy address the issue in an economic set-up
without money. I demonstrate that these models fail to elaborate the institu-
tional structure of the payment system they attempt to model and they neglect
issues regarding the existence of a generally accepted medium of exchange
(GAME) and of a medium of final settlement in the underlying payment sys-
tems.
Schmitz (2002b) concludes that the most likely institutional structure of the
payment system will maintain the pivotal role of CB money. Nevertheless, it
is important for CBs to understand the potential implications for monetary pol-
icy implementation of a hypothetical world without CB money; even if it is
considered unlikely at the moment.1
The role of CB money as GAME is a precondition for the implementation of
monetary policy in the current institutional set-up. In the paper I show that con-
ferring certain regulatory powers to CBs enable them to implement an equiva-
lent to monetary policy in a world without CB money. The analysis is based
on the conceptualisation of a payment system that does not settle in CB money;
in which the demand for CB money is actually zero. It explicitly provides a
role for a GAME and a medium of final settlement. The relevant instruments
available to CBs are the imposition of minimum reserve requirements in the
medium of final settlement and the competence to grant or charge interest on
reserves held as deposit balances at the CB. The ability to apply these instru-
ments is independent of the monopoly position of CBs to provide the GAME
at zero marginal costs. It is a consequence of their role as public institutions
endowed with certain regulatory competencies. Thus, CBs would be able to
manipulate the opportunity costs of holding minimum reserves without ma-
                                                          
1 CPSS 2003, 7.
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nipulating the market price of the medium of final settlement. As shown by an
analysis of the legal foundations of the operations of the ECB and the Fed,
CBs do in fact already possess the necessary regulatory powers. Politico-eco-
nomic objections to granting CBs the necessary regulatory powers would also
apply to the institutional frameworks currently in place in the Euro area and
the US.
In the first section I review the current proposals for monetary policy in “mon-
eyless” worlds. The second section discusses monetary policy implementation
in a world without CB money that explicitly provides a role for a GAME, a
unit of account, and a medium of final settlement. First, I conceptualise the
sequence of instruments of monetary policy implementation in a world with
CB money. Second, I discuss their potential application by a CB that does not
issue the GAME2 to conduct a functional equivalent to monetary policy.
Thirdly, I analyse politico-economic issues of the proposed alternative instru-
ments of monetary policy implementation. The last section summarised and
concludes the paper.
5.1 Proposals for the Conduct of
Monetary Policy in a World without Central Bank Money
For the purpose of his analysis of monetary policy without money Goodhart
(2000) assumes that all payments are based on the transfer of eMonies denomi-
nated in various distinguishable units. The various electronic means of pay-
ments (eMonies) float against each other. There is no GAME and, hence, no
uniform unit of account. The CB also offers an eMoney and quotes a bid price
(deposit rate) and an ask price (loan rate) just like all other financial insti-
tutions operating in the market for liquid funds. The spread between the bid
and the ask price of liquidity is determined by real factors such as uncertainty,
uncertainty preferences, resource costs of holding inventory positions in vari-
ous financial assets and the related uncertainty, potential asymmetries of in-
formation among market participants, operating costs as well as transaction and
information costs.3
As the CB is a not-for-profit organisation and the government’s bank, it can
afford to offer a lower spread and incur potentially large losses, because the
government offers unlimited financial backing. Assuming credibility of the
government’s commitment, the CB’s bid and ask price move the market rate
for liquid funds even if it is not the monopoly supplier of liquidity.4 Apart
from the fact that the government might eventually face a budget constraint5 as
well, the proposal seems incomplete and inconsistent. As there is no uniform
unit of account, there is no uniform price level the CB can attempt to stabilise.6
The market for liquid funds seems to consist of short-term financial assets but
                                                          
2 E.g. a CB under a gold standard.
3 Inter alia O’Hara 1997.
4 The Austrian central bank (OeNB) monopolised market making in the ATS/DEM
foreign exchange market in the 70s in basically the same way. It offered lower bid
and ask prices and drove commercial banks out of the market.
5 The parallels to forex market intervention and potential currency crisis are apparent.
6 If demand for CB money were positive, the CB could attempt to stabilise the price
level in its own currency.
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there is no tradable, most liquid asset that exchanges at the lowest spread rela-
tive to all other assets. The market for liquid funds seems to consist of funds
that are less liquid than electronic means of payment (eMonies), that’s why
there is demand for eMonies despite the spread involved in acquiring them in
exchange for liquid financial assets. As there is no medium of final settlement
the model is faced with problems of circularity. If issuers offer bid and ask
spreads (interest payments) solely in their own electronic money unit the exact
form of the budget constraint is opaque, unless the units are redeemable in some
asset that is costly to acquire or produce for each issuer (outside money). It is
unclear to what extent monetary policy provides a nominal anchor for the real
economy in the proposal, as the concept of nominal prices is not well defined
in this model.
Furthermore, the effects of monetary policy on macroeconomic activity appear
to be limited in the model. A contraction of monetary conditions in the eMoney
issued by the CB directly affects the price level measured in the respective
eMoney unit and, hence, directly influences macroeconomic activity only in
the share of the economy dealing in this particular electronic money unit. The
system seems to be unstable. What are the indirect effects of the CB’s policy
on eMonies issued by competing institutions? Expansionary monetary policy
implies that the CB decreases its spread on the market for liquid financial as-
sets so that it potentially attracts more agents willing to sell and, correspond-
ingly, issues a larger volume of its own electronic means of payment. Firstly,
assuming the competitors follow – as the face a strict budget constraint – losses
and, eventually, bankruptcy would be the consequence. The CB eventually
emerges as the sole issuer of eMoney and it can resume the role of the monop-
oly issuer of the GAME and uniform unit of account. Secondly, its competi-
tors leave their spread unchanged. The CB attracts all trades and drives its com-
petitors out of the market, unless the respective price level in the CB eMoney
unit and its exchange rates vis-à-vis its competitors adjust. The CB eMoney
unit depreciates relative to its competitors and the price level in the CB unit
increases. However, the price levels in all other units remain unchanged. Cov-
ered interest rate parity ensures the isolation of all other nominal spheres from
that of the CB.7 Admittedly, the argument assumes that the exchange rates be-
tween eMonies are more flexible than the prices quoted in the other eMonies.
But as the entire debate rests on the assumption that information and commu-
nication technology overcomes frictions in the economy, exchange rates be-
tween eMonies are likely to be less sticky than goods market prices.
Goodhart further assumes that electronic money issued by the CB is “… al-
ways acceptable, (since it is the government’s bank), so it can always force
out unto the system as much [of its own electronic money] as it wants …”
(Goodhart 2000, 28). This insinuates that it is the GAME and, hence, the unit
of account. In that case the model collapses to the current institutional arrange-
ment for the conduct of monetary policy.
Freedman (2000) also offers a thought experiment on the implementation of
monetary policy in a world of alternative settlement mechanisms off the CB’s
books. He provides two proposals: (i) the CB could sell treasury bills and re-
strict acceptable means of payment to its own liabilities. Unless the CB is the
sole source of treasury bills, it remains unclear why other banks cannot buy
treasury bills at the going market rate from other market participants or the
Treasury. Regulation ensures the acceptance of CB money as means of pay-
ment for treasury bills, but not necessarily as GAME and medium of final set-
                                                          
7 Covered interest rate parity assumes the existence of some form of option or futures
markets for eMonies.
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tlement in other transactions. It remains unclear what the unit of account is in
the model, what the treasury bills are denominated in, and how final settlement
is supposed to take place when treasury bills mature.
(ii) The CB continues to provide liquidity to the market via standing facilities
even when settlement takes place off its books. It would finance these standing
facilities by its own liabilities, which apparently continue to be accepted by
market participants. Furthermore, CB money seems to remain the GAME, the
unit of account and the medium of final settlement. But the details of the in-
stitutional structure of the payment system are not explicated in the model and
can only be inferred from the general description of the model. Consequently,
the model does not offer much of an alternative to current systems. Private set-
tlement systems reduce the demand for CB money further, but in principle, it
remains positive and the entire system continues to be firmly rooted on CB
money. Essentially, the model fails to describe a world without CB money.
Henckel/Ize/Kovanen (1999) discusses the conduct of monetary policy without
base money in the following model. Automatic end of day settlement takes
place on the books of private clearing and settlement institutions (CSI). Net
debtors and net creditors would pay and receive, respectively, the rate of in-
terest for their end of day net positions. Treasury bills would collateralise these
credit transactions. The exchange of treasury bills would provide finality with-
out settlement on the books of the CB. Collateralised overnight positions would
extend the netting process infinitely. Although there is no money in the model,
the CB retains the power to set the overnight rate, by narrowing the spread
between the borrowing and the lending rates on its overnights facilities. The
CB sets the rate solely for the net positions in the overnight market and not
for the stock of reserves. In the model the stock of reserves consists of treas-
ury bills and the opportunity costs of holdings these define the costs of liquid-
ity rather than the rates on end of day net positions, which are largely a resid-
ual of the payments process.
The ability of the CB to set the overnight interest rate – for the automatic end
of day settlement – lends support to the interpretation that CB money remains
the GAME and the unit of account and, hence, that the demand for CB money
must be positive. The authors argue that the CB can impose its target rate on
the market for overnight settlement by narrowing the spread between the bor-
rowing and the lending rates on its overnight facilities sufficiently. But the
credible ability to provide funds and accept funds from the market without lim-
its is a prerequisite for the efficacy of such a policy instrument, as Friedman
(1999, 2000) and Woodford (2000) point out. Only the institution that provides
the GAME at zero marginal costs is credible with respect to the (potentially)
infinite elasticity of its demand and supply of funds in the money market.
Despite the continuing monopoly position of the CB the authors attempt to
provide a solution to the problem of price level determination with purely en-
dogenous money. They derive a Taylor-type rule from a small macro-model
to show that the announcement of the target inflation rate is sufficient to an-
chor the system and determine the price level in this economy.
The model neither mentions a GAME nor a unit of account. As the CB does
not forego the monopoly power to “corner” the settlement market, it seems that
CB money remains the GAME and the unit of account in the model. Conse-
quently, the transfer of Treasury bills does not principally provide finality, as
these constitute claims to CB money. As the authors admit themselves, the
transfer of treasury bills rather extends the netting process. Instead of a model
without CB money the authors discuss a model with aggregate overnight set-
tlement balances in the interbank market equal to zero. Nevertheless, CB money
remains the medium of final settlement while treasury bills are means of set-
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tlement for end of day net positions without settlement finality. Otherwise the
model would imply circularity. Freedman’s (2000) arguments clearly highlight
the potential advantages and disadvantages of infinitely extended netting in
interbank settlement.
In order for a Taylor-type rule to be sufficient to determine the price level in
this economy the price level must be defined. If the demand for CB money is
zero the price level in CB money is defined; it is infinite. Again the set-up of
the model is inconsistent, unless the demand for CB money – also the GAME
in the model – remains positive and the money supply is not purely endoge-
nous as the authors claim. Consequently, their model reduces to an exposition
of net settlement and Taylor-type rules in a model with positive demand for
CB money but zero aggregate overnight settlement balances. In principle, the
individual overnight reserves can remain different from zero for at least some
nights due to uncertainty. As such the institutional arrangement of the model is
quite similar to the monetary framework in New Zealand.8
Lahdenperä (2001) offers a conceptualization of the future state of the mone-
tary system. Privately issued electronic monies compete while a uniform unit
of account is maintained and provided (sic!) by the state (p. 29). The eMonies
are backed by tangible assets (e.g. precious metals) or low risk government
(p. 40). The author does not discuss the role of the money market or the role
of the unit of account. As the paper reviews a lot of literature, it is not always
clear whether the author merely draws from the literature or subscribes to one
or more particular future monetary arrangement(s). The author devotes a sec-
tion (pp. 34) to an original analysis of the implementation of monetary policy
in a model of electronic money, which I shall discuss in more detail.
The model assumes two competing settlement systems that both provide final
settlement in electronic money. One is operated by the CB the other one by a
private clearing and settlement institution (CSI). Participants are free to choose
but switching between systems involves transaction costs. Both settlement
agents provide standing facilities at the respective rates. Alternatively, partici-
pants can obtain funds in the money market. CB and privately issued eMoney
trade at par and a single money market rate prevails. In order to cope with li-
quidity shocks in both settlement systems participants hold reserves in both
eMonies. Can the CB steer the money market rate? It is determined by the
weighted average of the respective lending rates of the competing settlement
agents. Lahdenperä concludes that the CB maintains the power to manipulate
the lending rate in its own settlement system and, hence, the money market
rate. Its influence on the money market rate is only partial as it is no longer
the monopoly supplier of the medium of final settlement and of reserves in
the system. The alternative provider of final settlement commands similar in-
fluence on the overnight rate. The relative impact of the policy decisions of the
two settlement agents depends on the weights of their respective lending rates
in an “aggregate lending rate”.
The model is incomplete and inconsistent. It assumes that the competing eMo-
nies trade at par but does not discuss how parity is supposed to be maintained.
The institutional arrangement supporting the assumed structure of the model
is not discussed at all. It remains unclear whether the privately issued eMoney
is backed by commodities, financial assets or fiat-type money.9 Furthermore,
there would be no mechanism in place ensuring parity. If CB money remained
fiat money and the competing eMoney were backed by commodities or finan-
                                                          
8 Sellon/Weiner 1997 and Woodford 2000.
9 If both eMonies were fiat-type currencies the literature predicts that the price level is
infinite. See White 1999 and Schmitz 2002b and the literature quoted therein.
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cial assets, parity would be maintained if and only if the respective portfolios
were expected to remain perfectly stable in nominal terms at all times. Unless
privately issued eMoney is backed by CB money that condition is unlikely to
be met. The eMonies differ only with regard to the respective lending rates. If
eMonies are perfect substitutes in the money market, the differences of the
lending rates can only be a temporary and transitory phenomenon caused by
transaction costs of switching between systems. Over time the differences are
expected to average out unless other characteristics of the settlement systems
(e.g. settlement and operational risk, supervisory functions etc.) exactly balance
the interest rate differential. Otherwise, the system with the lower lending rate
would gain market share and eventually a monopoly position. The weights cor-
respond to the market shares of the competing settlement systems and their re-
spective probabilities of a reserve deficiency or excess.
Furthermore, Lahdenperä does not even mention whether any of the competing
eMonies fulfil the role of the GAME and the medium of final settlement. In a
different section (p. 29/FN 18), however, he subscribes to King’s (1999) posi-
tion that a uniform unit of account “[…] could be provided mechanically by
regulation as other weights and measures today”. As argued in Schmitz (2004)
the analogy between the regulation of weights and measures and the unit of
account is based on a misconception of the subjective nature of exchange in
economics.10
If the model is taken seriously, the following implicit institutional arrangement
supports its main features, i.e. perfect substitutability, a single money market
rate but different lending rates: CB money remains the GAME and the me-
dium of final settlement. The alternative privately issued eMoney is denomi-
nated and redeemable in CB money. The alternative settlement system econo-
mizes on CB reserves through netting arrangements. By incurring a higher
settlement risk compared to real-time gross-settlement in CB money through
netting and pooling of reserves the settlement agent can invest the resulting ex-
cess reserves in low risk government debt and the system can be profitable.
How does monetary policy work under this institutional arrangement? The CB
maintains the monopoly provider of the GAME at zero marginal costs. The
demand for settlement balances to meet the redeemability requirement consti-
tutes a constraint for the alternative eMoney issuer that consequently faces
positive marginal costs in the provision of eMoney. The alternative eMoney is
a means of payment but neither the GAME nor the medium of final settlement.
Such arrangements are already wide spread (e.g. CHIPS) and have posed no
serious threat to the efficacy of monetary policy implementation, in principle,
as Lahdenperä emphasizes in section 5.2.2.
                                                          
10 See also Schmitz 2002b for an analysis of the unit of account function of the GAME
and price formation.
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5.2 Monetary Policy in a World without Money
In section 5.2.1, I present a conceptualisation of the instruments employed by
CBs to implement monetary policy in a world with CB money. Subsequently I
discuss the choice of the medium of final settlement in a world without CB
money (section 5.2.2, p. 98). Then I assess whether and to what extent the in-
struments available to CBs are sufficient to conduct and implement an equiva-
lent to monetary policy in a world without CB money (section 5.2.2, p. 99).
Finally, I briefly consider the ensuing politico-economic implications of the
proposed instruments of monetary policy implementation in a world without
CB money (section 5.2.2, p. 102).
5.2.1 The Money Market
and Monetary Policy in a World with CB Money
Bindseil (2004) presents a historical account of monetary policy implementa-
tion at the Bank of England, the Deutsche Bundesbank (formerly Deutsche
Reichsbank), and the US Federal Reserve System. Throughout most of their
histories the Bank of England and the Deutsche Bundesbank focused on the
money market rate as their main operating target rather than quantity variables.
The Fed on the other hand favoured targeting quantity variables until the 1990s.
In recent years the ECB, the Fed, and the Bank of England all rely on interbank
money market interest rates as operating targets in monetary policy implemen-
tation.11 Also Borio (2001) shows that CBs in industrial countries implement
monetary policy by manipulating interbank money market interest rates and
through open market operations (OMOs)12. CBs implement monetary policy by
manipulating the relative price, the opportunity costs of holding the medium
of final settlement, i.e. the spread between the rate of interest on CB money
held on accounts with CBs and the rate on the optimal alternative investment.
I will restrict the analysis to five instruments of monetary policy implementa-
tion, namely (1.) the communication strategy of CBs – the announcement of a
specific level for the operating target (the main policy variable), (2.) minimum
reserve requirements, (3.) open market operations, (4.) intraday credit13 and
(5.) standing facilities.
Although payment system participants are not necessarily legally required to
settle in CB money, they generally do so. The role of CB money in wholesale
payment systems is the nexus between the CB, the economy wide payment sys-
tem, and nominal GDP as well as the price level. Its role as medium of final set-
tlement is an incidental function of its role as GAME. In principle, the reliance
on CB money at the level of wholesale payment systems eliminates credit and
liquidity risks after settlement, i.e. vis-à-vis the clearing and settlement institu-
                                                          
11 For the role of excess reserves in the implementation of monetary policy in the Euro-
area see Bindseil/Camba-Mendez/Hirsch/Weller (2003), for the framework for mone-
tary policy implementation in the Euro-area, the UK, and the US see ECB (2004),
Wetherilt (2002), and Edwards (1997), respectively.
12 For details concerning OMOs of the ECB, the Fed and the Bank of England see
also ECB (2004), Bartolini/Prati (2003), and Allen (2002).
13 In fact, intraday credit is not an instrument of monetary policy implementation. I
have included it in the current discussion as it forms an important feature of the
wider implementation framework.
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tion (CSI).14 Settlement in CB money ensures finality in an economic sense (as
opposed to finality in a legal sense as unconditional and irrevocable payment),
since CB money is neither an explicit claim to real resources nor to nominal
payments. Reserve requirements are usually averaged over a fulfilment period
and the same account at the CB can usually be employed to administer settle-
ment balances, to fund and defund in the interbank settlement process, and to
fulfil reserve requirements. In interbank payment systems CB reserves are the
medium of final settlement. This guarantees a positive demand for CB money,
irrespective of the means of payment employed in retail payment systems, as
long as these are denominated in the CB money and, thus, linked to the inter-
bank market.15
Settlement on the books of CBs has additional advantages. As a public institu-
tion the CB is required to provide access to its accounts and to intraday credit
on fair, equal, and non-discriminatory conditions. Freedman (2000) argues that
settling on the books of a competitor could lead to a competitive advantage for
the private CSI, that the liabilities of a private CSI carry some credit risk, and
that a private CSI cannot increase liquidity at zero marginal cost as can CBs and
credibly act as lender of last resort (LLR).
The starting point of the analysis is the announcement of a level for the main
operating target directly (e.g. Federal funds rate) or indirectly (e.g. via the rate
at which OMOs are conducted such as the minimum bid rate). The credibility
of the announcement and its impact on the interbank money market rate are a
consequence of the capacity of CBs to increase aggregate reserves in the GAME
at zero marginal costs. Despite the relatively small size of their OMOs, CBs
can manipulate the main policy rate very well. It was frequently argued that
CBs can largely rely on the impact of their communicated target values for the
operating target rates (“open mouth operations”).16 This simplification of mone-
tary policy implementation is not justified, despite the relatively small size of
OMOs. CBs do in fact employ a number of additional instruments, in order to
actually implement the intended market rate and to contain the volatility of the
operating target around its announced level.
At the intended level of the main policy variable (i.e. the overnight interest
rate – rpol in Diagram 5.2-1) a structural liquidity deficit in the payment sys-
tem prevails. It is defined as the difference between demand D(rpol) and sup-
ply S(rpol) of overnight reserves at the intended level of the main policy rate.17
The structural liquidity deficit implies that money market participants demand
more CB reserves on aggregate than are available on the market. In principle,
the variation of minimum reserves requirements would be an additional in-
strument for CBs to manipulate aggregate demand for CB reserves D and its
volatility throughout the maintenance period. Minimum reserves requirements
change very infrequently and their role in containing the volatility of D rests
largely on averaging arrangements during the fulfilment period.
                                                          
14 Freedman 2000.
15 Schmitz (2002b) demonstrates that the denomination of means of payment in retail
payment systems in the GAME is strategically superior for issuers and costumers
than denomination in alternative units of account.
16 Friedman (1999) and Thornton (2000).
17 Minimum reserve requirements do play an important role in determining the size of
the deficit, but they are not a necessary precondition for one to exist, as is demon-
strated inter alia by the New Zealand framework of monetary policy implementation.
For a description of the relevant features of the institutional framework operational
in New Zealand see Woodford (2001), Sellon/Weiner (1997). Whitesell (2003) ar-
gues that even though the implementation of monetary policy also works without
reserve requirements, the systems would benefit from adding reserve requirements.
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CBs estimate the (expected) level of the structural liquidity deficit and set the
volume of refinancing operations ∆RS, in a way that the aggregate supply of
reserves S(rpol) + ∆RS equals their (expected) aggregate demand D(rpol) at the
intended overnight rate rpol, in other words CB determine the volume of OMOs
according to ∆RS = D(rpol)-S(rpol). The manipulation of aggregate supply by
OMOs is the instrument to actually implement the intended market rate on the
market. The equilibrium will only prevail temporarily, as CBs conduct refinanc-
ing operations which are reversed after a prespecified period (repos), such that
the structural liquidity deficit is covered only temporarily.18 The structural li-
quidity deficit ensures that at least some market participants have to bid for ad-
ditional aggregate reserves each time their outstanding debt with the CB ma-
tures. The opportunity costs of holding reserves are determined by the stock of
the aggregate supply of reserves rather than by the interest rate on excess re-
serves lend or deficiencies borrowed in the overnight market.19
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Diagram 5.2-1: Aggregate overnight reserves and the structural liquidity
deficit in the overnight market
The aggregate volume of overnight reserves consists of the sum of the over-
night reserves of commercial banks. The level of aggregate overnight reserves is
manipulated by open market operations (OMOs). The slope and position of the
demand curve D are not known to CBs with certainty, neither is the size of the
structural liquidity deficit. The precise demand for CB reserves varies within
the band indicated by ∆RD. The demand for CB reserves at OMOs depends on
the level of minimum reserve requirements, the expected working balances over
the maintenance period, the averaging arrangements in place, and the expected
future overnight interest rates. In equilibrium, the expected discounted marginal
costs of borrowing in the overnight market until the next refinancing operation
must equal the expected marginal costs of borrowing from the CB via OMOs at
the current refinancing operation. The relatively small size of OMOs compared
to daily volume is irrelevant, as price formation works at the margin and the CB
is in the unique position to manipulate the supply at the margin at zero marginal
                                                          
18 The maturity of the main refinancing operations in the Euro area is one week and
in the UK it is two weeks.
19 Comparing the small size of OMOs and the liquidity deficit to turnover in interbank
markets is therefore misleading as it relates the continuous redistribution of aggre-
gate reserves among market participants to one off changes in aggregate reserves.
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cost. Unless the liquidity situation between OMOs deviates substantially from
expectations, market participants have no incentive to borrow or lend at rates
substantially over and under the intended level of the main operating target.
CBs can address this uncertainty by auctioning off aggregate liquidity ∆RS, in
order to allow some degree of flexibility. Diagram 5.2-2 illustrates that ∆RS is en-
dogenised between the bounds [0, ∆RSmax], which are determined by CBs, as is
the minimum bid rate rOMOmin. If the aggregate demand for refinancing D2OMO
is below the maximum volume of a specific refinancing operation, all bids
will be satisfied at the respective bid rates20 and the volume will equal the
sum of the bids ∆R2S < ∆RSmax. If the sum of the bids D1OMO exceeds ∆RSmax,
not all bids will be satisfied and the allotment of additional funds and the mar-
ginal allotment rate will depend on the allotment mechanism in place.
The overnight rate remains close to the target level also between OMOs, as
CBs determine the maximum operational volume of OMOs precisely with the
intention to cover the estimated structural liquidity deficit in the money market
at the announced level of the operating target. The implementation process is
designed in a way to ensure that aggregate supply and aggregate demand inter-
sect at the announced level of the operating target, unless CBs’ estimates of
the structural deficit are wrong and/or conditions in the money market change
unexpectedly. In equilibrium, commercials banks bidding for overnight reserves
have no incentive to pay overnight rates substantially above the target level,
as they arrange their bidding behaviour at OMOs accordingly. In addition, the
effects of temporary liquidity shocks on aggregate demand for overnight re-
serves are (partly) absorbed by averaging arrangements for reserve require-
ments over the fulfilment period. The longer the remaining fulfilment period,
the more of a temporary shock can be absorbed by intertemporal substitution.21
Given that the frequency of OMOs is relatively high with respect to the fulfil-
ment period market participants can to some extent intertemporally substitute
bidding at OMOs for overnight credit.
r
∆R2S ∆RSmax = ∆R1S
∆RS
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Diagram 5.2-2: The maximum volume of OMOs, demand for additional CB
reserves, and the realised increase in aggregate CB reserves
                                                          
20 If the participating banks anticipate that demand will be below ∆RSmax, the respec-
tive bid rates will be rOMOmin.
21 Ewerhart/Cassola/Ejerskov/Valla (2003) present evidence that both the level and the
volatility of the money market rate in the Euro-area increase towards the end of the
maintenance period (for the US see Woodford 2001, 30).
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After refinancing operations are concluded, the supply of aggregate reserves
is determined and beyond the discretion of the participants of the interbank
market and the payment system. They are active on the intraday and the over-
night money market and supply and demand on both markets are interdepend-
ent. In order to address larger liquidity shocks or those occurring towards the
end of the fulfilment period, CBs have additional instruments at their discre-
tion that enable them to stabilise the operating target in the period between
OMOs: intraday credit and standing facilities.
Individual banks’ demand and supply of intraday liquidity on the intraday mar-
ket are determined by their initial CB reserves at the beginning of the trading
day, the processes of payments credited and debited, their degree of synchro-
nicity, and the target level of overnight CB reserves as well as the institutional
structure of the payment system. Intraday reserves yield a decreasing marginal
liquidity service yield and the demand schedule Dint is downward sloping (Dia-
gram 5.2-3). The sequence of incoming and outgoing payments is largely a
stochastic process and beyond the discretion of individual banks in the very
short run.22 Hence, individual banks’ demand and supply on the intraday mar-
ket are to some extent stochastic and so are their aggregates. In a net settle-
ment system these short run liquidity shocks are likely to average out during
the day as participants grant each other implicit credit.
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Diagram 5.2-3: The intraday money market and the availability of intraday
credit from CBs in RTGS
Most interbank payment systems in industrialised countries are RTGS with in-
traday credit provided by CBs.23 In RTGS the dynamics can lead to a liquid-
ity gridlock and an increase of aggregate demand for intraday liquidity from
D1int to D2int and to an increase in the intraday market rate from r1int to r2int. In
order to contain the volatility in the intraday market, which would imply wel-
fare costs due to the costs of hedging against the implied uncertainty and ob-
scure market signals on the liquidity situation, CBs can provide intraday credit,
                                                          
22 While the institutional structure is exogenous to the decisions problems of payment
systems participants, the degree of synchronicity of payment flows can be increased
at increasing marginal costs to the payment system participants to some extent in
the medium term, e.g. by clustering credits and debits at pre-arranged points of time.
But even under such arrangements exogenous factors – payments initiated by banks’
customers – play a crucial role in determining the liquidity positions of participants.
23 Borio 2001.
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which absorbs very short term temporary liquidity shocks, to market partici-
pants and shift the supply curve from S1int to S2int. Intraday credit also increases
the stability of the interbank payment system vis-à-vis net settlement systems
by making payment obligations more visible and enhancing risk management.
Hence, the supply of aggregate intraday liquidity is endogenised to some ex-
tent. In addition, intraday credit reduces the liquidity costs in RTGS. It is usu-
ally collateralised to decrease the credit risk of CBs and has to be retired at the
end of the day, in order to prevent spill over into the overnight market, where
it would exert downward pressure on the main operating target.24
As intraday credit has to be repaid at the end of the trading day, the aggregate sup-
ply of overnight reserves is independent of intraday liquidity management by CBs.
The demand for overnight CB balances is determined by a number of related fac-
tors: end-of-day balance of banks’ settlement accounts, minimum reserve require-
ments, the remaining duration of the fulfilment period, and the expectations con-
cerning future overnight interest rates until the end of the fulfilment period.25
Given the remaining duration of the fulfilment period, banks’ expectations
concerning the future overnight interest rates until the end of the maintenance
period, and their expectations concerning the overnight interest rate at the end
of the day the banks formulate their targets for their overnight reserves. Given
this target banks try to utilise their (limited) room for manoeuvre during the
day to reach end-of-day balances equal to their targets. After realisation of end-
of-day balances banks lend excess reserves or borrow to cover deficiencies in
the overnight market. Their lending and borrowing decisions are not mechani-
cally determined by end-of-day balances relative to the overnight reserve tar-
get, but also reflect deviations of the overnight rate from expectations. Given
banks’ expectations concerning future overnight rates, increases in current over-
night rates provide an incentive for banks to decrease their overnight reserve
target and to increase lending or decrease borrowing in the market. The elas-
ticity of supply and demand with respect to overnight rates depends on banks’
risk preferences.26 Due to the decreasing marginal liquidity service yield CB
overnight reserves provide their aggregate demand is a decreasing function of
the overnight rate. Their aggregate supply is determined exogenously.
Changes in expectations of future overnight rates over the maintenance period
shift the demand and supply curves in the current overnight money market. In-
creases in expected future rates shift the current demand schedule upwards as
current reserves can be substituted for future reserves over the averaging pe-
riod. Correspondingly, decreasing expected future rates shift the demand sched-
ule downwards.
In addition to OMOs and intraday credit CBs usually grant access to (some
sort of) standing facilities to park (deposit facility) or to raise liquidity (lend-
ing facility) at a premium relative to market rates. The rates charged on these
(rDF and rLF in Diagram 5.2-4) set a floor and a ceiling for the overnight money
market rate. The zero marginal cost of providing CB reserves and the function
of CB money as GAME are preconditions for the ability of CBs to define floors
and ceilings for money market rates. CBs do not face budget constraints with
respect to rDF and rLF at the margin. In Diagram 5.2-4 the deposit facility DF and
the lending facility LF ensure that the main operating target remains within
the bounds [rDF, rLF] despite shifts in the demand from D to D1 or to D2.
                                                          
24 In the Euro area intraday credits not repaid at the end of the day are treated as credit
from the lending facility.
25 For a survey of the literature on models of banks’ reserve management see Ewer-
hart/Cassola/Ejerskov/Valla (2003).
26 Ho/Saunders (1985).
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Diagram 5.2-4: The overnight market for CB reserves and standing facilities
(between OMOs)
As rDF and rLF constitute penalty rates deviating from the interbank money
market rate, participants have an incentive to borrow and deposit funds on the
overnight market before turning to standing facilities. A more liquid market is
an additional intermediate policy objective for CBs as it constitutes an im-
portant feature of an environment conducive to smooth monetary policy im-
plementation and financial market stability. Standing facilities are not em-
ployed to steer market liquidity at large, but to reduce the volatility of the over-
night rate in cases of temporary liquidity shocks exceeding the absorptive ca-
pacity of minimum reserve requirements.27
5.2.2 The money market and
monetary policy in a world without CB money
Friedman (1999) and Woodford (1998) extrapolate trends of decreasing ratios
of CB money to aggregate spending to the mathematical limit. The amount of
CB money necessary to operate wholesale and retail payment systems finally
reaches zero. They implicitly assume that the behaviour of the monetary sys-
tem while approaching the limit, and once it has reached the limit, exhibits
structural continuity, in principle. Even though CB money is expected to be-
come irrelevant in the limit, the monetary system does not exhibit any signs of
instability or structural changes.28
Contrary to their approach, I discuss the institutional arrangements of the in-
terbank payment system once the limit is reached and the implications for mone-
tary policy in a world without CB money. The questions that have to be ad-
dressed are: (1.) what is the medium of final settlement in the interbank pay-
ment system? (2.) What are the instruments available to CBs to manipulate
price and/or quantity on the money market? (3.) What are the politico-eco-
nomic consequences of alternative instruments of monetary policy implemen-
tation?
                                                          
27 Standing facilities are the main instrument of monetary policy implementation under
the “channel”-approach. The spread between rDF and rLF is substantially smaller.
28 See also Selgin/White 2002.
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The Choice of the Medium of Final Settlement
In a world with CB money the GAME (CB money) also functions as the me-
dium of final settlement in the interbank payment system. Schmitz (2002b, 2004)
argues that for efficiency reasons a single GAME and a unified unit of account
prevail in a world without CB money. All means of payment are claims to the
medium of final settlement. In order to reduce the spread between bid and ask
interest rates in the interbank market by eliminating credit, liquidity and mar-
ket risk, the GAME will also serve as the medium of final settlement in the in-
terbank market. It is the only medium that is not a direct or indirect claim on
future resources and that ensures settlement finality in the interbank payment
system.29
A number of papers that present models of worlds without money argue that
debt instruments or real wealth would serve as media of final settlement.30
(1.) If there were no GAME and settlement took place in claims on real wealth,
settlement would imply credit, liquidity, and market risk of the debt instrument.
Upon maturity of the debt instruments the underlying real resources would
have to be exchanged (bartered) for the goods actually demanded at additional
transaction costs. The eligible instruments would only exchange at par, if they
were perfect substitutes and equally liquid. Otherwise, the most liquid set-
tlement instrument would exchange at the lowest bid-ask spread and drive out
other debt instruments in the settlement process. The price level would be de-
fined in terms of the underlying real resource. Its stability would depend on
the institutional arrangements constraining the issue of the debt instruments and
the production function of the underlying real resource.
(2.) The existence of a GAME would increase efficiency, as debt instruments
would be dominated by instruments denominated in a GAME but indexed to
the prices of the underlying real resources.31 If there were a GAME and inter-
bank payments were finally settled in debt denominated in the GAME, the
transaction costs are higher compared to settlement in the GAME due to credit,
liquidity, and market risk. Each settlement in debt instruments would require
negotiations concerning the instruments accepted in settlement and the relevant
relative price. The eligible instruments would be perfect substitutes at the rele-
vant market price, if the bid-ask spread were zero and all eligible assets would
be equally liquid. However, final settlement in the GAME also involves trans-
actions costs and opportunity costs of holding reserves in the GAME. Market
participants economise on reserves in various payment systems by extended
netting, queuing mechanisms in money markets, and intraday credit. Never-
theless, all settlement media remain claims to the GAME and settlement fi-
nality in an economic sense is only provided by the GAME.
(3.) If debt instruments (and interest thereon) are settled in further debt instru-
ments in the future, the process will be subject to circularity and no effective
constraint of the issue of debt is in place for an individual issuer at the mar-
gin, unless debts are eventually settled in real resources. If debt instruments
are eventually redeemed in outside money, the system will resemble a form of
extended netting.
                                                          
29 Notwithstanding, that in extended netting systems private CSI allow for the exten-
sion of settlement and the exchange of debt instruments (often highly liquid gov-
ernment bonds) as collateral in net payment systems to economise on CB reserves,
final settlement takes place in the GAME eventually.
30 Inter alia Centi/Bougi 2003, Costa/De Grauwe 2001, and King 1999. For a discus-
sion see Chapter XX.
31 White 1984.
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In a world without CB money, the GAME will be outside money that will be
available at non-zero marginal costs only. The aggregate supply of the outside
money is determined by its marginal costs to the market participants.32 Even
in the case of individual transaction balances vanishing in the face of innova-
tion in the retail payment system (e.g. credit, debit, and cash cards as well as
ubiquitous electronic access to deposits) the demand for the medium of final
settlement would be determined by the demand for settlement balances in the
interbank payment system.
The Instruments Available
to CBs in a World Without CB Money
The market on which CBs would implement monetary policy in a world with-
out CB money is the market for the respective medium of final settlement (in-
terbank or money market). CBs lose their monopoly in the provision of the
GAME at zero costs at the margin. They face the same demand and supply
schedules as other market participants. How does that affect the efficacy of the
instruments of monetary policy implementation? The following instruments
will be considered: (1.) the communication strategy of CBs – the announcement
of a specific level for the operating target rate, (2.) open market operations,
(3.) minimum reserve requirements, (4.) intraday credit and (5.) standing fa-
cilities.
The announcement of a specific level of the relative price of the medium of final
settlement by CBs would be insufficient to steer market rates effectively in a
world, in which CBs have lost their monopoly in the provision of the medium
of final settlement at zero marginal cost. CBs are no longer in a position to
impose a structural liquidity deficit on the money market by shifting the supply
curve of the medium of final settlement at zero marginal costs. In principle,
CBs can withdraw quantities of the medium of final settlement from the mar-
ket by OMOs (i.e. open market purchases) as can all other market participants,
as Goodhart (2000) argues correctly. Like them CBs would have to bear the
resulting costs. The volume of open market purchases necessary to effectively
steer market rates and the resulting losses are ultimately empirical questions,
as is the sustainability of political support for covering the resulting costs by
public funds. CB interventions in foreign exchange markets can serve as anal-
ogy. Currency crises teach that, both, the funds available to CBs and the politi-
cal will of societies to cover costs related to large scale foreign exchange in-
terventions are not unlimited. Evidence is available in abundance showing that
CBs failed to defend fixed exchange rates in foreign exchange markets, despite
their previous explicit commitment and strong incentives in terms of often sub-
stantial welfare losses in the aftermath of currency devaluation. The monopoly
provision of the GAME is a precondition for effectively steering money mar-
ket rates by imposing a structural liquidity deficit on the money market and by
announcing specific levels for the operating target.
CBs can impose minimum reserve requirements in terms of the medium of final
settlement as a ratio of market participants’ liabilities as instrument of mone-
tary policy implementation. In principle, CBs could impose minimum reserve
requirements in terms of CB reserves on market participants by statutory regu-
                                                          
32 White (1999) demonstrates why the private issue of fiat-type money is infeasible.
Examples of an eligible GAME are various types of commodity monies.
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lation.33 Hence, they could force a positive demand for CB money upon ma-
ket participants. As the focus of this paper is on the analysis of monetary pol-
icy in a world without CB money, I will not consider this option further. In ad-
dition, minimum reserve requirements in terms of CB money are not neces-
sarily sufficient to ensure the role of CB money as GAME. In order to ensure
the efficacy of monetary policy implementation, minimum reserve require-
ments must be imposed in the GAME. Minimum reserve requirements in any
asset enable policy makers to manipulate the marginal costs of financial inter-
mediation, just like policy induced changes of any other input prices.34 Unlike
changes of the opportunity costs of the GAME, changes in input prices do not
change the relative price of the medium of final settlement vis-à-vis all other
assets and goods in the economy, but affect only the relative price interme-
diation services to all other assets and goods in the economy. The nominal
price of financial intermediation will adjust faster than the nominal prices of
all other goods in the economy. That is not to say that an increase in the nomi-
nal price of bank credit does not eventually affect aggregate demand and the
nominal price level at all, but the transmission mechanism is essentially differ-
ent from the monetary policy transmission mechanism based on manipulation
of the marginal price of the GAME. In order to preserve the independence of
CBs and their flexibility in monetary policy, legislatures would have to trans-
fer the authority to set capital adequacy ratios to CBs entirely. Such a transfer
of power would entail politico-economic problems as the CB lacks legitimacy
as legislator. If some regulatory powers would remain with the legislature and
the financial market authority, they would enable them to counteract the regu-
latory decisions of the CB in principle and, thus, undermine the efficacy of
monetary policy implementation. The legal framework to set minimum reserve
requirements in the GAME already is in place, as demonstrated in section
5.2.2, p. 102.
The proposed prominent role of minimum reserve requirements in the GAME
in monetary policy stems from the prominent role of the banking system and
bank liabilities in the payment system and from the role of the bank credit chan-
nel in the transmission of monetary policy. Monetary policy is implemented via
the money market precisely because it is a peculiar input market, not because
it is just one of the input markets of financial intermediation. In a tiered pay-
ment system all payments are eventually settled in the GAME, so that changes
in the marginal opportunity costs of the GAME affect the marginal costs of all
payments in the economy. The implementation of monetary policy in the mar-
ket for the GAME captures other transmission mechanisms as well, such as
transmission along the yield curve and the interest rate investment channel.
Averaging arrangements over the fulfilment period would have the further ad-
vantage of absorbing short term liquidity shocks and smoothing demand for the
medium of final settlement. In order to be effective at the margin, minimum re-
serve requirements would have to be binding, i.e. exceed settlement balances.
The ability to impose minimum reserve requirements is a consequence of the
character of CBs as public institutions endowed with regulatory competencies
and is independent of the monopoly to issue the GAME at zero marginal costs.
                                                          
33 See for example Henckel/Ize/Kovanen 1999, Costa/De Grauwe 2001, Palley 2002,
Arnone/Bandiera 2004. Similar proposals were also put forward in the discussion of
the paper by Angelo Baglioni and Dimitrios Tsomocos.
34 Examples of policy induced changes to input price sin financial intermediation in-
clude changes of capital adequacy requirements, personal income tax brackets appli-
cable to employees of financial intermediaries and credit contract fees (as in place
in Austria).
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The instrument of providing intraday credit below money market rates in
RTGS is only available to CBs at positive marginal costs. These consist of the
opportunity costs associated with holding reserves in the medium of final set-
tlement and the costs of lending below market rates. Lending below market
rates would provide an opportunity for arbitrage for market participants, who
borrow funds from CBs and lend them at higher rates in the money market.
The monopoly provision of the GAME is a precondition for the costless pro-
vision of intraday credit in RTGS.
Standing facilities provided at penalty rates deviating from the market rate, on
the other hand, constitute a potential source of income for CBs. However, as
long as market rates are within the floor and the ceiling defined by the penalty
rates, market participants have no incentive to deposit with or lend from CBs.
If market rate fluctuations exceed the bound, standing facilities can only be
offered at costs to CBs and provide arbitrage opportunities for market partici-
pants. The monopoly provision of the GAME is a precondition for standing
facilities to effectively define of a floor and a ceiling for money market rates.
Monetary policy in a world without CB money is feasible by a combination of
minimum reserve requirements in the medium of final settlement and interest
paid or charged on these. These competencies are a consequence of the CBs’
role as public institutions with certain regulatory authorities transferred to them
by the respective legislature.35 They are independent of the loss of CBs’ mo-
nopoly to issue the GAME at zero marginal costs. They can entail the transfer
of authority to impose obligations on third parties such as the authority to im-
pose minimum reserve requirements in the medium of final settlement as well
as to specify an interest rate paid or charged on these for the purpose of mone-
tary policy implementation.
The opportunity costs of holding reserves of the medium of final settlement
are determined by the marginal costs of obtaining it on the market minus the
(positive or negative) remuneration of minimum reserve requirements. Irre-
spective of the loss of the monopoly provision of the medium of final settle-
ment CBs can manipulate the opportunity costs of holding reserves. Rather
than assuming the interest on reserves to be fixed and the main policy target
to be endogenous, CBs treat the marginal costs of the medium of final settle-
ment as exogenous and steer liquidity conditions by manipulating the interest
rate paid or charged on minimum reserves held by market participants directly.
Comparable to the implicit taxation of financial intermediation by imposing
minimum reserve requirements in a world with CB money, remuneration paid
or fees charged on minimum reserve requirements in a world without CB
money correspond to a subsidy or to a tax, respectively, on the liabilities of
market participants.
The interest paid or charged on minimum reserves shifts the stock of reserves
held on average over the maintenance period and, hence, the aggregate demand
for the medium of final settlement upwards or downwards, respectively. The
supply schedule of the aggregate stock of the medium of final settlement is
unaffected by the decreasing (or increases) opportunity costs of holding re-
serves as it is determined by marginal costs of providing the medium of final
settlement. The equilibrium price in the market for the medium of final settle-
ment increases or decreases, respectively. Under the precondition that the sup-
ply of the medium of final settlement is not infinitely inelastic the equilibrium
                                                          
35 Buiter (2004) recognises that the central bank trades on the unique monopoly of the
state to legitimately use force (or coercion), to tax and to regulate. He conjectures
that the demand for CB money will never vanish completely as the state will always
be more creditworthy than private agents.
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price increases (or decreases) less than the interest rate on minimum reserves
and thus decreases (or increases) the opportunity costs of the stock of minimum
reserves held. This eases (or tightens) liquidity conditions for market participants.
In addition to the aggregate stock of the medium of final settlement banks also
supply excess reserves. But the demand and the supply of excess reserves are
unplanned residuals of the payments processed. After realisation of end-of-day
balances banks lend excess reserves, which are not remunerated, or borrow to
cover deficiencies in the overnight market. As interest is neither paid nor
charged on excess reserves they are independent of the opportunity costs of
holding the stock of minimum reserves. Woodford (2000) argues that increases
in the efficiency of the payment system should allow banks to operate with
very low excess reserves. If minimum reserve requirements are sufficiently
large relative to settlement balances, excess reserves and the share end-of-day
deficiencies of minimum reserves is small. If the time it takes to adjust the ag-
gregate stock of the medium of final settlement is below the maintenance pe-
riod, market participants have no incentive to borrow from each other at costs
above the marginal costs of the medium of final settlement. In analogy to the
determination of the opportunity costs of holding reserves in a world with CB
money, the opportunity costs of the stock of aggregate minimum reserves held
are determined by the marginal costs of the aggregate stock supplied and not
by the rate on the flow of the medium of final settlement due to demand and
supply of excess reserves.
In principle, CBs can manipulate the opportunity costs of holding reserves but
with less accuracy, as the discontinuation of standing facilities and intraday
credit deprives CBs of additional instruments to absorb liquidity shocks and
to stabilise money market rates. CBs lose control of the supply of the medium
of final settlement, such that supply shocks add to the uncertainty CBs face in
monetary policy implementation in a world without CB money.
Politico-Economic Consequences of
Alternative Instruments of Monetary Policy Implementation
The transfer of authority to pay or charge interest on minimum reserves, i.e.
to levy a tax or to grant subsidies on the liabilities of credit institutions, to CBs
raises politico-economic questions concerning the legitimacy of the transfer
of such powers from the respective legislature to an independent institution.
CBs are public institutions endowed with regulatory powers (e.g. in areas such
as monetary policy implementation and payment system oversight). As public
institutions the rule of law requires their competencies to be based on explicit
legal foundations like central banking acts and statutes, such as the Protocol on
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central
Bank (1992) and the Federal Reserve Act (1913). These constitute the legal
foundations for actions of the ECB and the Fed including decisions which im-
pose obligations on third parties. In general, legislatures grant CBs the discre-
tion necessary to execute the respective acts independently and effectively,
while retaining legislative authority.
Article 110 (1) of the Treaty establishing the European Union and Article 34.1.
of the ECB Statutes confer regulatory power to the ECB to the extent neces-
sary, inter alia, to define and implement monetary policy and to promote the
smooth operation of the payment system. Article 110 (3) of the Treaty and Ar-
ticle 34.3. of the ECB Statutes grant the ECB the right to impose sanctions in
cases of non-compliance with its regulations and decisions within the limits
and under the conditions adopted by the EC Council. The acts and omissions
of the ECB are subject to judicial control by the Court of Justice according to
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Article 35 of the ECB Statutes. The EC Council is required to adopt the nec-
essary complementary legislation after consultation with the Commission, the
European Parliament, and the ECB (Article 42 of the ECB Statutes and Arti-
cle 107(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Union).
In particular Article 19.1. of the ECB Statutes authorises the ECB to require
credit institutions established in the member states to hold minimum reserves
on accounts with the ECB, levy penalty interest and to impose other sanctions
in cases of non-compliance. The regulations concerning the calculation and de-
termination of the required minimum reserves may be established by the Gov-
erning Council. The application of minimum reserve requirements is restricted
to the pursuance of the ECB’s monetary policy objectives. However, Article
19.2. ensures that the EC Council (in accordance with the procedure laid down
in the Article 106 (6) of the Treaty establishing the European Union) main-
tains the legislative authority over the definition of the basis for minimum re-
serves, the maximum permissible minimum reserve ratios, as well as the appro-
priate sanctions in cases of non-compliance, which are defined in Council
Regulation (EC) No 2531/98 and No 2532/98 of 23 November 1998. ECB
Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 further specifies the details of infringements
procedures.
In accordance with Article 110 (1) of the Treaty, Article 5 of Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 2531/98 and Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98
explicitly grant regulatory power to the ECB for the purpose of non-discrimi-
natory exemptions from minimum reserve requirements and for the purpose
of more detailed specifications than provided in Article 3 of the respective
Regulation of the basis for minimum reserve requirements, as well as for the
specification of the reserve ratios as well as for more detailed specifications of
sanctions. Article 4 (1) of Council Regulation (EC) 2531/98 specifies that the
ratios may not exceed 10% of any relevant liabilities forming part of the basis
for minimum reserve requirements but may be 0%. The ECB may impose sanc-
tions in cases of non-compliance – in accordance with Article 110 (3) of the
Treaty establishing the European Union and specified in Article 7 (a) and (b)
of Council Regulation (EC) 2531/98 – of up to 5 percentage points above the
ECB’s marginal lending rate or twice the ECB’s marginal lending rate of the
reserve shortage or may require the relevant institution to hold a non-interest-
bearing deposit with the ECB up to 3 times the amount of the shortage. Con-
sideration (5) of Council Regulation (EC) 2531/98 explicitly states that the ECB
must have the flexibility to react to new payment technologies such as the de-
velopment of electronic money. Consideration (6) of Council Regulation (EC)
2531/98 restricts the ECB’s flexibility in the implementation of the regulation
to act in the pursuance of the objectives of the ESCB as laid down in Article 2
of its Statutes and in the principle of not inducing significant undesirable de-
location or disintermediation in the financial system. Similarly, consideration
(5) of Council Regulation (EC) 2532/98 emphasises that, in order to provide
an effective regime for the administration of sanctions the ECB must have some
discretion within the limits and conditions of the respective Regulation.
Based on the regulatory discretion conferred upon it the ECB specifies the de-
tails of the application of minimum reserve requirements in Regulation (EC)
No 1745/2003 of the European Central Bank. Article 2 defines the institutions
subject to minimum reserve requirements as credit institutions and branches
according to the relevant Directive (2000/12/EC); Article 3 specifies the re-
serve base as consisting of deposits and debt securities issued, unless they are
owed to any other institution subject to reserve requirements or to the ECB or
an NCB. The reserve ratios applicable are defined in Article 4 as 0% for all
deposits and debt instruments with a maturity over two years, repos, and de-
posits redeemable at notice over two years, and 2% for all other liabilities in-
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cluded in the reserve base. Article 6 states that institutions shall hold their mini-
mum reserve on accounts of the NCBs and that the reserves shall be denomi-
nated in euro. Article 8 defines the remuneration of reserves.
Similar institutional frameworks are in place in the U.S. Congress transfers
substantial regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve System in a number of
areas including the conduct and implementation of monetary policy but also
supervisory and regulatory authority over a wide range of financial institutions.
The Fed issues Federal Reserve Regulations from Regulation A (Extension of
Credit by Federal Reserve Banks) to Regulation EE (Netting Eligibility for Fi-
nancial Institutions). The U. S. Constitution gives the right to coin money and
set its value to the U. S. Congress, which delegates the right to the Federal Re-
serve System in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Accordingly, the Fed is sub-
ject to oversight by Congress.
Section 19 paragraph (2) sub-paragraphs (A) and (B) of the Act impose mini-
mum reserve requirements on depository institutions, i.e. on their transaction
accounts and their nonpersonal time deposits. The Act authorises the Board
of Governors to define the terms used in the section, to prescribe regulations
it deems necessary to effectuate the purpose of Section 19, and to determine
the exact reserve ratio by regulation within broad bounds defined in the Act.
Paragraph (2)(A)(i) determines the ratio at 3 per centum for that proportion of
each depository institution’s transaction accounts of $ 25,000,000 or less.36 In
paragraph (2)(A)(ii) the Act grants the Board some discretion with respect to
the ratio applicable to that proportion a depository institution’s transaction ac-
counts exceeding the dollar amount in sub-paragraph (i). The Board may pre-
scribe a ratio not greater than 14 per centum and not less than 8 per centum.
Sub-paragraph (B) authorises the Board to impose minimum reserve require-
ments on nonpersonal time deposits. The applicable ratio has to be between
zero and 9 per centum. The regulatory authority in imposing minimum reserve
requirements on transaction accounts and on nonpersonal time deposits is re-
stricted to the purpose of implementing monetary policy.37
Paragraph (4) enables the Board to impose a supplemental reserve requirement
on depository institutions of not more than 4 per centum, if that increases re-
serves to a level essential for the conduct of monetary policy. Supplemental
reserves have to be maintained in Earnings Participation Accounts and are re-
munerated. The Board is entitled to remunerate supplemental reserves at a rate
not more than the rate earned on the securities portfolio of the Federal Re-
serve System during the previous quarter. Subsection (c)(1) contains the prom-
ulgation of rules and regulations regarding the maintenance of balances but
does not stipulate that the reserves are to be denominated in US dollar. Sub-
paragraph (l)(9) entitles the Board to prescribe regulations establishing pro-
cedures as may be necessary to impose civil money penalties on depository
institutions violating any provision of Section 19.
                                                          
36 The Board of Governors has to increase (or decrease) the dollar amount stipulated
in paragraph 2 (A) (i) each year in line with the growth rate of the total transaction
accounts of all depository institutions. The Federal Reserve Act defines the method
of calculation of the increase in total transaction accounts and of the increase of the
dollar amount applicable in paragraph 2 (A) (i).
37 In addition to the implicit taxation of bank liabilities the Act also contained a sec-
tion on the explicit taxation of bank liabilities until 1914. Section 27 of the Act
prescribed a tax on that proportion of circulating bank notes of National banks,
which was not secured by bonds of the United States. For the first three months the
tax rate amounted to three per centum per annum upon the average amount of their
notes in circulation, an additional one-half of 1 per centum per annum per month un-
til a tax of 6 per centum per annum is reached.
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The detailed provisions concerning reserve requirements are contained in the
Code of Federal Regulations Chapter II (Federal Reserve System) Part 204
(Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions – Federal Reserve Regula-
tion D). Paragraph 204.1 (c) defines the depository institutions which are re-
quired to hold minimum reserves. Paragraph 204.7 (a) authorises the Fed to
assess charges for deficiencies in required reserves at a rate of 1 percentage
point per year above the primary credit rate. The precise ratios applicable to
the different categories of liabilities of credit institutions are defined in para-
graph 204.9. For net transaction accounts over $ 6.6 million and up to $ 45.4
million the ratio is 3 percent and for net transaction over $ 45.4 million the ra-
tio is 10 per cent of the amount over $ 45.4 million plus $ 1,164,000. For all
other categories it is zero. The Fed may impose emergency reserve require-
ments under extraordinary circumstances for up to 180 days, after which
affirmative action of at least five members of the Board is required for each
extension (paragraph 204.5), and supplemental reserve requirements to in-
crease the amount of reserves maintained to a level essential for the conduct
of monetary policy for up to one year, after which the Board shall review and
determine the need for continuation (paragraph 204.6). In both cases reports
to Congress shall be transmitted promptly stating the reasons for imposing ad-
ditional reserve requirements. Currently, no reserve requirements are imposed
under either paragraph. Reserve requirements are not remunerated, but the Fed
pays interest on service-related balances.
The analysis of the current institutional framework concerning the ECB dem-
onstrates that the EC Council and the European Parliament have already con-
ferred substantial regulatory power to the ECB, but these powers are both sub-
ject to judicial control by the Court of Justice and subject to the legislative
authority of the EC Council and the European Parliament. In particular, the
ECB’s has the competence to impose minimum reserve requirements and to
remunerate them. The framework provides the ECB with substantial opera-
tional flexibility and discretion. Politico-economic objections to granting CBs
the power to impose minimum reserve requirements on market participants or
to pay or charge interest thereon in a world without CB money (as described
in section 5.2.2, p. 99) apply to the current framework as well.
Indeed, the current legal framework hardly needs to be adapted to govern mone-
tary policy implementation in a world without CB money. The obligation to
hold minimum reserves denominated in the euro is at the discretion of the ECB.
It is laid down only in the relevant ECB Regulation but not in the relevant
Council Regulations or the ECB Statutes. The framework would have to be
adapted marginally with respect to the right to charge interest rates on mini-
mum reserves in addition to the right to remunerate them. The adaptation is
not one in substance as the current framework already allows imposing finan-
cial obligations on institutions subject to minimum reserve requirements in the
form of opportunity costs associated with holding reserve requirements.
Similarly, the Federal Reserve Act transfers regulatory authority to the Board
of Governors. Despite the fact that the Act provides more details with respect
to the imposition of minimum reserve requirements than the Statutes of ECB,
the Fed enjoys substantial discretion in imposing and administering minimum
reserve requirements. The Federal Reserve Act does not require minimum re-
serve requirements to be denominated in US$, nor does Regulation D.
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5.3 Conclusions
Many papers attempting to discuss monetary policy without CB money turn
out to assume that the CB maintains a monopoly in the provision of the GAME
and the medium of final settlement on closer inspection of the implicit insti-
tutional structure of the monetary system presented. Unfortunately, they do not
make the institutional structure explicit, i.e. the money market, the existence
of a GAME and a medium of final settlement are rarely discussed in detail. The
models are, thus, incomplete and inconsistent. The efficacy of monetary policy
is discussed solely from the perspective of the monopoly provision of the
GAME and the medium of final settlement by the CB, at zero marginal costs.
It does not take into account the regulatory authority of CBs.
In contrast, this paper provides a conceptualisation of monetary policy in a
world without CB money based on a GAME that also serves as medium of fi-
nal settlement. CBs can implement monetary policy by imposing reserve re-
quirements in terms of the medium of final settlement and by paying or charg-
ing interest thereon. These instruments are independent of the monopoly of CBs
in providing the GAME at zero costs at the margin. The smaller set of instru-
ments and particularly the loss of control over the aggregate supply of the me-
dium of final settlement impair the power of CBs to contain the volatility of
the target rate. Politico-economic objections to this institutional framework also
apply to the current practice of transferring regulatory powers and substantial
discretion to CBs. Indeed, the current legal frameworks of the ECB and the
Fed hardly need to be adapted. They already confer the necessary regulatory
authority to CBs to conduct monetary policy based on the proposed instruments
of implementation in a world without money.
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6 Electronic Money in Austria:
Legal Foundations, Brief History, and
Monetary Policy Implications
Stefan W. Schmitz
6.1 Legal Foundations
The Austrian E-Geldgesetz (eMoney Act) became effective as of 2 April 2002.
The definition (§ 2 (2)) contains all elements of Art. 3 (b) (i) to (iii) of the
eMoney Directive 2000/46/EC but restricts eMoney to “small” monetary val-
ues. It clarifies that the issue of eMoney does not constitute deposit taking if
the monetary value is exchanged for electronic money instantaneously, thus im-
plementing the exclusion of deposit taking according to Article 2 (3) eMoney
Directive. It further stipulates that the issue of eMoney does not constitute the
issue of payment media such as credit cards and traveller cheques under the
Austrian Banking Act.
The limitations of activities are implemented in the eMoney Act in two steps.
The permissible activities (Article 5 (a) and (b) eMoney Directive) are enclosed
in the definition of eMoney institutions in § 1 (2) eMoney Act, while § 2 (1)
states that eMoney institutions are not allowed to engage in any other activi-
ties than those mentioned in § 1 (2). In addition, § 2 (2) contains the restric-
tions on holdings in other undertakings inline with the Directive.
The provisions for redeemability are identical to those in the Directive. They
do not constitute deposit taking, but are meant to increase consumer accep-
tance. Schmitz (2002) argues that the respective provision was adopted under
the pressure of the ECB. The latter wanted to ensure the unit-of-account func-
tion of the euro. In low inflation environments such a clause is not necessary,
due to strategic advantages for issuers and consumers of eMoney, which are
associated with denomination of eMoney in the dominant unit of account in the
respective market and redeemability. Violations of the redeemability clause
constitute a violation of administrative law and the person(s) responsible has
to be fined up to € 20.000.- (§ 9 (2) eMoney Act).
The initial capital requirement was implemented by an amendment to Bank-
wesengesetz (Banking Act). It amounts to € 1 mio inline with the Directive.
The ongoing own funds requirement (§ 4 eMoney Act) is identical to the pro-
visions of Article 4 (2) and (3) eMoney Directive. Own funds are defined inline
with the Directive 2000/12/EC and its implementation in § 23 Banking Act.
In addition, § 8 eMoney Act states that the Minister of Finance has to collect
interest (bank rate + 2%) on any amount the own funds fall short of the re-
quirements laid out in § 4, except in cases of over-indebtedness of the eMoney
institution or under conditions of § 70 (2) Banking Act. The latter refers to tem-
porary supervisory measures by the Financial Market Authority (FMA) with
respect to credit institutions under financial distress.
The limitations of investments are almost identical to Article 5 (1) to (6) eMoney
Directive, apart from the exclusion of the requirement that the investments un-
der Article 5 (1) (a) have to be sufficiently liquid. It seems that the implemen-
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tation assumes sufficient liquidity for all assets qualifying under § 3 (1) Z 1
eMoney Act. The Act usually refers to the respective articles of the Banking
Act when the eMoney Directive refers to Directive 2000/12/EC to define quali-
fying investments. No further, more detailed definitions are provided. Article 5
(6) first sentence eMoney Directive is implemented quite strictly as § 70 (4)
Banking Act, which contains the provisions for cases of discontinuation of li-
censing conditions of financial institutions in general. As these refer to credit
institutions as well, the potential sanctions range from demands to remedy the
situation within an appropriate time frame on pain of a fine to the revocation
of the licence. In addition, § 8 (1) 2 eMoney Act states that the Minister of Fi-
nance has to collect interest rates (bank rate + 5%) on the amount the invest-
ments fall short of the provisions of § 3 eMoney Act.
The requirements concerning initial capital and ongoing own funds as well as
the limitations on investment have to be verified by the competent authorities
(Article 6 eMoney Directive). eMoney institutions have to transmit quarterly
reports to the Ministry of Finance and Oesterreichische Nationalbank according
to § 5 (1) eMoney Act, in order to proof compliance with §§ 3 and 4 eMoney
Act. Oesterreichische Nationalbank is required to provide expert opinions for
the Ministry of Finance on the compliance with §§ 3 and 4 eMoney Act based
on the quarterly reports. Offences of the reporting requirements are to be pro-
secuted as administrative offences and the person(s) responsible are fined with
up to € 20.000.-
Inline with the objective of the eMoney Directive providers licensed in EU
member states do not need an Austrian license to operate in Austria. The waiver
was not implemented in the Austrian eMoney Act.
eMoney institutions are subject to supervision by the Austrian Financial Mar-
ket Authority (FMA) according to § 69 Banking Act. Austrian credit institu-
tions have to cover most of the costs of banking supervision according to § 19
Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörden-Gesetz (Financial Market Authority Act) and to
§ 69a Banking Act. Consequently, eMoney institutions have to contribute as
well. Their contributions are based on calculations which only marginally de-
viate from those applicable to other credit institutions. In addition, payment
system oversight is the responsibility of Oesterreichische Nationalbank accord-
ing to §§ 44a and 82a Nationalbankgesetz (Nationalbank Act).
The requirements for sound and prudent operation are not specifically imple-
mented in the eMoney Act. The current loading maximum of € 400 and the
legal maximum of € 2.000 limit the attractiveness of the available systems for
money laundering activities. But §§ 39, 40 and 41 Banking Act concerning
prudential operations and management, money laundering, and terror financing
apply. Consequently, the money laundering requirements are very strict as they
also apply to all other credit institutions. eMoney institutions have to scrutinise
all transactions particularly strictly, which raise suspicion of money laundering
(§ 39). In addition, § 40 stipulates specific prudential requirements to counter
money laundering and terror financing.
Currently, there are no pure electronic money institutes licensed under the
eMoney Act. Both providers of electronic money products operate under bank-
ing licenses according to the Banking Act, which are not restricted to but can,
in principle, – and do in fact in these two cases – encompass the issuance of
electronic money (e-money business) (§ 1 (1) Z 20). Europay Austria1 who
operates Quick card holds a banking license itself. The company is also re-
sponsible for the fulfilment of the reporting requirements for the entire sys-
                                                          
1 Full name: Europay Austria Zahlungsverkehrssysteme GmbH.
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tem, irrespective of the banks that distributes the cards and provide the oppor-
tunity for their clients to load the cards from their accounts. It is jointly owned
by all Austrian banks. The second issuer, paysafe.com2 – the operator of pay-
safe card (a network based system) – is partly owned by an Austrian bank
(BAWAG/P.S.K.) and operates under the bank’s license. A total of 754 credit
institutions hold licenses under the Banking Act which also cover the right to
issue eMoney under § 1 (1) Z 20 Banking Act.3
Furthermore, a number of mobile network operators offer mobile-payment
services (m-payments). Transactions settled via mobile phone billing transac-
tions do not constitute eMoney. However, once they are initiated via prepaid
phone cards, their inclusion under the eMoney definition of the eMoney Act
is currently under discussion. One of the operators argues that the technical
nature of the contract is the crucial criterion given the other elements of the
definition laid down in the eMoney Act. If the respective good is provided by
an undertaking other than the mobile phone service provider4, paid for via a
prepaid card and based on a contract established by dialling a number (“real”
premium rate services – PRS based on SMS as well as phone calls), the pay-
ment service shall not be considered eMoney. If the respective good is pro-
vided by an undertaking other than the mobile phone service provider, paid for
via a prepaid card and based on a contract going beyond just dialling a num-
ber (i.e. ordering a parking ticket, such services are referred to as “payment
services”), the payment service shall be considered eMoney.5 Mobile opera-
tors want to avoid the provisions concerning ongoing own funds and limita-
tions of investments to gain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other eMoney
issuers. Procedural problems would also arise if the eMoney Act would be ap-
plicable to m-payments based on prepaid cards, as the share of the outstanding
amount on prepaid cards that is devoted to PRS, is hard to determine ex-ante.
The provisions of the eMoney Act would only apply to the latter. The approxi-
mation of ex-ante values by ex-post averages over the past six months, however,
constitutes a straight forward solution to the problem. In addition, the same prob-
lem arises if the good is delivered via other channels than the mobile network,
such that it is not unique to PRS. PRS providers estimate market volume to reach
€ 200 mio by 2005.6 It is currently unclear which share of the pie is settled via
prepaid cards.7 In a similar direction, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA)
argued in a guideline (February 2003) that the mobile phone service and the
good delivered via the same network (PRS) can be interpreted as single service.
                                                          
2 Full name: paysafe.com Wertkarten AG.
3 Source: Financial Market Authority (FMA).
4 In Austria PRS are usually provided by other companies than the mobile phone serv-
ice provider (e.g. Xidris, atms).
5 The distinction between „real“ PRS and „payment services“ is based on a draft re-
gulation of the Austrian telecommunication regulator (X. Verordnung der Rundfunk-
und Telekom-Regulierungs-GmbH, mit der eine Kommunikationsparameter-, Ent-
gelt- und Mehrwertdienstverordnung – KEM-V festgelegt wird).
6 Source: Kurier (an Austrian daily) 7 February 2004, 17.
7 The inclination to buy content via mobile phone seems to be independent of the choice
of the prepaid/contract decision. According to OrangeTM 25% of prepaid customers
and 30% of contract customers bought content from third parties via their mobile
service provider in the previous month in 2002 and 10% of the value of prepaid cards
are estimated to be spent that way. In July 2003 46% of mobile phone customers used
prepaid cards in Austria. If prepaid and contract customers have similar propensities
to buy content and their shares of total customers are similar, their share of the con-
tent market should be as well. Thus, the volume of transactions settled via prepaid
cards would reach some € 100 mio in 2005. Only slightly below the volume of trans-
actions settled via Quick cards in 2003 € 116,8 mio).
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These interpretations are not satisfactory as they are not technology neutral
and offer a wide scope for bypassing the eMoney Directive. Accordingly, the
FSA interpretation would force mobile operators also to accept responsibility
for the content of premium rate services distributed via their networks under
provisions regarding content regulation. As a necessary consequence, this would
imply substantial regulatory responsibilities which are alien to the telecommu-
nication industry and seem hardly acceptable for mobile operators. In general,
neither service providers nor network providers bear responsibility for the con-
tent delivered via their services and network. The telecom service provider col-
lects the funds on behalf of the PRS provider, not on its own account in its
own right. In Austria telecom providers do not sue customers who do not pay
their PRS charges. This unpleasant task is usually left to the PRS providers.
Consequently, taxation is assigned to two different companies for two different
sources of return. Nevertheless, the current policy stance in Austria adopts the
arguments of mobile phone operators.
Most of the operators hold banking licenses under the Banking Act which also
encompass the issuance of eMoney, anyways, such that the issues really at stake
are the ongoing own funds provisions, the limitations on investments, the
redeemability as well as reporting requirements. They argue that equal treat-
ment with other eMoney providers would hamper innovation in the area of m-
payments. The crucial question remains to what extent the implicit exemption
from the eMoney Act, the potential gateway to by-pass relevant regulation, and
the arbitrary provision of a competitive advantage are justifiable by additional
innovation in m-payments. As long as the relevant payment services are in their
infancy, they would profit from the waiver (which could still be implemented),
thus, leaving niche products and innovative new services unaffected at early
stages of diffusion.
To avoid legal disputes concerning the regulation of payment services based on
different technologies, the regulatory framework for payment services should
be based on a single functional definition of payment services irrespective of
the underlying technology. Rather than resting the distinction between the ap-
plicability of alternative regulatory regimes on the nature of the underlying
contract, it should focus on the payment service provided and the associated
risks.
The increase in the tiering structure of the payment systems, i.e. the increased
reliance on commercial bank money and transactions on the books of electronic
money institutions (incl. mobile service providers) raises questions with respect
to the regulation and supervision of the respective institutions. The increase in
the tiering structure of the payment system does not undermine the unique role
of central bank money as means of settlement providing economic finality (as
opposed to legal finality). Regulators want to ensure that the quality of settle-
ment media is sufficient to warrant the efficiency and stability of the payment
system. The instruments applicable, such as capital requirements, reserve re-
quirements, and portfolio restrictions feature prominently in the eMoney-Di-
rective. Regulators will also want to address the issue of access to central bank
(i.e. accounts with the central bank) and its price for non-credit institutions,
which provide payment services.
As the eMoney Directive has a limited scope in practice, a reform of the legal
framework for payment services is called for. A unified legal framework for
payment services is essential to eliminate legal ambiguities and to ensure a level
playing field. Rather than basing the distinction between different payment
service providers on the features of the underlying technology (i.e. eMoney
Directive) or on the technical nature of the contract (i.e. PRS), differences in
the restrictiveness of the regulatory framework should reflect the differences
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in the associated risks (e.g. solvency, liquidity, operational, contagion risks).
In addition, increased tiering will lead to the concentration of payment trans-
actions by top tier institutions. Central banks will want to oversee these par-
ticularly rigorously to prevent potential systemic crises.
6.2 History
The Quick card system is launched and operated by Europay Austria, which is
owned by Austrian Banks and holds a banking licence itself.8 After a test launch
in a small provincial city in 1994 about 2.5 mio “ec-cards” (called Maestro
cards today, with the capacity of combining a range of banking services like
ATM withdrawals) with an embedded chip were issued in 1995. In the fol-
lowing year the electronic money scheme Quick was launched nationwide. In
2001 the internet application based on card readers connected to PCs was in-
troduced.
Since the nationwide launch the number of loading terminals increased from
1.066 to 5.879 (as of 31 December 2003) and the number of payment termi-
nals expanded from 2.708 to 79.806.9 In the same interval the number of load-
ing transactions grew from about 50.000 to 1.32 mio, while the volume loaded
surged from € 2.16 mio to € 120 mio. Correspondingly, the number of payment
transactions increased from 86.591 to 17.7 mio and the volume of payments
reached € 116.6 mio in 2003. The current maximum loading value is € 400. It
is worth noting that the introduction of euro banknotes and coins in 2002 was
accompanied by a significant increase in the number of loading transactions
(from 0.63 mio to 1.47 mio) and in the volume loaded (from € 34.34 mio to
€ 145.25 mio). One of the explanations at hand is that the value of the lowest
denomination Euro banknote (€ 5) is about 3.5 times as large as the lowest
denomination Austrian Schilling banknote (ATS 20). Therefore, the volume of
change in the pockets of Austrian consumers jumped dramatically, thus, high-
lighting the advantages of electronic money as a convenient substitute for coins
in particular.
Currently, the system is not designed to accept other currencies than Euro or
to allow for consumer-to-consumer transfers and it is not compatible with other
schemes. The introduction of the Common Electronic Purse Specification
(CEPS) is scheduled for 2007.
The eMoney chip embedded in the Maestro cards is provided at no extra costs.
The costs of the card are subject to the fee structure of the customer’s giro ac-
count, but independent of the Quick function. The fees for loading the chip are
based on the fee structure of the customer’s giro account. The transaction fee
for retailers is about 0.5% of the transaction volume. In addition a fixed col-
lection charge of € 0.44 is charged upon presentment of the balance on the
retailer terminal.
                                                          
8 The paysafe system is only in its infancy. It is a network-based product that is distri-
buted via scratch cards. Neither the paysafe card nor the various eBanking and bill
presentment schemes operating in Austria are dealt with any further in this brief hi-
storical sketch. There are no nation-wide software-based systems in operation at the
beginning of 2004.
9 Source: Europay Austria – www.quick.at.
Quick card launched
in 1994
Diffusion of cards
high …
… but use lags behind
116 ___________________________  6  Electronic Money in Austria: Legal Foundations, Brief History, and Monetary Policy Implications
The diffusion of eMoney in Austria is more or less around the average of the
G-10 countries based on the number of circulating Quick-cards, number of
transactions, and volume of transactions.10 According to a recent survey con-
ducted for Oesterreichische Nationalbank (first quarter 2004, face-to-face in-
terviews with a representative sample of 2.000 individuals of 15+ years of
age), 19% of the respondents report to hold a Quick card. As 73% hold bank
cards with cash withdrawal function, in which Quick cards are routinely em-
bedded, the data suggests that many holders are not even aware of the Quick
function on their cards. About 9% of respondents (48% of Quick cardholders)
actually make use of it (ca. 4,5% of respondents and 23% of Quick card hold-
ers at least weekly). The average amount loaded is about € 76 per cardholder
and is higher than the average amount of cash carried (€ 64). Only three percent
of Austrians 15+ years of age, who do not currently hold a Quick card, plan
to acquire one in the near future. Penetration is, therefore, not expected to in-
crease much in the near future.
6.3 Monetary Policy Implications
The effects of the diffusion of the Quick card on monetary policy are rather
limited due to its current penetration and its institutional structure. The pay-
ment system is operated by Europay Austria which is responsible for clearing
and settlement. The means of settlement is commercial bank money. Upon
loading the card via an ATM, the respective amount is transferred from the
customer’s account to a pooling account at the same commercial bank. The ac-
count holder is Europay Austria which also collects the interest on the float
rather than the commercial bank. As it is owned by these banks it redistributes
the respective profit as dividends. The deposits of Europay Austria with com-
mercial banks are not included in M3, but the volume of eMoney outstanding
is. Consequently, the loading transaction does not increase the volume of broad
money in the economy directly. It merely redistributes the respective amount
from one customer’s account (the Quick card holder) to another customer’s ac-
count (Europay Austria). Liquid deposits (maturity below two years) are sub-
ject to minimum reserve requirements of 2%. But deposits of credit institutes,
which are themselves subject to minimum reserve requirements, are exempt
from the respective requirements. As Europay Austria is subject to minimum
reserve requirements, its deposits with commercial banks within the system are
not subject to minimum reserve requirements. Consequently, the use of com-
mercial bank money as means of settlement reduces the overall minimum re-
serve requirements of commercial banks by the amount of 2% of the current
float. But Europay Austria has to hold the same amount as minimum reserves
on eMoney outstanding. As a consequence, loading transactions neither in-
crease the total demand of central bank reserves in the system directly nor in-
directly, but merely lead to the redistribution of reserves from commercial banks
to Europay Austria.11
                                                          
10 BIZ Red Book 2004, Table 8 and www.quick.at.
11 The potential effects on monetary policy of the changing demand for banknotes and
coins are negligible, as these are not used to implement monetary policy. Their sup-
ply passively reacts to changes in the public’s demand and to the need to replace
damaged banknotes and coins.
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Once the value on the card is spent, the merchant can demand clearing and set-
tlement of the balance on the merchant terminal online with Europay Austria12
at what frequency he deems appropriate taking into account the applicable fee
(mostly daily or weekly). The value is than included in the clearing and settle-
ment procedures between the commercial banks involved. Upon clearing Eu-
ropay Austria calculates the total value of transactions among customers and
merchants holding accounts at the same commercial bank and transfers the
amount from the pooling account held at the respective commercial banks to
the banks’ own accounts which then credits the merchant’s account. The re-
maining net positions are cleared by transfers from the pooling accounts held
with the net debtors to the accounts of the net creditors via the interbank pay-
ment system. The commercial banks finally credit the merchants’ accounts with
the respective total amounts. As a result commercial bank money is issued as
substitute for central bank money to settle transactions between customers and
merchants.
A number of authors advanced claims that the diffusion of electronic money
will lead to the private provision of money, which is not denominated in cen-
tral bank money.13 Furthermore, the ensuing parallel use of multiple units of
account would enhance the efficiency of the payments system and the stability
of the price level. Schmitz (2002) shows that the parallel use of multiple units
of account is not desirable and in the case of fiat-type currencies not feasible.
The argument does not provide a rationale for legal barriers against potential
currency competition. The paper shows that users and issuers face strong stra-
tegic disincentives to opt for an alternative unit of account in eMoney schemes
under current inflation rates. The most likely institutional structure of emerg-
ing eMoney schemes includes redeemability and denomination in the dominant
unit of account. In addition, the EU Directive contains a redeemability require-
ment (Article 3). The role of national currencies as units of account will not
be diminished, ceteris paribus, by the diffusion of eMoney.
As central banks hold on to the monopoly of the supply of the medium of ex-
change, they retain control of its supply and its purchasing power, in principle.
The balance sheet of central banks will shorten relative to a world without
eMoney which is mainly a positive sign as institutional change in the payments
system (e.g. net settlement systems, electronic wholesale and retail payments
systems) increases its efficiency – which implies that monetary policy becomes
more rather than less effective.14 The effects of increased demand for m-pay-
ments (settled via phone bills or prepaid cards) are similar as transactions on
the books of commercial banks or even on the books of the telecom company
serve as settlement media at lower tiers of the payment system. From a mone-
tary policy perspective the similar treatment of functionally similar payment serv-
ices is called for. Moreover, central banks have proven to cope well with similar
changes in the past (e.g. diffusion of credit and debit cards). The crucial ques-
tion is how the emergence and diffusion of eMoney will affect the predictabil-
ity of the relationship between the instruments and the objectives of monetary
policy. Further research will have to focus on the effects of eMoney on the de-
mand for money function and on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
                                                          
12 Transaction processing and clearing takes place on the computer systems of APSS a
subsidiary of Europay Austria. APSS also processes all other card-based transactions
in Austria (credit- and debit cards, ATM withdrawels etc.) and provides the necessary
infatsructure (ATMs, POS-terminals etc.). In 2003 it operates 7.500 ATM- and 79.000
POS-terminals, administers ca. 7 mio. credit-, debit- and Quick-cards and processes
ca. 330 mio. transactions.
13 For an overview of the arguments see Schmitz 2002.
14 Selgin/White 2002.
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Electronic money is supposed to constitute a close substitute for central bank
money, in particular banknotes and coins. Electronic money increases the tier-
ing structure of the payment system as commercial bank money serves as a
means of settlement in electronic money transactions at lower tiers of the pay-
ment system (in addition to central bank money among top tier banks). As a
consequence the volume of central bank money necessary to support a given
level of transactions in an economy decreases and the velocity of central bank
money increases. The opportunity to switch to close substitutes for central bank
money in line with the increased use of commercial bank money as means of
settlement and the corresponding savings in opportunity costs also raise the in-
terest rate elasticity of the demand for central bank money (in particular by
credit institutions). What does that imply for the implementation of monetary
policy?
Today, the key policy variable is the money market rate of interest.15 Central
banks steer the market rate by conducting open market operations at pre-an-
nounced repo rates. An increased interest rate elasticity of the demand for cen-
tral bank money implies that a given interest rate rise reduces the demand for
central bank money by a larger amount. Ceteris paribus, a smaller change of
the policy rate is sufficient to affect the demand for central bank money to the
extent deemed appropriate to ensure price stability. The volatility of the policy
rate decreases which is positive. On the other hand, the size of interest rate
changes has to be determined with greater caution as potential absolute devia-
tions from the optimal level of money market rates have larger effects. How-
ever, the pace of institutional change in the payment systems enables central
banks to adapt their monetary policy operations inline with the diffusion of
electronic money.
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The data sources for all tables are various issues of the Red Book (BIS) and
the Blue Book (ECB).
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Table A-1: Banknotes and coins in circulation outside credit institutions (end of year)
Total (€/$ millions) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area (€) 324717 349877 348458 240341 341700
UK (€) 36286 45406 48423 53344 52224
UK ($) 42339 45612 45059 47009 54767
US ($) 463500 521700 535600 585400 630600
Germany ($) 144327 131703 117150 5928 nap
Value per inhabitant (€/$) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area (€) 1110 1193 1184 784 1110
UK (€) 622 776 826 904 882
UK ($) 509 446 455 504 531 606 627 726 780 768 796 925
US ($) 1070 1167 1272 1385 1430 1499 1600 1679 1868 1896 2050 2185
Germany ($) 1411 1534 1511 1790 2025 1936 1679 1759 1604 1425 728 nap
As a percentage of GDP (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 5,5 5,7 5,4 3,5 4,8
UK 2,7 2,9 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 3 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,3
US 4,6 4,8 5 5,2 5,1 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,6 5,5 5,8 6
Germany 6,0 6,5 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,0 6,8 6,4 6,6 6,2 3,3 nap
As a percentage of narrow money (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 18,5 16,9 16 10,3 14,1
UK 5,6 4,8 4,5 4,6 4,6 4,5 4,6 5 5 5,1 5 4,8
US 29,5 28,5 28,5 30,7 32,6 36 39,1 41,4 45,5 48,2 48,7 50,8
Germany 28,4 29,9 29,2 29,6 29,1 26,9 26,3 24,1 23,5 21,9 11,3 nap
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Table A-2: Transferable deposits held by non-banks (end of year)
Value per inhabitant 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area (€) 4901 5841 6233 6831 7222
UK (€) 11944 14657 15577 17238 17459
UK ($) 8515 9357 9589 10493 11073 12797 12895 13937 14723 14495 15191 18309
US ($) 2529 2910 3182 3101 2918 2632 2465 2348 2212 2012 2135 2086
Germany ($) 3655 3591 3761 4287 4953 5309 4697 5543 5220 5080 5712 7419
As a percentage of GDP (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 24,2 27,9 28,4 30,6 31,5
UK 45,8 60 58,6 59,5 58,4 58,1 57,4 57,2 59 60 62,3 64,4
US 10,8 11,9 12,5 11,7 10,4 8,9 7,9 7,4 6,7 5,8 6 5,8
Germany 15,6 15,3 16,7 16,3 16,8 19,1 19,1 20,2 21,6 22,1 25,8 27,7
As a percentage of narrow money (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 81,5 83 84 89,7 91,7
UK 94,4 95,5 95,5 95,4 95,4 95,5 95,4 95,4 95,3 95,3 95,3 95,5
US 69,7 71,1 71,2 68,9 66,6 63,2 60,2 57,9 53,8 51,1 50,7 48,5
Germany 73,7 70,1 72,7 70,8 71,2 73,8 73,7 75,9 76,5 78,1 88,7 nap
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Table A-3: Use of cards
Average number of cash withdrawls
per card with a cash function
1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 19,8 20,2
UK 16,4 16,0
US 16,5 12,3
Germany 13,1 13,6
Average number of payments per card with a debit function 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 33,7 37,6
UK 50,8 51,5
US 49,1 59,8
Germany 11,8 14,8
Average number of payments per card with a credit function 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 21,8 21,8
UK 31,1 29,8
US 13,8 14,2
Germany 19,2 19,2
Average number of payments
per card with an e-money function
1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 3,0 7,1
UK nav nav
US nav nav
Germany 0,4 0,5
Table A-4: Use of cashless payment instruments (total numbers of transactions, millions)
Cheques 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 6719 6344 6179 5865 5820
UK 2986 2859 2699 2565 2393
US 45169 43812 42500 41222 39985
Germany 596 424 392 319 150
Payments by credit/debit cards 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 6014 7107 8385 9674 11232
UK 2960 3406 3788 4257 4681
US 19153 22106 25734 29542 33441
Germany 993 1199 1622 1818 1994
Credit transfers 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 11170 11489 11841 12246 12518
UK 1726 1797 1845 1931 2008
US 2899 3167 3486 3890 3976
Germany 6217 7025 6446 6958 6739
Credit debits 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 8150 8881 9800 10092 10199
UK 1736 1863 2010 2152 2289
US 1530 1676 1947 2385 2760
Germany 4601 4806 5027 5080 4809
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Card-based e-money 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 71 98 114 135 285
UK nav nav nav nav nav
US nav nav nav nav nav
Germany 13,6 20,7 26,6 29,4 35,9
Total 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 32119 33918 36318 38013 40055
UK 9408 9925 10342 10905 11371
US 68752 70763 73668 77041 80164
Germany 12420 13475 13514 14204 13728
Table A-5: Use of cashless payment instruments (number of transactions per inhabitant)
Cheques 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 23 22 21 19 20
UK 51 48 46 43 40
US 163 156 150 144 138
Germany 7,3 5,2 4,8 3,9 1,8
Payments by credit/debit cards 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 21 24 28 32 37
UK 50 58 65 72 79
US 69 79 91 104 116
Germany 12,1 14,6 19,7 22,1 24,2
Direct debits 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 28 30 33 33 33
UK 30 32 34 36 39
US 5 6 7 8 10
Germany 56 59 61 62 58
Credit transfers 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 38 39 40 40 41
UK 30 31 31 33 34
US 10 11 12 14 14
Germany 76 86 78 85 82
Card-based e-money 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 0,39 0,57 0,66 0,58 1,21
UK nav nav nav nav nav
US nav nav nav nav nav
Germany 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4
Total 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 110 116 123 124 130
UK 161 170 176 185 192
US 249 253 261 270 278
Germany 151 164 164 173 166
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Table A-6: Relative importance of cashless payment instruments (percentage of total volume of cashless transactions)
Cheques (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 21,1 17,8 16 14,6 13,8
UK 48,5 45,4 43 40,2 41,3 37,8 34,7 31,7 28,8 26,1 23,5 21
US 81,6 81,1 80,1 78,9 76,3 74,5 72,9 65,7 61,9 57,7 53,5 49,9
Germany 9,6 8,8 8,1 7,9 7,0 6,4 5,7 4,8 3,1 2,9 2,2 1,1
Payments by credit/debit cards (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 18,4 20,7 22,7 26,6 29,6
UK 16,4 18,8 21,9 23,3 24,1 27,1 29,6 31,5 34,3 36,6 39 41,2
US 16 16,2 16,9 18 20 21,4 22,9 27,9 31,2 34,9 38,3 41,7
Germany 1,8 2,1 2,6 3,1 3,6 4,2 4,1 8,0 8,9 12,0 12,8 14,5
Direct transfers (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 34,8 33,4 32,3 30,8 30,1
UK 20,9 20,6 20,4 20,1 18,2 18 18 18,3 18,1 17,8 17,7 17,7
US 1,6 1,8 1,9 2,1 2,4 2,6 2,7 4,2 4,5 4,7 5 5
Germany 51,3 49,8 45,6 48,7 48,8 49,2 48,2 50,1 52,1 47,7 49,0 49,1
Credit debits (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 26,5 27,9 29 27,7 26,7
UK 14,2 15,1 15,6 16,5 16,4 17 17,8 18,5 18,8 19,4 19,7 20,1
US 0,8 0,9 1 1,1 1,3 1,4 1,5 2,2 2,4 2,6 3,1 3,4
Germany 37,3 39,3 43,7 40,3 40,6 40,2 42,0 37,0 35,7 37,2 35,8 35,0
Card-based e-money (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,7
UK nav nav nav nav nav
US nav nav nav nav nav
Germany 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3
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Table A-7: Relative importance of cashless payment instruments (percentage of total value of cashless transactions)
Cheques (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 11,3 9,3 8,6 7,7 7,2
UK 16,1 11,6 9,4 7,6 6,3 5,9 5 4,4 2,8 2,5 2,2 2,2
US 13,7 13,1 12,6 12,2 11,9 11,2 10,5 5,5 5,6 5,4 4,9 4,9
Germany 2,8 2,4 2,3 2,3 2,1 1,8 1,6 7,1 3,6 3,1 2,7 2,3
Payments by credit/debit cards (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6
UK 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2
US 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3
Germany 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03 neg neg 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4
Direct transfers (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 82,1 83,8 84,4 85,6 86,1
UK 82,5 87,1 89,5 91,2 92,4 92,7 93,8 94,4 96,3 96,6 97 96,9
US 85,4 85,8 86,4 86,8 87 87,6 88,4 93,3 93 93,2 93,8 93,7
Germany 95,4 95,5 95,7 95,7 95,8 95,7 95,5 78,1 83,2 85,4 84,2 84,9
Credit debits (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 13 13,4 13,6 12,7 13,3
UK 1,2 1,1 1 1 1 1,1 1 1 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,7
US 0,8 1 0,9 0,9 1 1 1 1,1 1,2 1,1 1,1 1,1
Germany 1,8 2,1 2,0 2,0 2,1 2,5 2,5 14,4 12,8 11,1 12,7 12,4
Card-based e-money (%) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 0,0009 0,0009 0,0008 0,0009 0,0033
UK neg nav nav nav nav
US nav nav nav nav nav
Germany neg neg neg neg neg
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Institutional Framework
Table A-8: General institutional framework for payment services
Number of institutions offering payment services
(per 1,000,000 inhabitants)
1995 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 24 23
UK 9,7 8,5 8,1 7,6
US 91,1 77,9 71 68,3
Germany 30,6 29,3
Number of central bank branches
(per 1,000,000 inhabitants)
1995 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 2 2
UK neg Neg
US 0,1 0,1
Germany 1,6 1,4
Number of bank branches
(per 1,000,000 inhabitants)
1995 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 561 554
UK 248,7 244,9
US 272,4 274,7
Germany 640,5 611,4
Number of post office branches
(per 1,000,000 inhabitants)
1995 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 182 190
UK 296,5 295,6
US nap nap
Germany 642 612,8
Total number of branches offering
payment services (per 1,000,000 inhabitants)
1995 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 666 657
UK 632,9 573,9 545,2 540,5
US 274,2 288,2 272,5 274,8
Germany
Number of accounts on which payments
can be made (per inhabitant)
1995 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 1,12 1,13
UK 2,3 2,6 2,7 2,7
US n.a. n.a. nav nav
Germany 1,1 1,0
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Table A-9: Cards with a cash function and ATMs
Number of ATMs per 1,000,000 inhabitants 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 577 618 654 683 717
UK 314 324 328 342 358 376 393 421 468 563 621 690
US 331 342 367 418 466 524 616 677 813 967 1135 1220
Germany 171 235 308 361 436 459 504 556 563 580 603 612
Number of transactions per inhabitant 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 16,6 17,6 19,6 19,6 20,6
UK 18,8 20,2 21,3 22,9 25,2 27,2 29,6 31,7 33,7 34,6 36,8 38,3
US 25,3 28,2 29,8 31,8 36,9 40,3 41,6 40,6 39,0 45,3 47,6 36,7
Germany 11,5 13,4 15,3 n.a. 17,1 18,4 20,4 19,4 19,7
Average value per transaction 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area (€) 114 114 114 119 127
UK (€) 78 83 91 94 95
UK ($) 78,2 84,6 72,5 74,6 77,3 78,1 84,5 87,8 88,8 84,3 84,1 90
US ($) 76,6 66,9 68,2 67,2 67,7 68 67,7 68 68 69,6 68 68
Germany 157,6 196,6 179,0 n.a. 169,5 155,9 134,2 140,2 148
Increase in the number of ATMs (%) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 9,7 6,8 5,9 7,5 5,3
UK 6 11,4 20,5 11,1 11,3
US 13,3 21,4 20,3 18,7 8,6
Germany 10,2 1,3 3,1 4,1 1,7
Increase in the number of transactions (%) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 11,3 6,8 8,1 3,4 7,9
UK    6 6,4 3 7,3 4,3
US        1,8 -2,7 17,4 6,3 -22,1
Germany nav 7,7 11,0 -4,7 1,3
Increase in the value of transactions (%) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 10 8,7 8 6,6 14,8
UK 8,9 10,2 4,6 12,4 7,1
US        2,3 -2,7 21,1 3 -22,1
Germany nav -1,0 -4,4 -0,5 6,9
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Table A-10: Cards with e-money function and accepting terminals
Electronic money cards
(in thousands)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area (weighted average) 24491 25244 25715 22204 22061
UK 140 160 nav nav nav
US nav nav nav nav nav
Germany 60700 60700 60700 67333 67525
Average value per reloading 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area (€, weighted average) 39 32 27 29 37
UK ($) neg neg neg neg nav
US ($) nav nav nav nav nav
Germany ($) 60,3 42,7 29,1 25,3 25,8
Number of purchase terminals 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area (weighted average) 53115 61439 77898 70223 90379
UK 1642 1921 nav nav nav
US nav nav nav nav nav
Germany 60000 59732 66946 80191 98492
Average value per transaction 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area (€, weighted average) 4,9 3,3 2,8 2,9 2,9
UK ($) neg neg neg neg nav
US ($) nav nav nav nav nav
Germany ($) 7,3 3,8 2,5 2,1 2,0
Table A-11: Number of Cards (per 1,000 inhabitants)
Cards with a cash function 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 1036 1067
UK 1433 1881 2246,7 2399,9
US nav 2658 2886,4 2995,5
Germany 1200 1480,2 1443,0
Cards with a debit function 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 905 908
UK 919,9 1003,6
US 887,8 902,3
Germany 1252,3 1129,0
Cards with a credit function 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 381 411
UK 936 1066
UK 950,8 1065,8
US 4321,6 4355,2
Germany 381,4 390,7
Cards with a debit function
issued by retailers
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area nav nav
UK nap nap
US 39,9 39,5
Germany nav nav
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Cards with an e-money function 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 406 393
UK nav nav
US nav nav
Germany 817,8 818,7
Cards with a cheque
guarantee function
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area nap nap
UK 822 911 989,4 1031,9
US n.a. n.a. nav nav
Germany 470 552 689,4 nap
Wholesale
Table A-12: Settlement media used by banks
Banks’ reserves at central bank
($/€ billions) 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area (€) 13,7 18,8 20,4 21,4 22,1
UK (€) 2,3 3,3 2,5 2,8 2,8
UK ($) 2,8 2,6 3,3 2,3 2,5 3,9
US ($) 29,6 15,6 12,4 13,5 17,8 20,9
Germany ($) 33,4 27,7 33,5 33,0 34,3 40,5
Banks’ reserves at central bank
as a percentage of narrow money (%)
1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 4,4 5,4 5,6 5,8 5,7
UK 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3
US 2,6 1,4 1,1 1,2 1,5 1,7
Germany 6,0 4,6 6,0 6,2 6,5 nap
Transferable deposits at other banks
($/€ bilions) 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area (€) 114,4 85,6 92,7 90,5 92,9
UK (€) 329,3 368 409,1 488,1 555,1
UK ($) 347,4 384,1 369,8 380,7 430,1 582,2
US ($) 32,7 32,8 27,5 32,1 34,8 35,7
Germany ($) 115,0 281,9 114,9 105,5 108,5 133,8
Transferable deposits at other banks
as a percentage of narrow money (%)
1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Euro area 31,1 21,8 24,1 22,3 21,6
UK 51,3 45,1 40,9 42,7 45,7 51,3
US 2,8 2,9 2,4 2,9 2,9 2,9
Germany 20,6 47,1 20,5 19,7 20,5 nap
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Table A-13: Features of selected interbank funds transfer systems (2002)
Number of  participants
Type Owner total of which direct Processing Settlement
Member-
ship
Degree of
centralisation Pricing
Gross/
Net
Settlement
finality
ELLIPS (BE)* L B+CB 93 17 RTT RTGS RM C F G real-time
Clearing House (BE) R B+CB 92 34 RTT N O D V
CEC (BE) R B+CB 95 30 RTT N O C F
Kronos (DK)* L CB 96 32 RTT RTGS RM C F G real-time
Retail Clearing (DK) R B 166 63 ACH N O C/D S
ELS (GE)* nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap G real-time
RPS (GE) R CB 2188 2188 ACH GS O D F
RTGSplus (GE)* L CB 1382 75 RTT RTGS RM C F G 7:00-18:00
ELS (GE) nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap
EAF (GE) nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap nap
HERMES (GR)* L CB 41 41 RTT RTGS RM C F G real-time
DIAS (GR) R B+CB/AS 35 35 ACH N O C V
ACO (GR) R B+CB/AS 59 59 M N O D V
SLBE (ES)* L CB 239 198 RTT RTGS RM C F G real-time
SPI (ES) L B 174 37 RTT N O C F N 16:00/16:15
SNCE (ES) R CB 239 27 RTT BN RM C V
TBF (FR)* L CB 705 195 RTT RTGS O C F G real-time
CH Paris (FR) R B/PA nap nap M N RM C F
CH Province (FR) R CB nap nap M N O D nap
SIT (FR) R CB+B/PA 660 17 ACH N O C F
CREIC (FR) R B/CB nap nap ACH N O D V
PNS (FR)* L CB+B/PA 537 24 RTT BN/RTGS RM C F G/N real-time
IRIS (IE)* L CB+B 22 22 RTT RTGS RM C F G real-time
Retail Clearings (IE) R CB+B 12 7 M N RM D F
BI-REL (IT)* L CB 844 663 RTT RTGS RM C F G
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Number of  participants
Type Owner total of which direct Processing Settlement
Member-
ship
Degree of
centralisation Pricing
Gross/
Net
Settlement
finality
Local Clearing (IT) R CB 116 116 RTT N O C V
Retail (IT) R CB nav 205 ACH N O C F
LIPS-Gross (LU)* L B/CB 31 31 RTT RTGS RM C F G real-time
LIPS-Net (LU) C B/CB 13 13 ACH N RM C F
Interpay (NL) R B 73 73 ACH N RM C F
TOP (NL)* L CB 158 108 RTT RTGS RM C F G 7:00-18:00
ARTIS (AT)* L CB 70 70 RTT RTGS RM C F G real-time
SPGT (PT)* L CB 37 37 RTT RTGS RM C F G real-time
SICOI (PT) R B 60 39 RTT N RM C V
SLOD (PT) R CB 143 143 M GS O C F
BoF-RTGS (FI)* L CB 17 17 RTT RTGS RM C F G real-time
PMJ (FI) R B 8 8 BN RM D F
POPS (FI) L+R B 8 8 RTT N/GS RM D F
K-Rix (SE) L CB 19 19 RTT RTGS RM C F G 07:00-17:00
E-RIX (SE) L CB 13 13 RTT RTGS RM C F G 7:00-18:00
Bankgirot (SE) R B 19 19 ACH N O C F
Dataclearing (SE) R B 19 19 ACH N O C F
Postgirot (SE) R B 1200000 1200000 ACH GS O C F
CHAPS Sterling (UK) L B+CB 289 13 RTT RTGS RM C F G -
BACS (UK) R B 62000 14 ACH N RM C F -
Cheque/credit Clearings (UK) R B 418 12 M N RM D F
CHAPS Euro (UK)* L B+CB nya 20 RTT RTGS RM C F G
EURO 1 (EU) L B 74 74 RTT SOS RM C F G after cut off
TARGET (EU) L CB 3345 1519 RTT RTGS RM C F G real-time
Fedwire (US) L CB 7899 7899 RTT RTGS O C F G 00:30-18:30
CHIPS (US) L B 51 51 RTT N/BN/GS RM C F G/N intra-day
132 ____________________
 D
ata Appendix: Statistics on paym
ent system
s in the Euro area, the U
nited Kingdom
 and the U
nited States
Features of selected interbank funds transfer systems (2002, cont.)
No. of transactions (thousands) Value of transactions (€/$ billions) Ratio of transactions value to GDP
2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002
ELLIPS (BE)* 1840 1730 14313 € 13339 € 56,3 51,2
Clearing House (BE) 3528 1740 78 $ 97 $ 0,4 0,3
CEC (BE) 919044 985394 448 $ 502 $ 2 2
Kronos (DK)* 106 109 1431 € 1931 € 8 10,5
Retail Clearing (DK) 851813 908498 546 € 556 € 3,1 3
ELS (GE)* 19031 nap 49292 nap 23,8 nap
RPS (GE) 2197487 2156752 1971 $ 1991 $ 1,1 1
RTGSplus (GE)* 4829 31893 17392 $ 117621 $ 9,4 59,2
ELS (GE) 19031 nap 44109 $ nap 23,8 nap
EAF (GE) 11041 nap 31343 $ nap 16,9 nap
HERMES (GR)* 1058 1210 2410 € 2683 € 18,4 19
DIAS (GR) 29178 14546 67 € 70 € 0,5 0,5
ACO (GR) 5197 4477 196 € 187 € 1,5 1,3
SLBE (ES)* 2671 3086 53228 € 63444 € 81,7 91,4
SPI (ES) 1365 1776 360 € 303 € 0,6 0,4
SNCE (ES) 982283 1059621 1727 € 1423 € 2 2,1
TBF (FR)* 3801 3825 87573 € 90877 € 59,3 59,8
CH Paris (FR) 677765 93303 683 $ 173 $ 0,5 0,1
CH Province (FR) 2469057 53640 883 $ 22 $ 0,7 neg
SIT (FR) 7131087 11043476 2187 $ 4187 $ 1,7 2,9
CREIC (FR) 270165 4316 21 $ neg neg neg
PNS (FR)* 8004 7571 19977 $ 18820 $ 15,3 13,3
IRIS (IE)* 543 582 4535 € 4886 € 39,6 38,1
Retail Clearings (IE) 176056 149089 311 € 245 € 2,7 1,9
BI-REL (IT)* 10247 9612 24291 $ 23706 $ 22,2 20
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No. of transactions (thousands) Value of transactions (€/$ billions) Ratio of transactions value to GDP
2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002
Local Clearing (IT) 105360 102698 641 $ 685 $ 0,6 0,6
Retail (IT) 1296828 1630549 1551 $ 1763 $ 1,4 1,5
LIPS-Gross (LU)* 290 350 4436 € 4428 € 200,7 198,6
LIPS-Net (LU) 13100 13700 48 € 48 € 2,2 2,2
Interpay (NL) 2558284 2812350 1410 $ 1582 $ 3,7 3,8
TOP (NL)* 4023 4548 18530 $ 19670 $ 48,2 46,9
ARTIS (AT)* 1869 2620 4981 € 4810 € 23,5 22,2
SPGT (PT)* 546 892 2209 € 2325 € 17,9 18
SICOI (PT) 1100700 1188362 361 € 308 € 2,9 2,4
SLOD (PT) 19 29 57 € 49 € 0,5 0,4
BoF-RTGS (FI)* 300 260 3582 € 3260 € 26,5 23,3
PMJ (FI) 371200 432000 146 € 168 € 1,1 1,2
POPS (FI) 700 661 415 € 392 € 3,1 2,8
K-Rix (SE) 655 1100 10962 $ 11731 $ 52,3 48,7
E-RIX (SE) 70 100 1265 $ 1305 $ 6 5,4
Bankgirot (SE) 345200 363000 376 $ 416 $ 1,8 1,7
Dataclearing (SE) 66910 73000 107 $ 124 $ 0,5 0,5
Postgirot (SE) 540000 404000 367 $ 345 $ 1,8 1,4
CHAPS Sterling (UK) 23962 25600 85083 € 82532 € 53,3 49,7
BACS (UK) 3527340 3735000 3483 € 3788 € 2,2 2,3
Cheque/credit Clearings (UK) 1940000 1817000 2315 € 2300 € 1,4 1,4
CHAPS Euro (UK)* 2600 3700 26848 $ 28233 $ 18,8 18
EURO 1 (EU) 28633 34401 52034 € 47996 € 5,9 5,2
TARGET (EU) 53664 64519 368469 $ 372927 $ nap nap
Fedwire (US) 112500 115000 423867 $ 405762 $ 42 38,8
CHIPS (US) 60400 63300 311707 $ 315709 $ 30,9 30,2
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Table A-14: Features of selected securities settlement systems (1995, 1999, 2002)
1995 1999 2002
UK UK UK US US GE UK UK UK US US GE UK UK US US GE
Name of the system CGO CMO CREST DTC Fedwire DKV CGO CMO CREST Fedwire DTC CSB AG CREST CMO NBES DTC CBF
Type of securities G, O O G, E, O E, O G G, E, O G, O O G, E, O G E, O G, E, O G, B,S, O G, C, O G, O
S, O,
B, C
G, E,
B, O
Owner/manager CB/SE B, SE, O B, SE, O B, SE, O CB SE CB/SE B, SE, O B, SE, O CB B, SE, O B, SE, O B, CB,SE, O B, CB, O CB B, SE, O SE
Number of participants 378 60 22949 527 9936 397 378 60 22949 9936 527 322 52881 58 1793 474 437
… of which direct 378 60 22949 527 9936 395 378 60 22949 9936 527 4322 nap nap 1793 474 437
Settlement of cash leg N N N N G N/G N N N G N N/G RTGS nap RTGS N RTGS, N
Securities settlement
(delivery) G G G G G G G G G G G G RTGS RTGS RTGS G RTGS, G
Delivery lag (T+n) T, T+1 T T+1, T+5 T+3 T T+0-40 T, T+1 T T+1, T+5 T T+3 T+0-40 T+3 T T, T+1 T, T+3 T+0-T+40
DVP mechanism DVP1 DVP2 DVP1 DVP2 DVP1,DVP2/3
Intraday finality Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Central securities
depository CB CB n.a. DTC CB DKV CB CB n.a. CB DTC CSB AG nap CMO CB DTC CBF
Cash settlement agent CB B, CB B, CB DTC CB CB CB B, CB B, CB CB DTC CB B, CB,SE, O CB CB CB CB
No. of transactions
(thousand) 2062 334 43237 18900 13400 23400 2062 334 43237 13400 18900 73158 75700 100 17400 224300 67282
Value of transactions
($ billions) 55634 3782 15328 94000 179500 8286 55634 3782 15328 179500 94000 15348 77,361 2566 228900 10400 nav
Ratio of transactions
value to GDP 37,2 2,6 10,6 10,1 19,3 3,4 37,2 2,6 10,6 19,3 10,1 7,3 49,3 1,6 21,9 10 nav
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Table A-15: Direct participants (2002)
… in CPSS real-time gross settlement systems
…in  other CPSS
large value-payment systems
… in CPSS retail
interbank funds transfer systems
UK UK US EU GE UK US US GE EU UK UK US GE
Name of system CHAPSSterling
CHAPS
Euro Fedwire TARGET
RTGS
plus nap Fedwire CHIPS nap EURO1 BACS
Cheque/
credit nav RPS
Direct participants 13 20 7899 1519 75  7889 51 74 14 12  2188
Credit institutions  7899 1424 74  7889 nav 74 13 11  2187
Central bank 12 19 1 15 1  1 nav 0 1 1  1
Non-banks 1 1 nav 80 0  nav nav nap 0 0  0
of which: 0 0      
… public authorities  5 0   0 0  0
… postal administration 0 0 2 0   0 0  0
… supervised financial institutions 0 0  65 0     0 0  0
Direct participants (2002)
… in EU RTGS systems
… in EU large
value-payment systems … in EU retail IFTS
UK UK Germany EU UK UK Germany
Name of system CHAPS Sterling CHAPS Euro RTGS plus EURO 1 BACS Cheque/credit RPS
Direct participants 13 20 75 74 14 12 2188
Credit institutions  74 74 13 11 2187
Central bank 12 19 1 0 1 1 1
Non-banks 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
of which: 0 0   
… public authorities  0 0 0 0 0
… postal administration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
… supervised financial institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Regulation
Table A-16: Access criteria
… of CPSS real-time
gross settlement systems … of EU RTGS systems
… of other CPSS
large-value payment systems
… of other EU large-
value payment systems
UK US GE UK GE UK US EU GE EU
Name of the System CHAPS Fedwire RTGS plus CHAPS RTGS plus nap CHIPS EURO1 nap EURO1
Access criteria Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Written rules Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Minimum level of data or ratios
representative of financial strengh No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Minimum number of transactions No No No No No No No No
Payment of an entry fee Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Approval from the owner/manager
or the direct participant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Approval from local central bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Technical requirements Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Removal rules Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A-17: Risk control measures
… in other CPSS
large-value payment systems
… in the EU
large value NSSs
UK GE US EU
Name of System nap nap CHIPS EURO1 EURO1
A. Settlement in central banks´accounts  Yes Yes Yes
B. Same day settlement  Yes Yes Yes
C. Compliance with Lamfalussy standards  Yes Yes Yes
I. Legal framework:    
… contractual (+) or advisory (-) netting  Yes Yes nap
… if contractual: legally enforceable or not  Yes Yes nap
II. Participants’ awareness  Yes Yes Yes
III. Risk management    
… monitoring of intraday balance  Yes Yes Yes
… multilateral limits  No Yes Yes
… collateral requirements  No Yes Yes
… intraday closure  No No  
IV. Timely settlement completion    
… risk-sharing agreements  No Yes Yes
… collateralisation of largest net debit position  No Yes Yes
IX. Fair open access  Yes Yes Yes
VII. Technical reliability  Yes Yes Yes
VIII. Practicability and efficiency   Yes
X. Governance arrangements   Yes
VI. Secure settlement assets    Yes

7 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
ATM........................ Automated Teller Machine
BIC .......................... Bank Identifier Code
BIS........................... Bank for International Settlement
CB ........................... Central Bank
CHAPS .................... Clearing House Automated Payment system
CLS.......................... Continuous Linked Settlement
CNS ......................... Continuous Net Settlement
CPSS........................ Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
CSI........................... Clearing and Settlement Institution
DNS......................... Deferred Net Settlement
DVP......................... Delivery Versus Payment
EBA......................... European Banking Association
ECB ......................... European Central Bank
EPC ......................... European Payments Council
EU ........................... European Union
Fed........................... Federal Reserve Bank
FSAP ....................... Financial Services Action Plan
G-10......................... Group of Ten
GAME ..................... Generally Accepted Medium of Exchange
IBAN ....................... International Bank Account Number
ICT .......................... Information and Communication Technology
LLR ......................... Lender of Last Resort
LVPS ....................... Large Value Payment System
MRR........................ Minimum Reserve Requirements
NACH...................... National Automated Clearing House
NLF ......................... New Legal Framework
OMO........................ Open Market Operation
PEACH.................... Pan-European Automated Clearing House
PEDD ...................... Pan-European Direct Debit Instrument
PRC ......................... Payments Risk Committee
PSR policy............... Federal Reserve Policy on Payments System Risk
PVP ......................... Payment Versus Payment
RTGS....................... Real Time Gross Settlement
SEPA ....................... Single Euro Payment Area
STP.......................... Straight Through Processing
SVPS ....................... Small Value Payment System
TARGET ................. Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement
Express Transfer
UK ........................... United Kingdom
US (USA) ................ United States of America
